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I

VS.

f

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,
DefendantIRespondent.

)
)

1
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Steven M. Parry
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #2153
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
)
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
j
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO,
1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )
)
Plaintiff,
1

1

-vsCANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.

case NO.

cY -@ d -d 3 a

COMPLAINT

)
)
)

1

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action colnplains and
alleges as follows:

COMI'LAINT - 1

I.
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is the
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff.
11.
That the Defendant, Lazy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the subject property by
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership.
111.
That the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of
government of the State of Idaho, and as such is lawfully empowered to lay out, build, construct,
improve, alter, extend, and maintain state highways at any place within the State of Idaho, and
has the power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts,
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, and it
is the duty of the Plaintiff, among other things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a
system of state highways within the State of Idaho; that Charles L. Winder, Bruce Sweeney,
Gary Blick, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the
duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportation Board of the State of Idaho.
IV.
That the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way
for laying out, building, constructing, improving, altering, relocating, and extending one of the
state highways of the State of Idaho; that said highway is a part and link of the established
highway system of the State of Idaho known as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1,
Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used
for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary

COMPLArNT - 2

for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary
for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state
designated public highway, and the use thereof by the public will be a public use; that the land
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of
such highway for such public use, and the taking of the said land is necessary for such use.

v.
That the location and survey of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manner as will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

VI.
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commencement of this action,
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of land so sought to be
taken by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and
across the same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their
property by the taking thereof for said right-of-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make
any bargain therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to make any settlement for the
damage to the property of said Defendants.
VII.
That for the reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing,
improving, altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the
hereinafter described property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemn any and all
rights to the hereinafter described property designated as Parcel No. 41 in fec simple absolute, a
permanent easement in Parcel No. 41 and obtain a temporary easement as to Parcel No. 41.

That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown
upon the official plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage 1, Project No. DHP-NH-F2390(104), Highway Survey on file in the office of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County,
located in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as follows:
That real property described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
That the property herein sought to be condemned is a part of a larger parcel of land.
That access is to be limited to that shown on Exhibit "B.

IX.
That the general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be
condemned herein is US-93, as is shown upon the official plat in the Idaho Transportation
Department of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No.
DHP-NB-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit

"B,and by this

reference made a part hereof.

IIX.
That the termini of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described
is sought to be condemned is Station 8231.1 1.091 to Station 825-f-68216 of the aforesaid US-93
Twin Falls Alternate Route, Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), Highway Suivey.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
That the rights to the property hereinabove described a.s Parcel No. 41 be condemned in
fee simple absolute, to obtain a permanent easement in Parcel 41 and obtain a temporary
easement as to Parcel No. 41.

COMPLAINT - 4

That the damages accruing to the Defendants by reason of the condemnation of the real
property described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and fkther orders,
judgment, and relief as to the Court may appear just and equitable in the premises.
day of December, 2004.

DATED this

/steven
M. Parry
Deputy Attorney General
State of Idaho

1

County of Ada

1

: SS.

Steven M. Parry, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
I am one of the attorneys for the above-named Plaintiff, and I make this verification for
and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of Idaho. I further say that I have
read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents thereof and that the allegations of
fact therein contained are true as I verily believe.

4

Steven M. Parry
Deputy Attorney General

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .
:l.i:day of December, 2004.

; '
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to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH2390(104) filed for record in the office of the
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument
No.2004-017039:
Being a portion of the N E V & (Government Lot 3) of
Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East of Boise
Meridian, Idaho,
PE-NT

EASEMENT

Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH-F2390(104) filed for record in the office of the
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument
No.2004-017039:
Being a portion of the NEt(Government Lot 3)of Section 4, Township 10
South, Range 17 East, Boise Meridian.
For the purpose of a slope easement.
TEMPORARY EASEMENT

Ltemporary easement to go upon, occupy, and use a
strip of land in a portion of the ( N E V W Gov. Lot
3)of Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East,
Boise Meridian, Twin Falls County, Idaho; on the
southerly (Right) side of the above described parcel
of land (Parcel No.41 /Parcel Id.No.0041481) and being
68 meters (approximately 223 feet) wide lying between
Stations 825100 Right to 825+20 Right and from 825+35
Right to 825+55 Right of the Pole Line Road Survey as
shown on the plans of said Highway Survey DHP-NH-F2390(104), for the purpose of construction, together
with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to
and from said property for said purpose.
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DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washingloll Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428

Attorneys for Defendants
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIFTIH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

01; THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

1
'THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOI-IN MCHUGIH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
1
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
IDAI-I0 TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCII,
MC.

CASE NO. CV 04-6336

TRIAL

1
1
1
1
)
)

Defendants.
COME NOW the Defendants, Cnyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J.
Ranch, by and through its attorneys of record, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, and hereby
answer Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as follows:
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1

5-4

ORIGINAL
,

6

.i.

I.
Defendants admit the allegations set forth in Paragraphs I, 11,111, VI, VII and VIII of
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint.
11.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny paragraph IV, but
affirmatively allege that the taking is for general highway purposes.
111.
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny paragraphs IX and X and
therefore deny the same.
IV .
It has been necessary for the Defendants to employ attorneys to represent them in this
action and Defendants have agreed to pay their attorneys a reasonable fee for their services in
defending the action brought against it by the State of Idaho. Plaintiff should be required to pay
all of Defendants' attorneys fees in this matter.

v.
Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint not
specifically admitted herein.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Defendants' property is being condemned for
general highway purposes, and that Defendants are entitled to recover its damages once and for
all time, based on the most injurious use by the Idaho Transportation Department of the property
sought to be condemned which is reasonably possible.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

-

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 2

In the alternative, Defendants affirmatively allege that its property is being condemned
for the specific project depicted in the project plans which is referenced in the Amended
Complaint, and that any changes in the use of the property taken and/or any changes in the
project which give rise to additional damages to Defendants' remaining property will entitle
Defendants or its successors to additional compensation.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants affirmatively allege that a permanent and temporary easement are sought to
be take11 by Plaintiff and are limited to the specific uses described in Exhibit A to the Amended
Complaint. Any additional uses of the easement areas will entitle Defendants to additional
compensation.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants are informed and believe, and based upon that information and belief
affirmatively allege, that portions of the prescriptive right of way are no longer being used for
their historic use and Defendants are entitled to additional just compeiisatioii for those portions
of its property which lie within a prescriptive right of way and which are not being used for their
historic use.
WHEREFOI-,

Defendants respectfully request that the Court determine the amount of

just compensation due the Defendants by reason of the condemnation of the subject property, and
enter judgment against the Plaintiff for the fair market value of Defendants' propcrty and
property rights taken and the severance damages to the remainder of Defendants' real property,
together with Defendants' costs, attorncys' fees and such other and further relief as to the Court
may seem just and reasonable.
DEFENDANTS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL ON ALL ISSUES OF FACT PRESENTED
HEREM. DEFENDANTS WILL NOT STIPULATE TO A JURY OF LESS THAN TWELVE.
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TIUAL - 3

DATED this 6'" day of October, 2005.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX

Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the GIh day of October, 2005, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following:
Steven M. Parry
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4

d ~ . ~ . MAIL
-Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
___ Overnight Mail

7#/2005

19 31 FAX 2 0 8 3 4 2 3 1 5 8

DAVKSON & COPPLE

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 1.1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone. (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #58 17
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF T W N FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
)
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO,
)
IDAHO TRANSPORTATLON BOARD, )

Plainti@,

1
1
)

-vs-

1

CANYON VISTA FAMJLY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
MC.,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

CV-04-6336

STIPULATION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

1T IS HEREBY STPULATED AND AGREED between the parties:
That the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, is engaged in the constraction of a highway project

designated as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1, Project no. DHP-NH-F-2390(104) in

S'TLPULATION TO AMEND COMPLAm'T - I

10/26/2005

19 3 1 FAX 208 3 4 2 3 1 5 8

D A V l S O N & COPPLE

Twin Falls County, Idaho
That the Defendants have previously stipulated to possession of the property to be taken
by the State of Idaho as part of that project, and, pursuant to Court Order, the State has entered
into possession of said property
That following modification to the project plans, the Plaintiff and Defendants entered into
negotiations regarding the amended project plans, and that the Defendants have stipulated to
possession of the property as reflected on those amended plans. The changes include increasing

the width of an access point and taking the bike path atea in fee, rather than the taking of a

That the State has made certain changes in the project that are not reflected in the rightolr-way legal description originally filed as "Exhibit A" and the right-of-way plans origulally
filed as "Exhibit B"with the Complaint in this matter.
NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto do hereby stipulate and agree that:

The Plaintiff, State of Idaho, may amend their Complaint and the right-of-way legal
description and the right-of-way plans by filing a new Complaint with new exhibits reflecting the
above-stated chanees.

-

DATED tiis

a

%?3
day of

2005

Attorney for PI

STIPULATIONTO h V E N D COMPLAINT - 2

9

E DON COPPLE - ISB K 1085
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428

Attorneys for Defendants
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

1
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
)
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV 04-6336

NOTICE OF SERVICE

1
1

j
)
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
)
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, )
INC.
1
Ys.

Defendants.

NOTICE IS I-IEREBY GIVEN that on the 28Ihday of October, 2005, a true and correct
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1

ORIGINAL,;

copy of the Defendants' Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, was served upon the
following:
Joseph D. Mallett
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 1 1 West State Street
PO Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

US Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

DATED this 28Ih day of October, 2005.

By:
Attorneys for Defendants

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #5817
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
1
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO,
1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )

Case No. (3-04-6336

)

Plaintiff,

1

)

1

-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

)

Defendants.

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action complains and
alleges as follows:

FlRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - I

I.
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSI-IIP is the
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff.
11.
That the Defendant, L,azy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the sub,ject property by
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Fanlily Liinited Partnership.
111.
That the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of
government of the State of Idaho, and as such is lawfully empowered to lay out, build, construct,
improve, alter, extend, and ~naiiltaillstate higllways at any place within the State of Idaho, and
has tlie power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts,
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, conde~nnationor otherwise, and it
is tile duty of tlie Plaintiff, a~noilgother things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a
systein of state highways within the State of Idaho; that Charles L. Winder, Bruce Sweeney,
Gary Blick, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the
duly ap?l,pointedand qualified acting Idaho Transpoitation Board of the State of Idaho.
IV.
'Tllal the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way
o r laying out, building, constructiiig, improving, altering, relocating, aud extending one of the
state higlivi,ays of the State of Idaho; that said higliway is a part and li11k of the established
highway system of the State of Idaho known as lJS-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1,
Pro,jecl No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used
for travel by the general public; that the l~ighwayto be constructed upon said land is necessary

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2

[or the safcty, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state
designated public highway, and the use thereof by thc public will be a public use; that the Iand
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of
such highway for s~icllpublic use, and the taking of the said land is necessary for such use.

V.
That the location and survcy of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manncr as will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

VI.
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commence~nentof this action,
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of land so sought to be
talten by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and
across the same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their
p~opcrtyby the taking thereof for said right-of-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make
any bargain therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to inaite any settlement for the
damage to the property of said Defendants.

VII.
Thai for the reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing,
i~nproving,altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the
l~ereinalierdescribed property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemil any and all
rights to the llereinafter described property designated as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 in fee simple
absolute, obtaiu a permanent easeinent as to Parcel No. 41, and obtain a temporary easement as
to I'arcel No. 41.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3

VIII.
That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown
up011 tlle o'ficial plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage I, Project No. DIiP-NIi-F2390(104), I-Iighway Survey on file in the office of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County,
locatcd in 'Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as hllows:
'Thai real property described in Exhibits "A" and "A-I" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.

Thai the property herein sought to be coildeiniled is a part of a larger parcel of land.
That access is to be limited lo that show11 on Exhibit "B".
IX.
That the general route of the highway for which thc right-of-way is sought to be
condelnned herein is US-93, as is shown upon the official plat in the Idaho Transportation
Departinen1 of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No.
DKP-NH-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B", and by this
reference illade a part hereof.
X.
Tllat the termini of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described
is sought to be coildeinned is Station 823+11.091 to Station 825+68216 of the aforesaid US-93
Twiis Falls Alternate Route, Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), Highway Survey.
WEEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgrnei~tas follows:
That the rights to the property hereinabove described as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 be
condei~lnedin fee. simple absolute, to obtain a perlnailent easement as to Parcel 41, and obtain a
teiuporary case~nentas to Parcel No. 41.
That the dairiages accruillg to the Defeildallts by reason of the co~ide~nnation
of the real

FIRST' AMI:NDED COMPLAINT - 4

properly described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and further orders,
judgment, and relief as to the Court nlay appear just and equitable in the premises.
DATED this &7-4ay

of October, 2005.

fij-4

q@J&Q'h
Josep D. M et
Deputy Attorney General

State of Idaho

)

Couuty of Ada

1

: SS

Loren D. Thomas, being first d ~ d ysworn upon oath, deposes and says:

I am the Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) for the above-named Plaintiff,
and I malte this verification for and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of
Iclallo. I further say that I have read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents
thereof and that the allegatioils of fact therein contained are true as I verily believe.

LOREN D. THOMAS
Acting Assistant Chief Eligineer (Development)
Idaho Transportation Department

&

AND SWORN to before ille tliis -21 day

,2005.

+-

Residing at
fl0i S c
My Colninission Expires:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 5

, Idaho

EXHIBIT "A"
REQUIREMENT

Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH2390(104) filed for record in the office of the
Countx Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on
the 9' day of August, 2004 under Instrument No.
2004-017039: Being a portion of the NEY4NW1h
(Government Lot 3 ) of Section 4, Township 10
South, Range 17 East of Boise Meridian, Idaho.
Also including that property described in Exhibit
"A-1" as Parcel No. 41-1.
PERMANENT EASEMENT

Parcel No. 41, Parcel I .D. No. 0041481, according
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH-F2390(104) filed for record in the office of the
Countl;:Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on
the 9' day of August, 2004 under Instrument No.
2004-017039: Being a portion of the NEY4NW1h
(Government Lot 3) of Section 4, Township 10
South, Range 17 East, Boise Meridian.
For the purpose of a slope easement.
Excepting out that property described in Exhibit
"A-1" as Parcel No. 41-1.
TEMPORARY EASEMXNT

A temporary easement to go upon, occupy, and use a
strip of land in a portion of the (NEY4Nwlh GOV. Lot
3) of Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East,
Boise Meridian, Twin Falls County, Idaho; on the
southerly (Right) side of the above described parcel
of land (Parcel No. 41 / Parcel Id. No. 0041481) and
being 68 meters (approximately 223 feet) wide lying
between Stations 825+00 Right to 825+20 Right and
from 825+35 Right to 825+55 Right of the Pole Line
Road Survey as shown on the plans of said Highway
Survey DHP-NH-F-2390(104), for the purpose of
construction, together with the right and privilege
of ingress and egress to and from said property for
said purpose.
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #5817
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
1
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
)
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO,
1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, j
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-04-6336

)

1
j

-vsCA3!YON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,
Defendants.

1
1

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

)
)
j

1
1

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action complains and
alleges as follows:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1

1.
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is the
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff.
11.

That the Defendant, Lazy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the subject property by
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership.
111.
That the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of
empowered to lay out, build, construct,
government ofthe State of Idaho, and as such is lawf~~lly
improve, alter, extend, and maintain state highways at any place within the State of Idaho, and
has the power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts,
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, and it
is the duty of the Plaintiff, among other things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a
systenl of state higl~wayswithin the State of Idaho; that Charles L. Winder, Bruce Sweeney,
Gary Bliclt, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the
duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportati~nBoard of the State of Idaho.
IV.
That the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way
for laying out, building, constructing, improving, altering, relocating, and extending one of the
state l~ighwaysof the State of Idaho; that said highway is a part and link of the established
highway system of the State of Idaho ltnown as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1,
Project No. DHP-NH-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used
for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2

for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state
designated public highway, and the use thereof by the public will be a public use; that the land
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of
such highway for such public use, and the taking ofthe said land is necessary for such use.

v.
That the location and survey of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manner as will be most
conlpatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

VI.
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commence~nentof this action,
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of land so sought to be
taken by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and
across tile same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their
property by the taking thereof for said right-of-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make
any bargain therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to make any settlement for the
damage to the property of said Defendants.

VII.
That for the reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing,
inlproving, altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the
hereinafter described property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemn any and all
rights to the hereinafter described property designated as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 in fee simple
absolute, obtain a permanent easement as to Parcel No. 41, and obtain a temporary easement as
to Parcel No. 4 1.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3

VIII.
That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown
upon the official plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage 1, Project No. DNP-NH-F2390(104), Highway Survey on file in the uffice of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County,
located in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as follows:
That real property described in Exhibits "A" and "A-1'' attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
That the property herein sought to be condemned is a part of a larger parcel of land.
That access is to bc limited to that shown on Exhibit "B".

IX.
That the general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be
condenined herein is US-93, as is shown upon the offrcial plat in the Idaho Transportation
Departnlent of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No.
DI-IP-NW-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit " B and by this
reference made a part hereof.

?ha1 the teriniili of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described
is sought to be condelnned is Station 823+11.091 to Station 8251-68216 of the aforesaid US-93
Twill Falls Alternate Routc, Project No. DHP-NI-I-F-2390(104), Highway Survey.
WHEREFORF,, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:

That the rights to the property hereinabove described as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 be
condeinned in fee simple absolute, to obtain a permanent easement as to Parcel 41, and obtain a
temporary easement as to Parcel No. 41.
Thai the damages accruing to the Defendants by reason of the condemnation of the real
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property described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and further orders,
judgment, and relief as to the Court may appear just and equitable in the premises.
DATED this a % a y of October, 2005.

Deputy Attorney General
State of Idaho

1
: SS.

County of Ada

)

Lore11 D. Thomas, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

I an1 the Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) for the above-named Plaintiff,
and I make this verification for and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of
Idaho. I further say that I have read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents
thereof and that the allegations of fact therein contained are true as I verily believe.

LOREN D. THOMAS
Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development)
Idaho Transportation Department
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -day of

(SEAL)
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NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho
Residing at
My Commission Expires:

,2005.

, Idaho

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #5817
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
1
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
1
1
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO,
)
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )
Plaintiff,

1
)

1
)

-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,

Case No. CV-04-6336

FIRST AME?DED COMPLAINT

1
)
)
)

1
Defendants.

1

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, and for a cause of action complains and
alleges as follows:

FJRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - I

I.
That the Defendant, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is the
record owner in fee of the land sought to be condemned by Plaintiff.
11.
That the Defendant, Lazy J. Ranch Inc., may have an interest in the subject property by
reason of a lease agreement between it and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership.
111.
'I'llat the Idaho Transportation Department is a civil administrative department of
goverllluent of the State of Idaho, and as such is lawfully empowered to lay out, build, construct,
improve, alter, extend, and maintain state highways at any place within the State of Idaho, and
has the power and duty to acquire the necessary land and property for rights-of-way, turnouts,
fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, and it
is the duty oE the Plaintiff, among other things, to establish, construct, improve and maintain a
system of state highways within the State of Idaho; that Charles L.. Winder, Bruce Sweeney,
Gary Bliclc, John McHugh, Monte C. McClure, Neil Miller, and John X. Combo now are the
duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportation Board of the State of Idaho.

IV .
That the tract or strip of land so sought to be condemned is to be used for a right-of-way
for laying out, building, constructing, improving, altering, relocating, and extending one of the
state highways of the State of Idaho; that said highway is a part and link of the established
highway system of the State of Idaho known as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1,
Project No. DHP-NM-F-2390(104), in Twin Falls County, Idaho; that said highway is to be used
for travel by the general public; that the highway to be constructed upon said land is necessary
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for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public; that the same will be a state
designated public highway, and the use thereof by the public will be a public use; that the land
sought to be condemned herein is required for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of
such highway for such public use, and the taking of the said land is necessary for such use.

v.
That the location and survey of said highway, as hereinafter described, was made by and
under the direction of the Plaintiff herein, and the same is located in such manner as will be most
conjpatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

VI.
That the Plaintiff herein by its proper officers, prior to the commencement of this action,
sought in good faith to purchase from said Defendants said strip or tract of land so sought to be
taken by the Plaintiff for the right-of-way of such state highway to be constructed on, over, and
across the same, and to settle with the Defendants for the damages which might result to their
property by the taking thereof for said right-or-way, and that the Plaintiff was unable to make
any bal.gaii1 therefor, or to make any settlement therefor, or to make any settlement for the
damage to the property of said Defendants.

VII.
That for thc reasons aforesaid and for the purpose of laying out, building, constructing,
improving, altering, extending, and maintaining the said state highway on and across the
hereinafter described property, it is necessary for the Plaintiff herein to condemn any and all
rights to the llereinafter described property designated as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 in fee simple
absolute, obtain a perrnanent easement as to Parcel No. 41, and obtain a temporary casement as
to Parcel No. 41.
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VIII.
That the property sought herein to be condemned is now surveyed, located and shown
upon the official plat of US-93, Twin Falls alternate Route, Stage 1, Project No. DHP-NH-F2390(104), Highway Survey on file in the office of the County Recorder of Twin Falls County,
Iocatcd in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, and is described as follows:
That real property described in Exhibits "A" and "A-1" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
That the property herein sought to be condemned is a part of a larger parcel of land.
That access is to be limited to that shown on Exhibit "B".

IX .
That the general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be
condeillned herein is US-93, as is shown upon the official plat in the Idaho Transportation
Department of the State of Idaho, as US-93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, State 1, Project No.
DHP-NH-F-2390(104), a copy of which plat is attached hereto marked Exhibit " B , and by this
reference made a part hereof.

X.
Tha? the termliii of the centerline of the highway for which the property herein described
is sought to be condemned is Station 823+11.091 to Station 8251-68216 of the aforesaid US-93
Twin Falls Alternate Route, Project No. DI-IP-NH-F-2390(104), Highway Survey.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
That the rights to the property hereinabove described as Parcel Nos. 41 and 41-1 be
coildemiied in fee simple absolute, to obtain a pernlanent easement as to Parcel 41, and obtain a
temporary easement as to Parcel No. 41.
That the damages accruing to the Defe'endants by reason of the condemnation of the real
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property described in this Complaint be assessed; that the rights of the parties hereto be fully
determined; that a final order of condemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be
entered herein as provided by law; and that the Plaintiff have such other and further orders,
judgment, and relief as to the Courtmay appear just and equitable in the premises.
DATED this a % a y of October, 2005,

~ e ~Attorney
u t ~General
State of Idaho

1

County of Ada

1

: SS.

Loren D. Thomas, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
I all1 the Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development) for the above-named Plaintiff,
and I make this verification for and on behalf of said Plaintiff, a political body of the State of
Idaho. I further say that I have read the above and foregoing Complaint, know the contents
thereof and that the allegations of fact therein contained are true as I verily believe.

LOREN D. THOMAS
Acting Assistant Chief Engineer (Development)
Idaho Transportation Department
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of

(SEAL)
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NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho
Residing at
My Colninission Expires:

,2005.

, Idaho

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL.
JOSEPH D. MALLET
KARL D. VOGT
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #5817
ISB #5015
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
DARRELL V. MANNING, R. JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C.
McCLURE, GARY BLICIC, NEIL MILLER
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
-VS-

1
)
)

Case No. CV-04-6336

1
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE
TESTIMONY OF ROGER DUNLAP

1
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
Defendaiits.
Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D.

Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby submits this Memorandurn in
support of its motion seeking to exclude certain evidence that is not admissible in a
condernilation action.

- 1-

,'
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1.
INTRODUCTION
This is an eminent domain case. The Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter, "ITD") has
essentially talcen a "strip talte" fiom Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and
Lazy J. Ranch (hereinafter, "Defendants") in conjunclion with phase one of the US 93 Twin
Falls Alternate Route Project (hereinafter, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93
west on Pole Line Road, bypassing the core of the City of Twin Falls.
The Defendants have disclosed the opinions of Roger Dunlap, an expert valuation
witness. Because Mr. Dunlap arrived at his conclusion of just compensation by employing a
valuation method that is not allowed in Idaho, ITD has filed a motion to strike Mr. Dunlap's
opinions and testimony.
11.
LEGAL STANDARD

The legal standard for a motion in liinine was set forth in Suiz Valley Potato Growers,
Iizc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,86 P.3d 475, (2004):

Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on inotions in 1imine. Appel v.
LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 135, 15 P.3d 1141, 1143 (2000). A trial court's motion in
li~nineruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion sta~ldard.Leavitt, 133 Idaho
at 631, 991 P.2d at 356. This standard requires a three-pronged inquiry to
determine whether the district courl (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Leavitt, 133 Idaho at 63 1, 991 P.2d
at 356; Sun Valley Shopping Cti*.,Iizc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Absent a clear showing of abuse, a district court's exercise
of discretion will not be overturned. Appel, 135 Ida110 at 135, 15 P.3d at 1143.
SZLIZ
Valley Potato G r o ~ ~ e rInc.
s , v. Texas Rejrzery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767-8, 86 P.3d 475,
481-2 (2004)

Discussing the favorable policy behind using a lnotion in lirnine, the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated:
PLAINTFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF
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It enables a judge to rule on evidence without first exposing it to the jury. It
avoids juror bias occasioiially generated by objectio~isto evidence during trial.
The court's ruling on the motion enables cou~iselon both sides to make strategic
decisions before trial concerning the content and order of evidence to be
presented. (Citations omitted).

Davidsoiz v. Reco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 733 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1986) (Overruled on other
grounds)

III.
ARGUMENT
The Defendants have disclosed Roger L. Dunlap as an expert valuation witness iii this
case to offer ail opinion of just compensatio~lat trial. At the April 11, 2007 deposition of Mr
Dunlap, it becane apparent to ITD that Mr. Dunlap arrived at his co~lclusionof just
co~npensationby e~nployinga valuation neth hod that is expressly forbidden in Idaho by City oj

Culdwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 P.2d 615 (1968). On that basis, ITD is moving to exclude
Mr. Dunlap's testirnorly and any reference or evidence relating to Mr. Dunlap's opinion.

A. The Ronrli Case Rule.
This motion to exclude principally relies on City ofCaldwel1 v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437
P.2d 615 (1968). The Roarlc case concerns the acquisition of part of a subdivision for an airport
expansion. In that case, the prol~ertyowner's whole parcel contained 80 lots, and Caldwell
coiidernned a portion of that parcel containing 49 lots. At the date of the take, Roark's
subdivision was platted and approved by the city and filed of record. The subdivision streets and
alleys had been laid out, but the comers of the lots were not staked. Gas, electric power, and
sewer were available to the property. Id. at 100,616.
The relevant dispute in the Roai-k case arose when the property owners tried to arrive at
just colnpensation by valuing the larger parcel through aggregating the individual value of the
platted lots. The property owners deteiinined what value the total of the lots would bring if sold
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iildividually to various buyers at various times, and used that value to arrive at just
compensation. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that this was an
iniprol>ervaluation method. The trial courthad instructed the jury that this was not the correct
incthod of determining the fair market value in this case, but rather the value should be

determined "with the whole parcel being sold in its then conditiorr in onc sale." Id. at 101, 617.
The property owner challenged this jury instruction which was ultimately upheld in a
ruling that said "The court correctly instructed the jury that the value should be fixed for the
entire tract as one parcel." Id. The court .further explained the iuie as follows:
This value cannot properly be determined by aggregating the individual sales
value which separate lots may bring when sold to individual prospective home
builders over a period of time in the future, for the reason that such a basis of
valuation would peimit the jury to speculate upon future developments.

Id. at 101-02; 617-18.
The Roark cou1-t also quoted from a Utah case which held, "The valuation must be on the
basis of what a willing purchaser would pay now and not what a number of purchasers might be
induced to pay in the future for the land in slnaller parcels." Id. at 102, 61 8 (quoting Utalz Road

Colizinissio~zv. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917, 920 (Utah 1963). This is consistent with IDJI 7.16 which
reads "Just coinpensation is the difference between the market value of the entire property before
the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition, together with any special
damages caused by the taking measured as of [date]." (IDJI 7.16).

R. Rorer Dunlap's Valuation Method.
In the case at bar, the defense valuation witness, Roger Dunlap, has einployed a method
that violates both the rule and policy Goin the Rourlc case. At his deposition on April 11, 2007,
Mr. Dunlap explained his approach to valuatioil in detail.
ITD has pleaded a taking in fee of 1.8784 acres froin a larger 20.070-acre parcel owned
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF
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by Defendants. See First Amended Co~nplaintat Exhibit "B." Mr. Dunlap assumed the "larger
parcel" in this case was the 20-acre parcel described in the Cotnplaint (See Deposition Transcript
of Roger L. Dunlap, Exhibit "A" to Fourth Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet, at p. 110, LL. 5-

I ])(hereinafter "Duulap Tr.") with the highest and best use of mixed use coin~nercialand office.
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 72, LL. 5-7,' and p. 163, LL. 7-9). Mr. Dunlap says the "larger parcel"
determination is important because "you need to know what you are appraising. Once you come
up with your larger parcel, that is your subject property. And that is what you appraise."
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 110, LL 1-4). Dunlap valued the whole parcel at $5.50 per square foot. He felt
that a purchaser of the whole larger parcel would have had to pay this price for the entire parcel.
(DunlapTr. atp. 161,LL. 2-15, andp. 164,L. 25 top. 165, L. 4).
However, Dunlap did not use this number to determine the value of the land taken.
Instead, Dunlap valued the take at $9.50 per sq. ft., which is what he felt was the value of a
subdivided pad site on the property. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 173, LL 4-9 and p. 174, LL. 10-15). Mr.
Dunlap was very clear that in arriving at his value for the property taken, he calculated the price
for a one-acre pad site fronting on Pole Line Road. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 165, LL. 13-14). In using
the t e ~ m"one-acre pad site," Dunlap referred to an "approximately one-acre site that is suitable
for a user lo develop a building, as well as a parking lot." (Dunlap Tr. at p. 166, LL. 1-4).
Mr. Dunlap explained that he determined that a one acre of undeveloped land, fronting 0x1
Pole Line Road would sell for $9.50 per acre if the owner were to sever off and sell a piece of the
front of that property to a purchaser. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 167, LL. 4-17). Although he admitted
that no one-acre pad sites were platted at the date of the take (Dunlap Tr. at p.168, LL. 10-12),
Dunlap still determined what a purchaser would pay for the non-existent pad site of this size and
assigned that value to the land taken. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168, L. 24 to p. 169, L. 3). Dunlap
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hypothetically assumed a pad site was created, and assigned a value to the hypothetical pad site,
discounting only a "little bit" for the lack of C-1 zoning at the date of the take. (Dwllap Tr, at p.
169, L. 21 to p. 170, L. 2). Accordingly, the cornparables he used to determine value were pad
site comparables for an acre along Pole Line kontage, not the whole larger parcel itself. (Dunlap
Tr. at p. 170, LL. 3-19).
Dunlap clarified at one point that he could have detennined just compensation using what
a purchaser would have paid for the whole parcel, but chose not to do so. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168,
LL. 2-12). While Mr. Dulllap has performed several appraisals on this project and other cases
for the Copple firin, lie does not recall ever having used illis particular approach in Idaho.
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 156, LL. 18-2 1). He also ad~nittedthat this method gives a higher value for the
property owner than the other methods he has previously used ill Idaho. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 160,

LL 18-23). In fact, in this case, Mr. Dunlap's choice to use the different approach increased his
value for the property taken from $5.50 per square foot to $9.50 per square foot.

(Id.).

Comparing the different results, Dunlap's choice of applying this particular valuation method
resulted in a 73% increase in his opinion of the value of the property taken.
C. Dunlap Violated the Xonvk Rule.

In a partial take, the rule from ille Real-/c case requires valuing the land taken by fixing
the value of the entire tract as one parcel. Roark at 101-02,617-18. Real-lc prohibits valuing the
take by determining what a purchaser would pay in the future for the land in slnaller parcels.

(1.). Dunlap explains that when he valued the take, he did not use the value of thc entire tract as
one parcel, but instead delerrnined what a purchaser would pay for a srnaller piece of the
property if it were severed into a'lpad site" and marketed and sold as such. This directly violates
the Roarlc rule. Ronrlc prohibits looking to what a purchaser would pay for a slvaller part of the
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whole property, and yet that is exactly what Dunlap had done.
The stated policy behind Roarlc is that the court wants to avoid speculation as to future
developlneilt of the property. (Id). Dunlap's inethod uses the exact type of speculatio~lthat the
Roarlc case found was improper. Although he felt the property subject to the taking was a 20acre landholding, he valued the take at the value a one-acre pad site would have. Dunlap
admitted that no one-acre pad sites existed at the date of the taking (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168, LL. 1012), and yet he still used the non-existent pad sites to value the take. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 168, L. 24

to p. 169, L. 3). Dunlap's value depends on speculating that a pad-site was possible, and then
arrives at a value of the hypothetically assumed pad site, and uses that value to determine the
value of the take. This violates both the rule and policy of Roarlc.
It is very important to note that the facts of the Roark case concerned the taking of 49 of
80 subdivision lots. In Roarlc, there actually was a platted subdivision with streets and alleys laid
out and utilities stubbed to the site. Even where the lots actually existed, the court found that
speculating on the value the individual lots would bring was improper. If the court required
valuation of the whole parcel in that situation, it is even Inore clear in the case at bar, where no
slnaller subdivided lot exists, that the value of the take must be determined by fixing the value of
the entire parcel.
Two things are clear about Mr. Dunlap's appraisal. First, he violated the rule in the
Roarlc case by valuing the take as if it were a part of a fictitious pad site, not the whole 20 acre
parcel. Secondly, he employed this method to generate higher damages that would be allowed
by a per~nissiblevaluation approach. By valuing the take based on a non-existent pad site, he
adillits that he arrived at a higher damage number for the land taken that he would have if he
cornpared it to the whole parcel. (Dunlap Tr, at p. 160, LL 18-23). At the same time, when
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considering severance damages, he no longer looked at the smaller non-existent pad site, but
changed his analysis to the whole 20-acre parcel. He also admits that the effect of this shift on
his severance damage figure is that it generates higher severance damages than if he stayed with
the s~nallerone-acre pad site he used to damage the take. (Dunlap Tr. at p. 163, LL. 10-18). As
you can see, Mr. Dunlap conveniently switched his valuation reference with the effect of
generating n~uchhigher darnages than if he would have consistently applied a lawful valuation
method.

D. Exclusio~~
of Dunlap is the P r o ~ e rRemedy.
Because Mr. Dunlap violated the Roai.1~rule, ITD is asking for exclusion of his opinions
and testimony as well as any evidence referring to or based on the same. The property owners,
though their legaI counsel, chose to call Mr. Dunlap to value the property using a method that is
not legal in Idaho. They could have asked him to value the property the same way the other four
valuation witnesses in this case have, and the way Mr. Dunlap has valued it every other tiine he
has appraised property in Idaho. Instead, they let Mr. Dunlap appraise the property with an
illegal method that generates higher damage nun~bersthan the correct valuatioil method. In all
fairness, the Defendants cannot complain now when his opinions are excluded.
Additionally, under the scheduling order in this case, the Defendauts cannot have Mr.
Dunlap generate a new opinion using correct methodology. The time to disclose expert opinions
is long past and the trial is too close for ITD to have a fair opportunity to wait for, review, and
prepare a response for any new opinions Mr. Dunlap would create. Further~nore,the addition of
a third valuation witness is culnulative and would be a waste of tinie anyway. If Mr. Dunlap is
excluded, both sides still have two valuation experts to present evidence to the jury. Any Inore
valuation witnesses would be an unnecessary waste of court time.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, ITD respectfully requests that the Court exclude any
teslilnony froin Mr. Dunlap, as well as any reference to or evidence of his opinions in this case.
DATED this

day of May, 2007.

-

J O @ P & ~ .MALLET
~ e b uAttorney
t~
General
Idaho Depart~nentof Transportation

CERTIPlCATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the *day

of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above to be served to:
E Don Copple
Heather Cunningham
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

0u.S. Mail
m a n d Delivered
novemight Mail
n ~ e i e c o p y(Fax) 386-9428
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB ft5817
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF 'THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
D A W L L V. MANNING, R. JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C.
McCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL MILLER
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

1
)
)

Case No. CV-04-6336

1
1
)
)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT O F PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION IN LIMLNE

-vsCANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
Defendants.

1
1
1

Comes now tile Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter "ITD), by and through its counsel
of record, Joseph D. Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and submits this
Memorandum in support of its motion seeking to exclude certain evidence that is not admissib!~
in a condemnation action
Defendants seek to introduce inadmissible evidence to support their basis of just

BRIEF IN SUPPOIU OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE - 1

t'

d

"

(1

compensation. The State requests that the Court exclude Defendants' evidence regarding issues
that are not properly considered in the determination of just compensation in a condemnation
action.

This is an elnillent domain case. The Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter, " I T D ) has
essentially taken a "strip take" from Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and
Lazy J. Ranch (hereinafter, "Defendants") in conjunction with phase one of the US 93 Twin
Falls Alternate Route Project (hereinafter, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93
west on Pole Line Road, bypassing the core of the City of Twin Falls
11.

LEGAL STANDARD
The legal standard for a motion in lilnine was set forth in Sun Valley Potato Growers,

Inc. v. Texas Rejnery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,86 P.3d 475, (2004):
Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on motions in lirnine. Appel v.
LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 135, 15 P.3d 1141, 1143 (2000). A trial court's motion in
limine ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Leavitt, 133 Idaho
at 631, 991 P.2d at 356. TIlis standard requires a three-pronged inquiry to
determine whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Leal&, 133 Idaho at 631, 991 P.2d
at 356; Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Absent a clear showing of abuse, a district court's exercise
of discretion will not be overturned. Appel, 135 Idaho at 135, 15 P.3d at 1143.

Id. at 7678,481-2
Discussing the favorable policy behind using a motion in limine, the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated:
It enables a judge to rule on evidence without first exposing it to the jury. It
avoids juror bias occasiollally generated by objections to evidence during trial.
The court's ruling on the motion enables counsel on both sides to make strategic
decisions before trial concerning the content and order of evidence to be
BRIEF IN SLJPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION n\r LIMINE - 2

presented. (Citations omitted).

Davidson v. Beco Cor.p., 112 Idaho 560, 733 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1986)(Overruled on other
grounds)

111.
EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS THAT RELATE T O THE ORDER OF
CONDEMNATION SHOULD BE EXCLUDED
Based upon multiple deposition questions and discovery propoulided by the Defendants'
counsel in this case, it is apparent to the State that the Defendants' will reference the Order of
Condemnation in this case when discussing the taking of access. However, the Order of
Condemnation is not relevant to the issue of just compensation, and serves no purpose other than
to mislead and prejudice the jury against the State. The State of Idaho, therefore, seeks an order
from the Court excluding any evidence or argument relating to the Order of Condemnation.
The Idaho Rule of Evidence exclude irrelevant evidence, providing:
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or
by other rules applicable in the courts ofthis state. Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible.
I.R.E. 402 (Emphasis Added).
Furthermore, Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 excludes even relevant evidence if it is unfairly
prejudicial or if it is colifusilig or misleading to the jury:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideratiolis of undue delay, waste of time,
or lieedless presentation of culnulative evidence.
I.R.E. 403.
In the case of Ada County h-ighway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idalio 888,26 P.3d 1225 (2001),
Idaho first addressed the issue of whether a civil cornplaint of condemnation supersedes an
administrative order of a colidemliing authority for purposes of determining what property
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interest is being condemned. Sharp dealt with an administrative order of condemnation that
differed from the conlplaint as to the talting of access. The property owner unsuccessfully
argued that the language in the Order of Condemnation suggesting access was taken had a legal
effect on the scope of the talce. In rejecting this argument, the court ruled that the complaint, and
not the order of condemnation, determines the scope of the take. Sharp, 135 Idaho 891,26 P.3d
at 1228.
In this case, the jury's sole task is to decide the issue of just compensation. Because

Sharp ruled the order of condemllation language did not determine the scope of the taking, any
evidence related to the administrative order of condemnation is irrelevant to the scope of the take
and thus irrelevant to just compensation. Although it seems unlikely, even if the Defendants'
can argue another basis of relevance, the Order of Condemnation would be confusing and
unfairly prejudice the jury. To the extent it may differ with the language of the complaint, the
order of condemnation would mislead the jury by suggesting compensation is due for property
rights that have not actually been taken. The Order of Condemnation and any reference to that
administrative document should be excluded.

IV.
EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS THAT SUGGEST A DISPUTE EXISTS AS TO ANY
ISSUE COVERED BY THE STIPULATION OF POSSESSION SHOULD BE
EXCLUDED
Through a Stipulation of Possession, filed on February 2, 2005, the parties agreed that the
requirements of Section 7-721, Idaho Code, had been met, enabling Plaintiff to obtain possession
of the subject property pending trial. The parties specifically stipulated that (a) Plaintiff has the
right of eminent domain; (b) the use to which the subject properly is to be applied is a use
a~rthorizedby law; (c) the taitillg of the subject property is necessary for such use; and (d)
Plaintiff has sought in good faith to purchase the subject property sought to be taken. (See
Stipulation of Possession, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). Thus, the main issue remaining in the
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE - 4
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present case is the amount of just compensation to which Defendants are entitled as a result of
the talting.
Because these matters have been conclusively resolved between tlie parties, any evidence
suggesting a dispute exists as to any issue covered by the Stipulation of Possession should be
excluded from the trial. By definition, to be relevant evidence, the evidence must relate to a fact
of consequence to the determination of the action. (IRE 401). Since these issues have already
been resolved, they no longer are of consequence to the determination of the action and are not
releva~~t.
Furthennore, even if disputed, these issues are not relevant to the jury's assessment of
just compensation. The law is clear that the only issue for submission to the jury is the question

oE the value of the property sought to be taken or the amount of compensation for the talting;
other factual issues are to be resolved by the trial court. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 943,
500 P.2d 841, 844 (1972). Referencing a dispute as to any of these issues would not assist the
jury in determining just compensation but would tend to unfairly confuse and prejudice the jury
against ITD. It should be excluded on this basis.

V.
ANY TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANTS' WITNESS JAMES MACDONALD OR
EVIDENCE OR REFERENCE TO HIS OPINIONS SIiOULD BE EXCLUDED
The Defendants have listed James Macdonald, a University of Idaho College of Law
professor, as a rebuttal witness. (See Third Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet, at qj 3). Defendants
disclosed Professor Macdoilald's expected opinions and testimony as relating to the law of
exactions, the legal authority of city staff versus the city counsel, and his interpretation of the
case law related to the city fro111 imposing requirements on properties in the county. A11 of these
opinions require Professor Macdonald to explain his opinions of the applicable law and how they
would apply to the facts of the case.
It is generally recognized that this type of testimony is wholly improper. A leading legal
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE - 5
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publication summarizes the rule as follows:
As a general rule, at1 expert witness may not give his opinion on a question of
domestic law or on matters which involve questions of law, and an expert witness
cannot instruct the court with respect to the applicable law of the case, or infringe
on the judge's role to instruct the jury on the law. So, an expert may not testify as
to such questions of law as the interpretation of a statute, an ordinance or
municipal code, administrative rules and regulations, or case law, or the meaning
of terms in a statute, or ordinance, or a corporate charier, or the legality of
conduct.
(32 C.J.S. Evidence

9 634)(see also 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence 8 121)

Specific courts have been upheld for excluding the testimony of a law professor who was
to offer testimony on whether an agreement violated federal law (Casper v. SMG, 389 F. Supp.
2d 618 (D.N.J. 2005)), and excluded an expert's opinion that the court felt was nothing more
than a lecture on the law for the reason that such testimony usurps the duty of the trial court to
instruct the jury on the law. (People v. Reynolds, 139 Cal. App. 4" 1l l , 4 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 761 (4"'
Dist. 2006).
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Iioward v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co.,
137 Idaho 214, 46 P.3d 510 (2002). In that case, the Court excluded testimony of a lillguistics
expert called to testify that a contract was ambiguous. In Idaho, the identification and resolution
of ambiguity in an insurance policy are matters of law. The Court excluded this testimony
because the Idaho Rules of Evidence only provide that an expert may be allowed to testify as to
his or her opinion if his or her "specialized howledge 'will assist the trier ofSact to understand
the evidence or to determine a facl in issue.' I.R.E. 702." Howard at 219, 515 (emphasis in
the issues related to ambiguity before the trial
original). The Court collcluded that "Beca~~se
judge were matters of law, the offered expert opinion was irrelevant, and there was no abuse of
discretion in excluding the testimony." Howurd 137 Idaho at 219, 46 P.3d at 515
Applying these rules to the proffered basis of Professor Macdonaid's testimony, it is clear
that his testimony is not relevant and must be excluded. I-Ie will testify to his opinions of the law
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE - G

of exactions, the legal a~~tliority
of city staff versus the city counsel, and his interpretation of case
law related to the city's right to impose requirements on properties in the county. Each issue on
which he will testify relates to his explanation of a body of law and his application ofthat law to
the facts of the case. As such, his testimony is irrelevant and exclusion is proper

VT.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court to enter its order in
lilnine excluding and prohibiting any and all rderence to the following matters during ally stage
of the trial in this matter, including voir dire, opening and ciosi~ig statements, and the
presentatioii of evidence. In the alternative, the State requests the Court require that such matters
be raised before the Court, outside of the presence of the jury, for a deternliilatioii of the
admissibility and relevance of such matters before they are injected into the case:
1.

Any evidence, testimony or comment related to the Order of Condemnation

relating to the subject property.
2.

Any evidence, testimony or comment attempting to suggest that a dispute exists

as to any issue covered by the Stipulation of Possession between the parties in this case.

3.

Any testimony by Defendants' witness James Macdonald or evidence showing or

referencing his opinions.
DATED this %d-ay

I@

of May, 2007.

~ e p GAttorney
t~
General
!daho Department of Trailsportation
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CEItTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the pday

of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above to be served to:

E Don Copple
Heather Cu~iniiigham
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

~ u . sMail
.
B a n d Delivered
n o v a n i g h t Mail
z@?elecopy (Fax) 386-9428

~ e ~ uAttorney
t$
General
Idaho Department of Transportation
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
STEVEN M. PARRY
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Streat
P.O.Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB # 2153
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICM DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

THE STATE OF IDAHO, cx =I.,
1
CHARLES L. WTNDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEEMEY, MONTE C.
)
M C C L W , GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER, AND JOHN X. COMBO,
)
IDAHO TWSPORTATION BOARD, )
Plaintie

CmtNo.

P&'-

0 Y'

63.336

1

1
)

-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LWIITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J W C H
INC.
Defendants.

1
1

STIPULATION OF POSSESSION

)
)

1
1
)

COMES NOW che Plaintiff, the Idaho Tmmprtation Department, by and through
its counsel of record, Steven M. Pany, Deputy Attorney General, and the Defiandants,
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J. Ranoh b.,
by and thmugh their

STIPULATION OF POSSESSION

-1-

EXHIBIT NO.

BOB

-

counsel of record, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, and hereby stipulate and agree that

the wurt may enter an order encompmsing the following:
1.

The requirements of Idaho Code 47-721, enabling Plaintiff to obtain

possession of the subject propty pending trial have been satisfied, in that (a) Plaintiff

has the right of eminent domain; (b) the use to which the subject p
r
o
m is to be applied
is a use authorized by law; (c) the taldng of the subject p r o m is necessary for such we;

and (d) Plaintiff has sought in good faith to purchase the subject property sou@ to be
taken.
2. Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendants' etLomey in tmt for D e f e n h & the sum

of $327,000.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per amurn fkom the date
of the summons.

3. Upon paying the amounts identified in Pmgraph 2 hereof, P l h t i f f $M1be
entitled to take possession and commence use of the pbopaty described on Exhi'bit A and
incorporated herein by this refmce.
4.

Plaintiff and Defendants mutually agree not to have any contact or

communications not authorized in advance by their respective a t t o m y with mch other
or their agents during the pendency of this action, rand if any contact should c~ccur,such
unauthorized communications shall be deemed settlement negotiations and inadmissible
in any proceeding in this matter relating to the amount of just cornpermalion to be paid.

5. Plaintiff shall give notice to Defendants' counsel of any major ch-

orders

directly impacting the project adjacent to the Defendants' remaining property within
fhirty (30) days of the chmge o&rL&ng

STIPULATION OF POSSESSION

issued.

-2-

6 . Plaintiff shall accept financial responsibility for all real property taxes assessed

on that portion of that property described in Exhibit A which is bkng condemned by
Plaintiff from the date of possession until possession is retumed or judgment is entered.
These taxes shall be calculated as follows:
Land: sci. feet of take X taxes assessed on parcel X davs of ~ossession= ITD's
portion
365 days
total sq. tt. of parcel
Nothing in this stipulation shall prevent Plaintiff From obtaining consent from the Twin
Falls County Assessor to cease assessing taxes on the subject property being conaemned
by Plaintiff, and thus terminating Plaintiffs financial responsibility to pay such taxes.
7. The amount paid pmuant to Paragraph 2 of this stipulation shall be used as

an offset against any judgment entered in this matter either by way of trial or negotiation.

In no event shall Defendants be required to refimd any of the funds paid pmuant to this
stipulation.
8. At the time construction commences at or around Defendant's property the

Plaintiff shall adequately stake or otherwise delineate the right of way between
Defendant's property and the limits of the construction project. The Plaintiff shall make
a good faith effort to keep the stakes or delineate in place during construction. The intent
of this paragraph is to ensure that Plaintiffs contractor does not trespass on or in any way
damage Defendant's property.

STIPULATION OF POSSESSION
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DATED this

A day of January, 2005.

Attorney for the Plaintiff, Idaho
Transportation Department
DATED this

day of Jenuary, 2005.

Copple, Copple, & Cox - Attorney for
Canyon Vista Family & Lazy J. Ranch

STIPULATION OF POSSESSWN

EXHIBIT "A"

.

.

Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DHP-NH2390(104) filed for record in the office of the
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument
No.2004-017039: ',
Being a portion of the NEW&?% (Government Lot 3) of
Section 4, .Township 1 0 South, Range 17 East of Boise
Meridian, Idaho.

Parcel No. 41, Parcel I.D. No. 0041481, according
to the Right of Way Plat of Project No. DWP-NH-F2390(104) filed for record in the office of the
County Recorder of Twin Falls County, Idaho, on
the gth day of August, 2004 under Instrument
No.2004-017039:
Being a portion of the NE
(Government Lot 3)of Section 4, Township 10
South, Range 17 East, Boise Meridian.
For the purpose of a slope easement,

Astemporaryeasement to go upon, occupy, and use a
strip of land in a portion of the (HE
Gov. Lot
3)of Section 4, Township 10 South, Range 17 East,
Boise Meridian, Twin Falls County, Idahos on the
southerly (Right) side of the above described parcel
of land (Parcel No.41 /Parcel Id.No.0041481) and being
68 meters (approximately 223 feet) wide lying between
Stations 825+00 Right to 825+20 Right and from 825t35
Right to 825c55 Right of the Pole Line Road Survey as
shown on the plans of said Highway Survey DNP-1VH-F2390(104), for the purpose of construction, together
with the right and privilege of ingress and egress to
and from said property for said punpose.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
JOSEPI-I D. MALLET
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB fi5817
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, M AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
DARRELL V. MANNING, R. JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C.
McCLURE, GARY BLlCIC, NEIL MILLER
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAI-IO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

)
)

1
)
)

)

-vs-

1

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERST-IIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.

1
1

Defendants.

Case No. '3-04-6336
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMIWE TO
EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF
ROGER DUNEAP

1
1

Comes now the Plaiiitiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D.
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court to enter its
order in lin~ineexcluding and prohibiting any and all testimony froin Roger Dunlap, or evidence
related to the opinioi~sof Roger Dunlap including his opinion of just compensation, at any stage
of the trial in this matter, including voir dire, opening and closing statements, and the

PLAJNTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMNE TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF ROGER DUNLAP - 1
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presentation of evidence.
This motion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and other authorities, as
further set forth in Plaintirs Brief in Support of Motion in Lilnine to Exclude the Testimony of
Roger Dunlap and the Third A:ffidavit of Joseph Mallet, filed concurrently herewith, as well as
the other pleadings and papers on file in this case.
DATED this qBday ofMay, 2007

3
9, \

JOSE H D. ALLET
~ e p u t $Attorney General
Idaho Department of Trailsportation

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

1

9

day of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above to be served to:
E Don Copple
Heather Cuilninghaln
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

&c$i;ivered
UOvernight Mail
n ~ e l e c o (Fax)
p ~ 386-9428
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENElWL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
KARL D. VOGT
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.0. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #5817
ISB #SO15
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, Dl AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
DARRELL V. MANNING, R. JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENY, MONTE C.
McCLURE, GARY BLICIC, NEIL MILLER
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,
-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
Defendants .

1
1
)

Case No. CV-04-6336

1

1
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION
INLIMINE

1
1
1
1
1

Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D.
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby nioves this Court to enter its
order in lirnine excluding and prohibiting any and all reference to the following matters during
any stage of the trial in this matter, including voir dire, opening and closing statements, and the

PLAINTEF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE - 1

presentation of evidence. In the alternative, the State requests the Court require that such lnatters
be raised before the Court, outside of the presence of the jury, for a determination of the
admissibility and relevance of such matters before they are injected into the case:
1.

Any evidence, testimony or colninent related to the Order of Condemnation

relating to the subject property.
2.

Any evidence, testinloily or cornrnent attempting to suggest that a dispute exists

as to any issue covered by the Stipulation of Possession between the parties in this case.
3.

Any testimony by Defendants' witness James Macdonald or evidence showing or

referencing his opinions.
This rnotion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and other authorities, as
further set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Second Motion in Limine, filed
concurrently herewith, as we11 as the other pleadings and papers on file in this case.
DATED this

day of May, 2007.

~ k p uAttorney
t~
General
Idaho Transportation Department

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

q?L

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -day of May, 2007, 1 caused a true and correct
copy of the above to be served to:
E Don Copple
Heather Cunningha~n
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

B

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
movernight Mail
jZITelecopy (Fax) 386-9428

I
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
JOSEPIH D. MALLET
KARL D. VOGT
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB 115817
ISB #5015
Counsel for Plaintiff

SN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAIHO. SN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
TIHE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY,
MONTE C. M c C L U S , GARY BLICK,
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

1
)

Case No. CV-04-6336

1
)

)
)
)

AMENDED
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF
JOSEPI-I D. MALLET

)

I
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
Defendants.
State of Idaho
)SS.
County of Ada
Joseph D. Mallet, being first duly sworn, states the following:
1.

I am the counsel of record for the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, in the above captioned

AMENDED FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPI-I D. MALLET - 1

case and make this Affidavit based on my personal knowledge, unless stated otherwise.
2.

On Wednesday, April 11,2007,I took a deposition in this case of the Defendants'

valuation witness, Roger Dunlap. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
referetlce, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Depositioli Transcript of Mr.
Dunlap from the April 1 1,2007 deposition.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" are true and accurate copies of two pages from

Defendants' Fifth Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants. This is the portion of Defendants'
discovery responses in which they disclose their intent to call Professor James Macdonald as an
expert rebuttal witness at trial. These pages describe the substallce of the testimony that the
Defendants expect Professor Macdonald will offer at trial.

4.

Further your affiant sayeth not.

DATED this

~Qd.
day of May, 2007.

~ e $ u Attorney
t~
General
Idaho Department of Transportation

"a

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this jL_ ay of May, 2007.

Residing at
gV
,.JMy Commission expires
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Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tbe

& day of May. 2007, I caused a true and correct
*@"

copy of the above to be served to:
E Don Copple
Heather Cunninghain
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

C]U.S. Mail
D H a n d Delivered
novernight Mail
4?elecopy (Fax) 386-9428
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1 determination?
2
A. Yes.
Q. And you, it1 fact, undertook that
3
4 atialysis in tliis case?
5
A. Ycs.
6
Q. In tlie before cotidition what right of
7 access did you find or did yo11 feel tlint existccl
8 to tlic west side ad,jacent property?
A. Well, 1 want to rephrase a little bit.
9
1 0 1 didn't find tliey liad a specific right of access
11. in a specific place. I believe tliat upon
1.2 rezotiing and secttritig entitletnents they would
1.3 liiivc beeti erititlcd to a shared access, one or two
1 4 other driveways, and a -- probably a public
3. 5 street woi~ldliave gone tliroitgh tlie sul),ject
1.6 property.
Q. I'm going to ask you questions relative
17
1.8 to each propetty line oS the sttl)ject propetly.
1 9 S o 1'111going to start on tlie west side. Tlicy
2 0 have a western boundary of the propetiy that
21. abuts to tlie KLS&M property; does it not?
22
A, Yes.
Q.
And I'm going to ask you specifically
23
2 4 tibout your opinion of access rights to tliat
2 5 property boitndary. Does that tiiake sense?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1.0
11
1.2
1.3
1I
15
16
17
18
19

A. I guess I'm getting hung up on your
pllrase what access rights do they lrave at that
point.
Q. Okay. We are in tlie before coridition.
Is tliat clear?
A.Riglit.
Q. And we just talked about you coming in
and looking at a piece of propet-ty and
ascertaining the access rights that tile property
has in the before condition.
A. Okay.
Q. iitid, in your opiriion, when yoit
undertook that atialysis it1 this case, did yoit
dctermi~iethat tlicrc were ariy righis to access
across the westerti boutidary ofthe sui?ject
property?
A. I woitltl like you to rcplimsc it agaiti.
I'm sorry.
MR. COI'P1,E: Are you asking him did

2 1 property? Is that what you arc asking hiin?
22
MR. MAL,I.,E'T: That is what I'm aslting.
23
MR. COI'PLE: To say it tlifferetitly.

I

Q. (BY MR. MAL.L,E'T) Why don't you tell tiie
2 what is confusing aboitt my question. I'm going
3 to ask you about every propefly line so we can
4 get tlirough this.
5
A. I looked at this property as 20 acres
6 of property that had a highest and bcst use for
7 cotntiiercial and probably at1 office component. Anti
8 1 think it could liwve a connection to Canyori
9 Cresi Drive. A~idone or two other access points.
1 0 Arid probably a shared driveway on tlie west
1.1 property line in $1 before sititatioti. I gucss 1'1n
1 2 a little concerned tliiit you are saying wliat (lid
1.3 yoit tlctertiiine the access riglits to be at a
1 4 certain location. 1'111not saying it is goitig to
1 5 be at this locatioti right here (itidicatitig). Or
3.6 it is going lo be at this location right liere
1 7 (indicating). My determination was a liille bit
1 8 tiiore general.
1.9
Q. Let's talk about tlie deteriiiirrrition that
2 0 yoit made, ofcourse, it seetns like you are
2 1 rererring to the boundary line, whicli would be
2 2 the northern boundaly litie on Pole Line Road?
A. Yes.
23
Q. You just mentioned several access
24
2 5 points. Tliose are all on the northerti boundrrty

B
1

-?

2

A. Yes.

10
1.1
12
13
14
1.5
16
17
18
1.9

trapped. But i tlii~rkwe are on the sanic page.
Q. 1 appreciate you beitig ciiutious. But
truth be told, what you just told tiic is in the
before conditioti Canyon Crest Drive would liavc
bcen extended tlirougli the property; correct?
A. Yes.
Q.Tliat's a public street access or
approach tliat the propetly woitld have etijoycd 011
tliis northern boundary?
A. I believe so.

22

A. To the soittli of Pole Line Road i t does

C

..J

1
A. Well, you need to know wliat you are
2 appraising. Once you come up with your larger
3 parcel, that is your subject propet"ry. And that
4 is wliat you appraise.
5
Q. Did you perFortn that analysis in this
6 case?
7
A. Yes.

1.4

A. Well, tile iiighest and best usc is $1

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

A~idtherc are 110otlicr contiguous parcels tliat
are owtied by the same folks. I guess tliat's rhe
end of the analysis.
Q. Okay. So you gave me three factors.
And yoit applied those three factors. And the
result was the parcel that we've identifietl is
tlie larger parcel?
A. Yes.

2

Q. Yott called it contiguity?

Q. Whether that's a word or not, 1 think I
5 know what yoit are mean. They are toi~cliingeach
6 other. l'liey are next to each othcr. Right?
7
A. Tliat is a worcl.
8
Q. Oltay. So you look at tlie Lazy J parcel
9 at1 tlie east. And what we call the KI.,S&M parcel

4

I. 1. go one tiiore fu~llieron the west.
"flic DCMkW is not contiguous; is it?
I. 3
A. 'To the subject; no.
14
Q. But tlie rwo adjacent parcels that I
1.7

A. Yes.
(2, So far so good. It looks liltc we liave
1 9 a larger parcel as of these two Fdcton; correcl'?
20
A. Correct.
Q. We move down to the unity of title.
2 1.

18

Q. And tliet is tlic sole reason that you
23
2 4 have determined the larger parcel to be oiily the

1 was.

2

Do yo11believe that that is tile sanre
3 iiighest and best use i'or adjacent parcels oil both
4 sidcs?
5
A, It's very similar. I cnii't recall

2
Q. And what was it h a t made yo11decitlc
3 tlierc wasn't sktficient unity of title?
4
A . There are different cornpatlies that own
5 tliree different parcels.

7 13t1tI tliirik it was really si~tiilar.
8
Q. It is your opinion, tlien, if not
9 identical, tiley are substantially the same?

7 subject we lii~veC:ttiyon Vista -8
A.LI.,C.

1.0
A. Yes.
Q. So in the lhigiicst and best usc fiictor
11
1 2 we accuslly got :I check mark. I itlean, that is
1 3 lireserit oti tliat one fiictor in your atialysis;
L 4 correct?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. You tioll't see tiny barricrs related to
1.7 tlie higliest and best use -- iiothing aboitt tile
:I. 8 l~iglicstant1 best usc of tlic iieighbori~igipal-cels
1 9 wot~ldcatisc you to tiialte a larger parcel
2 0 tleterrninittiori tliaii whet you havc tionc'?
21
A. No. Yoo'rc correct.

1.1.
12
1.3
1.4
15
16

17
1.8
1.9
20
21.
22
23

A. I tliitik it's litnitcd liiibility conipaiiy.
But I coi~ldbe wrong.
Q. Whiciicver the entity is. Wc've got
thai cntity. And I,ezy J is ownetl by the l..szy J
lla~ichCorporation?
A. Sotnetliiiig like that.
Q. Because those two are diffcretit
etitities, that is tlie basis of your dctcrtliitiatio~i
tliitt it~iityortitle ditln't csist?
A. Yes.
Q.Atid bccatrsc ~tiiityof title didti't
exist, for tliat sole rcasoti yoti lievc take11the
larger parcel only as the subjcct property?
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1 the KLS&M property?

1

2
3
4
5
6

2
3
I
5
6

'7

8
9
I. 0
11
12
13
14
15

16
1.7

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. I believe on tlie KLSBrM there was gad
value. Wliicli I slid back iii the after situation.
1 was going to tnention tlitit earlier. Because
they can, in fact, replace some of tlie higher
value larid in the after situatioti.
Q. We talked about some of tlie criticisms
ortliis as creating a windf>illfor tlie propcrty
owner.
Did you resolve whether that was
appropriate or not in the KI,S&M case?
A. Well, it worked to tlic disadvantage of
the property owtier. Is what I believe I did with
KLSBrM. Because I took some of tlie valurtble larld
that was being taketi and I said in the after
situatioii you still have -- you can slide this
trlore valuablc band baclt. So that decreased my
scveralice daiiiage figure in the KLSBrM. So it
would be the opposite of 11 wiiidfall,
(1. What about the Lazy J casc? Did you
iise -- which valuation approach, if eitlier of
these, did you use in that case?
A. I do not recall.
Q. Tliis band of valuc iipproacli that you
used in tliis case. do vou recall tising that ever
['age

1. I.

12
13

14
15
16
1.7

3.8
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

help you remember? Yotir cxec~~rivc
su~nmary'?
A. You know, the only -- I do~i'tlhave a
good explanation. What comes to rnitid is tliat tlic
proj'erty ow~iersreservetl this frontage oitt here
for commercial purposes. Atitl I guess it was riiore
clear to me on this case where tlie higher value
zone would be. It's about 200 feet cleep. Atid
it's pretty obvious pad sites. I probably siioulti
li:l\,e (lolie tliat on tlie Hilliar case. I probably
ulrdcrstatcd severance tlamnge in that case.
MR. COPPLE: \Vhat a goy. Now you tell
fnc.
Q. (BY MR. MAL,LE'I') Does itsotind likcyou
agree with tny ontlerstanding that you reitlly
didn't use tliis approacli on Billiar?
A. It doesn't looli like it froin Iookitig at
that summary; no.
Q. So as yoit sit licre today you can't
tllitik ofaiiother casc in Idaho wliere you linve
used this band O F Y R I U approach?
~
A. No.
Q. I was looking at ;lie Target casc and
that is riglit on tlie corner of Blue L.akcs 8t1d
Pole 1,ine. Do pot1 recall thilt ciise?
A. Yeah. I don't want to be techlhical.
tlirlt

155

1 ill thc Scnte of ldatio for any of tlie work that
2 you have done?
3
A. Otlier than tlie cascs we have talketl
4 about just tiow?
5
Q. Wcll, it looks like the batid oCva1rte
6 al~proachmaasonly used in tlijs case. You tiilked
'7 ilbout the slide back on the I<I,S&M. And you
1 weren't surc on the l..azy J.
9
MR. C0PPL.E: What about Target? I-lave
I. 0 you looked at tl~at:}
11
MR. M.ALLE'I': 1 couldn't tell whet, J
1 2 Ioolted at that.
13
Q. (BY MR. MAL,L.ET) It loolted like a slide
1.4 back case to me. But I'm asking because I wasn't
1.5 sure.
16
A. None otl1er corne to tniiid. The
I. 7 propcrties I'vc worlted on in Nanipa a1.e stnuller.
1.8 And I don't think that any of those werc
1.9 siisceptible to this kinti oi't~.cat~nciii.
20
Q. l'vc got to ask. Wliy would this bc tlic
2 1 only one you lhave used tliis atialysis on in all of
2 2 the c a k s you have done in i d ~ ~ h o ?
23
A. Well, now, 1 don't remernbcr what I did
2 4 in Billiar, either.
25
Q. I've got a copy of yotir sutnrnal-y. Woitld
,,, .~
....,.,....,,.,..-,',..,",-~..~
.,.... ",....,.*."..,.....%..s:, .,,.,
,,.,..,,...
....................
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1.0
11
12
13
14

1.5
1.6
1.7

18
19
20
21
22
23

It is on tlie soitthwest c1iiadrant. The itntiiediate
corners of it. Yes.
Q. Some of that propetty fronted on Pole
Line and some fronted on Blue Lalies?
A. Right.
Q. The actual corner itself belonged to
sornebody else?
A.RigRt.
Q. I-lowever we icrm that. I recall you
cotiiing up will1 $1 1.00 a square foot not using
this method. Does that ring a bcll?
A. Eleven dollars for the overall
property?
Q. My titiderstanding -- and, r~gaiti,I'll be
frank with you. I'jn tlot sure I uitdcrstood
really -- 1 never took your deposition in that
casc, 1'111 not si~reI really understand what you
tliti in that case. I t loolts to me like yoir diti
not use tlie banti oi'valiie approach. Wl~atever
approach you used kicked out an $I 1.00 per scjtlarc
foot val~iefor the take.
As yoti recall, tlierc was also an issue
pad site illat was feasible in the before,

",~
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1. irrespective of the sevoaiice, to me, when I'm
2 looking at that, you get $1 1 .OO a square Soot.
3 Does that sound consistent with what you did'?
4
A. 1 lioncstly can't re~neniber.I liad
5 enough to do to get ready for this one.
6
Q, I can appreciate that. My next
'I qi~cstionwas going to be. If you got $I 1 .OO a
8 sqi~arefoot on the T'arget case, does it sccln
9 consistent that you get $9.50 down the road on
1 0 tlie sub,ject properly?
11
A. 1 would havc to loolc at that again.
1 2 1'111sorry, I can't recall as I sit liere wiiat I
1.:3 did on that case.
1.4
Q. Ifit were, in fiict, a $1.50 per square
1 5 hot dii'fere~icebetween tile two cases, would tliat
1 6 surprise you?
A. I'm not sure whetlier the $1 1.00 was Tor
1.7
:I8 the overall tztrget sites. And tlie $9.50 is just
1 9 for the pad frontage on Pole Line. Which seeiiis
2 0 to me has got to be tile case. But 1'1nnot sure
21. if wc are comparing apples to apples in tliis
2 2 case. 1 wo~lldhave to rcview that, 1 tliink I
2 3 have been consistent tlirot~glioutmy valuations in
2 4 'Swin 1:alls. I havc tried to be.
25
0. I tliink you sec my implicntion that I

P a g e 16C

I.
2
3
4
5
6

J

Q. Is it fair for me to say that this band
o f value approach increases the value ofthe talte
or the property value in Favor ofthe owner'!
A. 1 don't think it increases it. I think
it is fair to do i t that way. If you did it
anoilier way it would decrease tlie compensation
7 due to tlie owner.
8
Q. In all fairness, you said you didn't do
9 this 011the Billiar property. And that probably
1.0 restilted in lower ~iutiibcrs'?
11
A. Yes.
12
Q. l'lie implication tlieii would be using
1.3 this approach versus (he approach used on the
1 4 l3iiliar kicks out a iiigher number?
15
A. Well, I gr~cssI don't like tlie way you
1 6 art characterizing it as I did it this way to
1 7 jaclc up the value. I tliink tliis is the
1 8 appropriate way to do it. But it does give you a
1 9 higller value tliali doing it -- ifyou say this
2 0 lalid you are taking offof here, off of the
2 1 frontage, is worth tlie exact same as this entire
2 2 property, that \vould give you $5.50 per squarc
2 3 foot.
24
Q,Your band of val~ceapproach, you only
2 5 use that in tlie before; correct?
Page 1.61.
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1.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11.
12
13
1.4

15
16
17
18

don't see tlie consistency between -- you got
Billiar at $6.00 in tlie before. And Target at
$ I 1.00 in the before. And in the micldle yo11 get
this $9.50. It just see~iisurijilstifiably l~,iglias
compared to tile other work you havc done.
A. Well, Dilliiir was $6.00 for the overall
site of 71 acres. 'The $9.50 is jilst for tliose
Li.ontage pads. The overall vali~eofthis
property I tliink is $5.50 a square foot, ~vliicliis
consistetit with Billiar being srortli $6.00 at an
ar-terial corner. A n d you wo~ildexpect 'I'arget to
be significa~itlyinore tlian citlicr Billiar or this
property being at Blue laaltcs aiid Pole I.,ine.
Q. Now, wllen yo11 valued your serics of
strip rakes Sortlic City oI'Gleiidale, did yo11 use
tliis blind o f v a l ~ ~approacli
e
in any ofthose
cases, as far as yo11 can i.ccall'?
A. No. 'They :ill Iiod tlic some higlicst ant1
best use. 'l'hey were all one solf-contained
little sinall porccl of land. 'fl~eonly ti~nethat
woltld conic iiito play is if you have soinetliing
Iirrgc like this with signilicant depth that couitl
be used for different things in tliffcrent hands.
lryou lravc a one-acre com~ncrcialpiece you are
not going to havc different bands oTvalue.

1.9
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21
22
23
24
25
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A. Yes.
Q. Now, tliat doesn't really give you what
a willing purchaser would pay for your larger
parcel in the before; does it?
A. Ifyou're buying this entire properly 1
tliink a willing buyer would pay $5.50 a square
foot fo~'the entire parcel.
Q. Your larger parcel determination was
tlic whole parcel; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So if1 were Lo ask yoit what price
would a willing pi~rcliaserpay for wlrat you iiave
tlctermincd is a larger parcel, the answer \\'auld
be $5.50 a square hot?
A. Yes.
Q. Wily go throi~glithe Iargcr parccl tlsill
at all if yo11 are only goirig to value tlie take ttt
the band of value in tlie koiit'?
A. It isjust requireti that you dcterniine
wliat the larger parcel is i n an eminent donlain
action and value it before and alter to collie 111)
\\,it11 scvelancc tlaniage. I-low else would you (lo
that'?
0. Let me ask this aiiothcr way. Wl~v
ditin't yoti find tlie front band of value as being

.
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the larger parcel?
A. I think that all of these comporients of
this property liave synergy, wliich is good for all
of tile other components of it. If you have acre
retail in here, this will draw people into your
development. And thc pad users will take some
advantage from that. Tlie office users will like
to have restaurants and services along the
frontage. And shopping opportunities. And the
office -- well, I've already said that.
1 think that the center works
together -- you could arguably cut off the
frontage and call that the larger parcel.
Q. It seemed like in your larger parcel
detemiriatioii one of your kctors was highest and
best use; was i t !lot?
A.Yes.
Q. And you'vc got three different highest
atid best uses on what you have already called the
large parcel; don't yoti?
A. No. 1 think the highest and best use
of the wliole property is a [nixed use develop6~ent.
Q. Okay. That rnixcd use development
co~isistsof a band of nad sites on the front. a
band of anchor tenanis in the middle, and band

1

1 take you, in my mind, essentially, play it the
2 other way. You have determined your larger
3 parcel as smaller. Alid the effect, in my
4 opinion, is, when it cornes to the larger parcel
5 per severance damages, you have analyzed it in
6 favor of the property owner. And when you
7 have done the seine undertaking for the vali~eof
8 the take, you have ignored it, and tlie result
9 is in favor of the property owners. Call that
1 0 an accusation o f m y qiiestioning your process.
11 blow do you answer that question?
12
A, It was riot my intent to crertte anything
3.3 artificial. I believe it's logical that the
1 4 property owner should be paid for the band of
1 5 value where he is, I think you also have to be
1 6 accouritnble for the taking of all access from the
1 7 entire property for Pole Line Road, because the
1 8 taking has nuked the potential of this back area.
1 9 And if 1 had done it the other way, as you are
2 0 suggesting woultl make a difference of about ten
2 1 percent of the overall compensation, you can
2 2 argue that that would be appropriate, But it
2 3 wasn't my intent to pump up the value of the
2 4 taking.
Now, we talked about your value of the
25

6

Page 1
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1
1 of offices in tlie back?
2
A.Yes.
2
3
3
Q. And if l were to ask you to explain to
4
4 me why one of your bands, specifically tlie front
5
5 band, didn't end up to be your larger parcel,
6
6 what would your answer be?
7
7
A. It's just 111y opinion that thc highest
8
8 and best use of the subject is a mixed use
9
9 property.
10
3.0
Q. If your larger parcel was just the
11
3.1. fioiit band that would reduce the amount of
1 2 severarlce darnages you would deter~nine;wouldri't 1.2
13
3.3 it?
14
A. Well, that's another good reason to
14
15
3.5 consider this all as one property. Because solne
16
1 6 of these eiernents have access only through this
17
1 7 band of value. So you kind of have to look at
28 this as one larger parccl. That's a good point.
18
1
9
Q. The reason I ask is because the way I
19
2 0 scc this is timi when it cornes to severance
20
21
2 3. darnages you have used the wliole parcel as the
2 2 larger parcel, And that creates higher severance
22
2
3
2 3 datnagcs
for
the
Droperty
owner
than
if
you
just
. . .
.
24
24 liinited your larger parcel to the front bancl.
25
I illso sce when it conies to valui~igthe
25
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wliole parcel, If I were to buy this whole larger
parcel at $5.50 a square foot in the before;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Your $9.50 a square foot, isn't that
essentially what a purchaser would pay for -- 1
want to say a pad site on the front. Is that
fair to say? If I were to buy a pad site on the
front, or if I were to sever offsornetliirig in
that band on thc front, sever off a pad sitc, I
would pay $9.50 for that as a purchaser?
A. Yeah. And let rne just clarify that.
$9.50 contemplates selling off an acre of land
with frontage on Pole Line. There is some
confirsion in the rnarket and in our terminology
when we talk about rcal estate. Sometimes pads
inearl that you sell this area off to a potential
user. And tlie parking lot has been installed.
And all of tlie utilities beeii stubbed to tliis
building. And the only thing that is tlicre is a
little piece of dirt where they can drop iri the
building and everything is ready to go. That is
not what I'm tiiinkinr!
- ofwhen I say. nad
. sites.
Q. I'm with you. Wliat are you describing
in contrast to wl~atyou have just stated?
,,=-*
"&.,"~u,.: *,.,

,a,*vm-,,.,*...7,
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A. I'm thinking of'a pad site with il
2 one-acre -- approximately one-acre site tliat is
3 si~itablefor a user to develop a building, as
1

8

Q.But you cliose not to?

8 with.
9
So if yoil've got a sliopping center that
1 0 is almost 90 percent built out. There may be $1
I. 1 little sqtiarc of dirt up thcrc with a parking
12 lot. Services stabbed oiit. Everything of that
13 naturc. Atid so~iiehodyis going to come by and
1 4 stick a coffee sliop, or a Jack in the i h s , or
1.5 something on tliat square ofdirt.
16
'That is what some people refer to as a
1 7 pad sitc; correct?
18
A.Yes.
19
(2. My question was -- and 1 tliink it was
2 0 in lineorwhat you are thinlting. What do you

13
Q. 11 is still yoilr opinion tliat a market
1.4 existed for one of those at the date of tlie tukc?
15
A. Yes.
26
Q. So yotr basically decide wliat a
1 7 pt~rcl~ascr
would pay in tlic futtrre for larid in one
1 8 of tlrose smaller pad sites and that is what yoii
1 9 assign to tlie take?
20
A. In the future?

2 2 and you're contemplating the wliolc sitc that

2 % Wotrld you like me to rephrase that?

3.0

Q. Now, at tlie date of tlie take there was

25 tlie parking lot and
1 site tbr ilie sake of our discussion iiglii now to

1 of tl~esesmaller pad sites. And when you gct
2 that numbcr that is what yo11assign Lo the rake?

2 avoid confusioii?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. Okiiy. Under that definition of a pad
5 site, if l were LO c o ~ i up
~ e with this piece of
6 lxopcrty in thc before, and want one of those pad
7 sites, and I were to buy it, you are saying $9.50
8 a stluarc foot; right'?
9
A. I'm saying tiiat is the price for the
:I0 dirt.
3.1
0,iiiglit.
L2
A, The one acre of dirt iintievelopcd.
1.3
Q. 'I'lie one acre of dirt i~ndevclopcd. So
1.4 that $9.50 a squirre fool eqiiutes to what you
1 5 would sell a piccc of -- scvc~.off and sell a
1 6 ~ i c c oi'thc
e
front dirt to a p i ~ l ~ h a s e r ?
17
A. Yes.
18
Q. Yoti would call tliat the cconotiiy scale'?

Q. 1 know a lot of wlii~tyou do is
5 specolatioir, 1 meair, it's yoirr opiniori.
MR. COPPLE: Thcrc is a difference.
MR. MALLET: I won't call i t guessing
8 until we arc ill front of the ju~y.
MR. COI'PT..E: I would object to any
1.0 comincnts on gt~cssitig.
L1
Q. (BY MR. MAI..I..ET) LiuL \\dliat you are doiiig
3.2 lrere is yo11are speciiiatitig bftsically what vioiilti
1.3 happen i f tlie 1)ropeily were broke into a pad
1 4 site. And if there were a pi~rcliascrfor thet pati
1 5 site. Corrcct?
16
A. Well, I'm not speculatitiy too Iiel-d.
17 l3ccaiise there are tliree sales riglit rtcross tile
1 8 street that have sold iii aliiiost the ideiitical

2 0 tlic front lias a liiglier price than wliat n

2 0 niorc observing.

4

2 2 of thc take, il'tliere were a pad site createtl, or
2 3 platretl, or brokcn out, or subtlivided, anti it
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8 $7

I, bit because the pacis weren't zoned on the dace of
Q. So your comparablc salcs tlliit you used
3
4 were cornparables that show you a pad site velue.
5 Not thc value OF the wholc larger parcel.
Is that correct?
7
A. Yes. Docs yoilr copy show pagc five?

9

3. impact on the itnprovemenls. It is stupid to go
2 through an entire analysis like this. But in

4 value, and severance damage, you llave to go
5 tliroitgh this entire analysis.

A. Yes.

1.6 land sales chart.
A. So hose are the sales that I looked at
17
1.8 to get tin idea of what yoit co~ildsell
1 9 approximately an acre itlong Pole Line frontage.

1 4 yoilr just co~iipensationin this case?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. I don't rneat~to belabor that point. I
1 7 have never seen anybody do it this way. I aln

2 1 you can see I ~nadea ininits adjustment becoi~se

1 site, And came up with an estimate of $9.50 per
2 squas'c foot for tliis land in its cunent

1 spced with you. The trickery, if it exists, will
2 comc litter. 1'111just trying to rnaltc sun I'tn
3 playing catch-up at this point.
So the value of tlic Pakc at $9.50 il

9 valuing the larger parcel as a wliole; correct?

9
1.0

11

A,. Correct.
Q. We go up to the total value beforc.

Q. Why even go through that drill i n this

.

..

.......

15. - -h 7 i k V d ~ ~ ~ y O f i - 1 itoi l come
~ e up will~the

A. Yes. Cali I help you a little hit?
Q. J would appreciate it.
A. This ~iulnberis extrapolated. What I

I. 6 entire valuc oS the sitbjcct property ill a before
1'7 sitoalion. 'Sake out the value oSthe take.
1O Valuc the rclnainder before, remainder after, to

16

2 0 to your. bottoni linc oScstimiit~t1just

2 0 square foot. That is reflected by tliis nuilibcr
2 1. (indicatitlg). And llien I valued the taking at
22 $9.50 a square foot. Arld the ftontage, if it .is

You can usc R strip take rnethod in somc

17

18

44

(Pages 170 t o 1'73)

CY

Page

Page

1'74

I. nitmber that gets you to tliat number.
2
Q. So yoar $4,723,296. Do you see that
3 niimber there? The total?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. If 1 take thal number, divide it by tlle
6 square footage or tlie parcel site in tlie before
7 co~idition,it comes out to $5.50:'
8
A. Yes. You rnay want to refer lo llie
9 footnote.
10
Q. I see that. So you got the value of'
I I. the take at $9.50. You've got your pcrtiianent and
1%tetnporary easemerits. And you gel your total
3.3 vel~teof tlie take at that $9.30 a squa1.e foot
1.4 value.
3.5
A. Yes.
Q. Then we takc the before value,
16
1 7 aggregate, less the value of the retnainder -18
A. Wllicli gives yoct the value oftlie
1 9 remainder in tlic before situation.
Q.So you really didn't cotnc up with your
20
2 1 after value using the income approach; tiid you'?
2 2 Your after valuc is the bcfore value minus the
2 3 take?
24
A. There is an nftcr value -- there's a
2 5 value of the remainder before i~nda value of the

176

I

Q. What do you thinlt a reasonable ti~ncto
2 find a purchaser is in this case?
3
A. I:or the subject property?
4
Q. Yes.
5
A. Nine to 12 months.
6
Q. So if this were to have listed -7 "lhis" being the sub,ject prope~~y.
If it were to
8 hilve been listed at lhc tlnte of the take it could
9 lhave bee11a year before a purcliascr was foitnd'?
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. Do you cver use a tinhe to develop
1 2 adji~sirrient,as wcll?
13
A. No.
I. 4
Q.In this case there is an iritcrim use of
1 5 a [nobile ho~ilepark; right?
16
A. Yes.
i7
Q. Did yo11 consider the fact that it might
!8 take a wliiie to wintl up the affairs of itie mobile
1 9 home park and tlemolisl~the mobile home park and
2 0 gct this rcady to sell?
21
A. IS could be sold with that use in
2 2 place.
23
Q. In order to develop, then, it would
2 4 still tiike tinhe to wind up the afhirs of the
25 mobile lhotne park atitl to prerjare this for

Page 1 7 5

I remainder after.
Q. 7'he value of the remoiiider after is not
2
3 calculated through the incofnc approacli on page
4 nine; is id
5
A. Yes, it is. That nrcniber comes Srom
6 page eight. Wliicli is an income approach.
7
Q. It ji~stso lhr~ppe~hs
that that ecluals
8 your vali~cof the before tninus the value of the
9 talte?
10
A. No. The value of the rc~naii~der
aner
13. docs not equal il~eviilue besore, mitii~sthe -12
MR. C:OI'I'LE: Let's talte a liinc-out.
13
(A discussii~nwas held off the record.)
14
(Recess.)
15
Q. (13Y MR. M A I L L E ~Wearc baclc aner the
1G break. We are looking at your belore sales on
1 7 page two and three. But before I ask yoi~about
1.8 that.
3. 9
Do you make a distinction personally
20 becweeri market value and morkct pvicc? Arc they
2 I the same thing to you? Or are they different?
A . Yeah, I don't krlolv what ~nnrkctprice
22
2 3 is.
(2. Market vall~ei s what you dctermiilc'?
24

1 devcloplnerit; would it not'!
2
A. Yes.
3
Q,l-iow long do you think it \vouId take?
4
A. I'm told that it would take about six
7 take. I'robably a couple of months.

8
10
11.
3.2
13
14

Q. So if it look nine months to find a
ready to develop?
A. This estimate of market value
anticipates a marketing time of nine to I2
months. Alid tliat means that is what it would
have old for on the date oSvalue if it hod becn

1 9 out. 13ut your estitnatc at inarkel valuc is as
2 1 vt~lucatid it sells or1 that date.
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to testify. Without waiving said objection, the following individuals may be called to testify on
rebuttal:
1.

James Macdonald, University of Idaho Law School, I 1 85 Paradise Ridge Road, Moscow,

ID 83843; 208-885-7947; Mr. Macdonaldmay testifyregardingthe standards relating to imposition
of exactions on the property if it were to apply for a plat or PUD development, the authority of staff
vs. the City Council, and the authority cited to imposerequirementson properties inthecounty. Mr.
Macdonald has given us the following opinion:
(1) It is his opinion that the law of exactions (government conditions on development) has

been established by the United States Supreme Court in the cases ofNollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) ('Wollan") and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)
("Dolan").
Nollan held that the police power allows government to put a condition on development if
thecondition is rationally related topreventingor mitigatinghms caused by the development. The
Court ruled that there must be a nexus between a legitimate governmental interest and the condition
on development. More specifically, the condition must be related to and serve the same
governmental interest as the underlying restriction on development.
Nollan's "nexus" requirement was clarified in Dolan, where the Court said that the law
required an evaluation of whether the exactions or conditions on development were "roughly

proportionate"tothegovermnent'sjustifications forregulating(theso-called "roughpmportionali~'
standard). The Court said that "[nlo precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
~ a k some
e sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both innature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development." 512 U.S. at 391.
DEFENDANTS' FlFTH SUPPLEMENTALANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAIMIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIESAND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO DEF

BBlT NO.

(2) It is his further opinion that local government staff employees (such as planning, zoning
and engineering personnel) do not have the final legal authority to impose exactions or conditions
on development. Under KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577,582 (2003), such authority
resides solely in the ultimate local government decision-making body, most typically the County
Commissioners. Staffs legal function is to advise the ultimate decision-maker. Any staff
recommendationsare appealable to, and can be accepted or rejected by, the decision-makingbody,
again most typically the County Commissioners.
2.

Michael Binham, 306 Valley Drive, Wimberley,TX 78676; (512)847-1213; Mr. Bingham

is a former Corporate Real EstateManager of Wal-Mart and will testify to thehistory of Wal-Mart's
efforts to obtain a location in Twin Falls, Idaho. He will testify that in his opinion the road project
by the State of Idaho in this case did not create a demand for commercial development on Pole Line
Road; but, that the recently expanded and increasingpopulationbaseinTwinFalls County, and the
surrounding market area which Twin Falls serves, creates the demand for additional commercial
uses. Also, in his opinion, retailers do not prefer limited access to the store locations; and, that the
highest and best use of the Canyon Vista property is for comrnerical purposes. Further, lhat
assemblage would not be required to develop the same if it had reasonable access to the property
&om an arterial road.
3.'

Pat Dobie, In addition to his work already disclosed, Mr. Dobie will respond to Mr.

Funkhousers body of work in this case, will address the estimated development costs if the property
developed in the before or aAer condition. Additional work done by Mr. Dobie is attached hereto
as Exhibit A.

DEFENDAhTS' FLWH SWPLEMEh'TAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AM3 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS 4

-

_l.I.-.--.-.-.I

BY
-,-

,--.__I--

CLERI<
DEPUTY

IIN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DBSTRBCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWfN FALLS

THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex. rel.,
DARRELL V. MANNING, JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY,
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK,
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER REGARDING
BOTH PLAINTIIFFSFAND

1

DEFENDANTS' MOTlORlS
IN LfMlNE AND MOTIONS

)

)
)
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED )
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, )
INC.
)

Defendants.

Case No. CV 2004-8636 b336

TO EXCLUDE

1
1
1

0
1
1May

18,2007, Plaintiffs, State of Idaho, and Defendants, Canyon Vista

Family Limited Partnership, presented various motions in limine and motions to
exclude before the court. The Court having reviewed the written

ORDER ON PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS
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memorandums, affidavits and relevant case law, as well as having heard oral
argument of the parties, does hereby rule as follows:

1. Defendants' Motion to Extend Time Setfor Trial is GRANTED;
2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and

Argument Regarding Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project is
GRANTED; however, the State can attempt to show bad faith;
3. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Allow into Evidence the Deposition Testimony
of Clarence Pomroy is GWPLWITED per the requirements as illuminated by
the Court at oral hearing;

4. Defendants' Motion to Compel is DEWBllED;

5. Defendants' Motion in Limine for an Order That a Partial Settlement in an
Adjacent Project Cannot be Testified to by One ofthe State's Appraisers, John
Dillman, is GRANTED;
6. Defendants' Motion to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and Argument

Regarding the Development of Subject Property with Adjacent Properties is
PARTIALLY GRANTED only to speculation;
7. Defendants' Motion to Exclude all Evidence and Testimony Regarding Special
Benefits is DENIED;
8. Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED;
9. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude References to Taxes, Taxpayers and
Public Funds is GRANTED;
10. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Appraisal Reports is GRANTED;

11. Plaintiff's Second Motion in Limine is DENlED if4 PdRT as to the Order
of Condemnatioi~and GRANTED EN PART' as it pertains to any
statements made by Professor McDonald as to what the law is;

ORDER OM PRE-TRIAL MCPTlONS
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12. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclzide any Evidence and Testimony
Regarding the Cost to Cure Method is GRANTED as to testimony
concerning what the Twin Falls City Council would have required if an
appIication would have been submitted to them by the property owners;
13. Defendants Request to Tale Judicial Notice of This Courts File, Records in State

v. KLSBM, L.P., et. al., State v. Lazy]. Ranch, Inc. and State v. BCMG.W
Limited Partnership Purstiant to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 is ILBENIIEIIP;
14. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Allow Evidence and Testimony Regarding a
Collateral Issue is G M M T E D ;
15. Plaintiff's First Motion in Limine is GRANTED;
16. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap is RESERVED
to Trial.

COMGLUSIBN

Based upon the arguments presented, this court denies, grants and
reserves rulings 011 the various pre-trial motions as outlined above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this.&

4.
day of May, 2007
/

ORDER O N PRE-TRIALMOTlOMS

District Judge

3

/

I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the&
day of May, 2007, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order was mailed,
postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons:

Ms. Heather A. Cunningham
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE &
COX
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
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Mr. Joseph D. Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129

E DON c o P P L e - ISB if 1085
HEATHER A. CUNNLNGI-IAM - ISB # 5480
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Suite 600
Post OfficeBox 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
(208) 386-9428
Facsimile:

Attorneys for Defendants
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE: STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCIKJGH
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL.
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

)
)

CASE NO. CV 04-6336

1

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)
)
)

1
)
)

VS.

1

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH,
INC.

1
1
1
1

Defendants.

***
TO:

THE HONORABLE JUDGE HIGER, District Judge:
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r) ?
,
i
,

J

The Defendant, Canyon Vista, presents herewith instructions to the jury which they respectfully
request that the Court include in the instructions to be given the jury in this case. Furnished herewithare
the original requested instructions which are numbered.
DATED this 25"' day of May, 2007.
DAVISON. COPPLE. COPPLE & COX

Attorneys for Defe;da@
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25" day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was servedupon the following by the method indicated below:
U.S. MAIL
a n Delivery
d
-FacsimileTra~ismission
Overnight Mail

Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

x

~
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DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2

PRE VOlR DlRE INSTRUCTIONS

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. I
You have been summoned as prospectivejurors in the lawsuit now beforeus. The first thing we
do in a trial is to select 12 jurors and, perhaps, one or two alternate jurors from among you ladies and
gentlemen.
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court marks the trial
exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. The bailiff will assist me in maintaining
courtrooln order and will arrange for your meals after this case bas been submitted to you for decision
The cout reporter will keep a verbatim account of all maters of record during the trial.
To assist both you and the attorneys with this process of selection of a jury, I will introduce you to
the pasties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about.
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the "plaintiff." In this suit the plaintiff is the Idaho
Transportation Board. The plaintiffis represented by lawyers, Karl D. Voet and Joseph Mallet. Deputy_
Attorney General for the State of Idaho. The party against whom a lawsuit is brought is called the
"defendant." In this suit the defendants are Canvon Vista, a Family Limited Partnership. Lazy J Ranch,
Inc. has disclaimedany interest in this case The defendants are represented by legal counsel,
Copple and Heather A. Cunningham of the firm Davison, Copple. Copple & Cox of Boise. Idaho.
This is a civil case illvolving eminent domain "Eminent Domain" is a term which refers to the
taking of private land bv the government for public use. In this case, the Defendants, own property located
on Pole Line Road in Twin Falls, Idaho. The Plaintiff. the Idaho Transportation Board, filed this action on
December 28,2004, to take a portion of Defendants' property. "Condenmation" is the lepal term for a
taking by eminent domain
A trial starts with the selectionof a fair, impartialjury. To that end the court and the lawyers will
ask each of you questions lo discover whether you have any information concerning the case or any
opinions or attitudes which either of the lawyers believe might cause you to favor or disfavor some part of

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 4

the evidence or one side or the other. The questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs, and
experiences, but they are not intended to embarrass you. If you do not hear or understand a question, you
should say so. If you do understand the question, you should answer it freely. The clerk of the court will
now swear you for the jury examination.
Previous D J I 1

GWEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 5

PRE EVIDENTIARY INSTRUCTIONS

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 2
Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to begin the trial o f a lawsuit. Some o f you may be unfamiliar
with the procedures in which you are about to participate; and I am going, therefore,to outline briefly for
you how this trial will proceed.
Now that the jury is selected and sworn, the court will read to you some o f your instructions.
Then, the attorneys will make opening statements; or t h e w attoiney may, i f he wishes, save his
opening statement until later. In an eminent domain case such as this, the Defendants have the right to
give its ooenine;statement first. The opening statement is intended to inform you about the party's case,
and what they claim, and what evidence they intend to produce for you. The opening statemerd is not
evidence, however.
Then each side offersevidence to support his claim. The Defendants proceed first and offerall
their evidence. Then the Plaintiff proceeck to offer all its evidence on its claims.
After all o f the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest o f your instructions. In those instructions I
will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will have to decide.
Then the trial concludes with the arguments o f the lawyers for both side.
Finally, you will be taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in privacy.
Slate v. McGill, 79 ID 467, 321 P2d 595 (1958)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

DEFENDANTS' MQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case. It is
your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this
way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective assessment of the
evideiice. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessaryto decide the case, and it is your duty to
follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking out one and
disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in which they are
numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand ail instructio~h
you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This evidence
consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any stipulated or
admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of attorneys may help you understand the evidence and
apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in
the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I
sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered exhibit
without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my responsibility. You
must not speculate as to the reason for aiiy objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in
reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the aiiswer
or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it
gives meaning to the aiiswer.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the trial. As
the solejudges of the facts, you much determine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to
it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroomall of the experience and background of your lives.

There is no magical formula for evaluation testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for
yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told.
The considerations you use in making the inore important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same
considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case.

IDJI 1.oo

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVEFED
OTHER

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions concerning the
law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you
in the course of the trial proceedings.

If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted from the
witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them to other persons or
jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.

2.

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, you
must report it to me proinptly.

3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.

4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all the testimony and have

receivedmy instructions as to the law that applies to the case.

5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater

understanding of the case.

6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

IDJI 1.03

GIVEN
REI;USED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 6
Menibers of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with
anyone else, nor to form ally opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally submit the case to you.

D3JI 1 .03.1

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

-

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
This lawsuit is a condemnation action brought under the govenmental power of eminent domain.

In this case, the State of Idaho. Departmenl of Trans~ortationhasbeen authorized to acquire a portion of
tlie real property belonging to the defendants for the purpose of constructing a limited access highway on
Pole Line Road in Twin Falls. In addition thereto, ail the right of access to. from and between the ~ u b l i c
right of way and all of the contipuous remaining aroperty of Canyon Vista has been extinguished and
prohibited except ibr access, if any, as shown on the oroiect olans
Under our law, no private property may be taken though the power of eminent domain without tile
payment ofjust compensation. The sole issue for your determination is the amount to be paid to the
property owner as just compensation.
IDJI 7.01.1 (modified as noted).

GWEN
REFUSED
MODLFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, together with any direct
damages suffered by the defendant, all measured as of December 28,2004.
The guiding principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the defendant for the property
interest taken. The defendant is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had
not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more.
IDJI 7.05.5 (modified as noted).

United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)
People ex rel. Pub. Wks. v. Lynbar, Inc. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 870, 880
Utah StateRoad Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984)
Lange v. State, 547 P.2d 282, Washington

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODPIED
COVERED
OTHER
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 9

In this case, the defendant has the burden of proving that the just compensation for the taking of its
property exceeds the sum of $327,000, which is the highest amount forjust compensation presented in this
trial by the plaintiff, Statc of Idallo. Since the condemning authority has conceded this value, your verdict
should not be for an amount less than the amount of $327,000.
JDJI 7.03

GWEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVEFCED
OTHER

-

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 15

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 10
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if you

find""or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not
true.

IDJI 1.20.1

GWEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED SIIRY INSTRUCTIONS - 16

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
WSTRUCTION NO. 11
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a willing seller would sell and a willing
buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marketplace free of restraints, taking into account the
highest and most profitable use of the properly:
It presumes that the seller is desirous oT selling, but is under no cornpulsio~lto do so, and that the
buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so.
It presumes that both parlies are fully informed knowledgeable and fully aware of all the relevant
market conditions and the highest and best potential use of the property, and are basing their decisions
accordingly.
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property has been
exposed to the market for a reasonable time.
IDJI 7.09

GIVEN
RBFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 12
The phrase "highest and best use" means the lughest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and best use does not necessarily depend upon
the uses to which the property is devoted; rather, all uses for which the property is suitable should be
considered.
State ex rel, Symms v. City of Mountain Home,
94 ID 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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DEFEmANTS' REQUEST
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
If you find from the evidence that the fair market value of the property condemned in this case
increased or decreased because of the prospect of condemnation, you should disregard any such influence
and your award should be based on the value of the property as it would be at the timeofthe talcing if it
had not been subjected lo the threat of condemnation. In other words, the just compensation that is due the
owner for the taking of his or her property should be the value of the property as it would have beell at the
time of the taking uninfluenced by the fact that it was to be taken in this proceeding.
Florida Eminent Domain Jury Instruction 5 11.10
Threat of Condemnation (Project Influence;)
Langston v. City ofMiamiBeach, 242 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971);
State Road Dept. v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
City ofPhoenix v. Clauss, 177 Ariz. 566,568, 869 P.2d 1219, 1221 (App.
1994)
Town of Paradise Valley v. Young Financial Services,
Inc., 177 Ariz. 388,868 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1993)
City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 103 Nev. 619,748 P.2d 7 (1987)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 19

DEFENDMTS' REQUEST
INSTRUCTION NO. 14

In the State of Idaho the law provides that any incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with the general
laws of the State. The power of a city only exists within its boundaries
Idaho Constitution, Article XII, Sec 2
Blaha v CilyofEagle, 134 ID 770,9 P.3d 1236

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODlFED
COVERED
OTI-fER

-

DEFENDANT CANYON VYSTPI'S PROPOSED JVRY INSTRUCTIONS - 20

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
Under Idaho Law a planned Unit Develop~nentis permitted in cities as follows:
As part of or separate from the zoning ordinance, each governing board may provide, by ordinance for the
processing of applications for planned unit development permits. A planned unit development may be
defined as an area of land in which a variety of residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses are
unit development ordinances may include, but are
provided for under single ownership or control. Pla~u~ed
not limited to, requirements for minirnwn area, pennitted uses, ownership, common open space, utilities,
density, arrangements of land uses on a site and petmit processing.
I.C. 67-6515

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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DEFENDANT CANYON VZSTA'S PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTIONS - 21

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST
INSTRUCTION NO. 16

In determining the fair marketvalue of property, you may consider not only the opinions of the
various witnesses who testified as to marltetvalue, but also all other evidence in the case which may aid in
determining market value, such as location of the property, the surroundings and general enviromnent, any
peculiar suitability of the property for particular uses, and the reasonable probabilities as to future potential
uses, if any, for which the property is or would be suitable or physically adaptable, all as showll by the
evidence in the case to have existed on December 28,2004.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY NSTRUCTIONS - 22

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 17
In determining what compensation should be paid for damages, if any, to the remainder of the
property, you should take into coilsiderationthe uses for which the land is adaptable before and after the
taking, the characterand quality of the property, the shape and condition in which the remaining property is
left, the convenieilce of using the property before and after the taking, and such other factors as you find
would affect the market value of the property.
IDJT 7.16.1

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 23

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
The road construction involved in this case will result in what is known as a controlled or limited
access facility Such facilityis a highway or road especially designed to expedite tlxough traffic, a highway
or road which highway users and occupants of abutting property shall have only a controlled right of access.
The right of access to and fro~nan existing highway is one of the incidents of ownership of the land
therefore
abutting thereon. It may be regulated but not taken away without the payment of compe~~sation
The taking of such right of access is a factor that you should consider in determining the market value of the
remainder.
Pattern lnstnictions for Kansas 2d 11.13
Smith v. State Highway Comm, 346 P.2d 259, 185 Kan. 445 (1959)
Stale v. Fonberg, 80 ID 269,328 P.2d 60
Ferris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 I
D583,586,347 P.2d 996, 998
(1959)
HadJeldv. State, 86 ID 561, 566,388 P.2d 397,702 (1958)
Hughes v. State, 80 ID 286,295, 328 P.2d 397,402 (1958)
Mabe v. State, 83 ID 222,227,360 P.2d 799, 801-802 (1961)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 24

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 19
The measure of damages for the impairment of a right of access to a highway upon which the
property of an owner abuts is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before
the taking, and the fair market value of the same property immediately after the taking of the access. The
basis of the damages awarded is not the value of the right of access to the highway, but rather the difference
in the value of the property before and after the taking of the access, and this in turn is based upon the
highest and best use to which the land involved is suitable before and after the taking.

LobdeNv. State, 89 ID 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965).

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODPIED
COVERED
OTHER

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 25

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
DJSTRUCTION NO. 20
Just compensation is the difference between the market value of the entire property before the taking
and the market value of the remainder after the acquisitio~&together with any special damages caused by the
taking, measured as of December 28,2004.

IDJI 7.16

GWEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 26

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 21
Severance damages may arise where the property being taken is only part of a larger parcel
belonging to the defendant. Severance darnageconsists of either or both of the following.
a.

A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the taking or severance of the parcel

taken from the remainder.
b.

A diminution in the value of the reminder caused by the construction upon and use put to

the property taken.
Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the remainder immediately
before the taking, and deducting from this value of the fair market value which results after the severance of
the part taken and after the construction of the project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.

IDJI 7.16.5

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTI-IER
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 27

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 22
In this case there is evidence of damage and a decrease in the market value of the Defendant's
remaining land which has occurred as a result ofthe taking and the use lo which the Idaho Deparlment of
Transportation intends to put the property.
Market value adjusts to consider the possibility of restoring the damaged property lo the same
relative position in which it stood before the taking and evidence of the cost to cure the damage to the
remaining property may be considered. However, any proposed evidence to restorethe property must be
limited to that which can be done within the existing boundaries of the property.
The measure of damage adopted should be the one that produces the lesser damage amount.
State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112 (1955)
St. Patrick's Church v. State, 294 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1968)
Department of Highways v. Intermountain Term Co., 435 P.2d 391,
Colorado, (1968)
Utah Department of Transportation v. Rayco, 599 P2d 481, Utah
Mulkey v. State ofFlo,ida, 338 S.2d 1062, Florida, (1984)
Gluckman v. State ofN.Y., 325 N.Y.S.2d 99, (1971)
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain #I 8.18

GIVEN
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COVERED
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DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 28

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCITON NO. 23
Damages to the Defendants remaining property is to be assessed once and for all time. You may
consider all uses to which the property taken may reasonably he put by the State of Idaho. You may assume
the worst possible effect on the remainder of the property that the full extent of the legal rights acquired
would apply,
Crane v. City ofHavrison, 40 ID 229,234,232 Pac. 578. (1925)
Powell v. McKelvey, 56 ID 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935)
Reisenauer v. State Dept. ofHighw., 120 ID 36, 813 P.2d 375 (1991)
Idaho Etc. Ry. Co. v. Columbia Etc. Synod., 20 ID 568, 119 Pac. 60 (191 1)

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTI-IER
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 29

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 24

You were taken out to view the premises involved in tics case. What you observed there is not to be
considered evidence. You should consider your view of the premises only as a means of understanding and
applying the evidence produced here in trial. .
ID51 1.26.2

GWEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

-

DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JVRY INSTRUCTIONS - 30

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 25

In deciding this casc, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide ay question by
chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. In determininp the amount of iust com~ensali&
be awarded or, you may not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the
method of determining the amount of the just com~ensationaward.

IDJI 1.09 (modified as noted)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 31

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 26
If it becomes necessaryduring your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a note
signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by any means other
than such a note.
During your deliberatio~ls,you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of the
questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.
IDJI 1.11

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTI-IER
DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 32

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 27
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding matters that
you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few miiiutes counsel will present
their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude and
conduct ofjurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of deliberations, it is
rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the case or to stat how he or she
intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or
advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and
declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of reaching an
agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case
for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow
jurors.

IDJI 1.13
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DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 33

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 28
Members of the July: In order to return a verdict, it is necessarythat at least time-fourths of the jury
agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an
ageement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but do so only after an impartial considerationof the evidence with your fellowjurors. In the course
of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is
erroneous. But do not surrender your honest convictionas to the weight or effect of evidence solely because
of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges -judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain the
truth from the evidence in the case.
IDJI 1.13.1

GIVEN
REFUSED
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COVERED
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DEFEiWANT CANYON VISTA'S'PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 34

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 29
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over your
deliberations. Appropriate ibrrns of verdict will be submitted to you with any instrnctioils.

A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine or lnore
of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, fill it out and have it signed. If your verdict is unanimous, your
foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, tlle~lthose so agreeing will
sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, notify the bailiff, who will then return you
into open court.

IDJI 1.15.1
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DEFENDANT CANYON VISTA'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 35

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 30
The bailiffis now going lo escort you to the premises involved in this case. At the premises, you are
not to malceany measurenients, perform any tests, or conduct any demonstrations. The view is not to be
considered as evidence in this case, but is provided only to help you understand the evidence.
lDJl 1.26.1
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The Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of record, submits to the Court

m , its proposed instructions to the jury and jury verdict form. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the

3I

Court include these instructions and form in its instructions to be given to the jury in this case.

PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND JURY VERDICT FORM - 1 .
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Attached are the original instructions and a copy of an email sent to Mr. Loren Anderson,
Judges' Law Clerk, relaying a numbered set of proposed jury instructions, with citation
references and an un-numbered clean copy set for his use.
DATED this

s y d a y ofMay, 2007.
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Heather A. Cunningham
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PO Box 1583
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PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND JURY VERDICT FORM - 2
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JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case.
It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the Iaw set forth in these instructions to lhose facts,
and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective
assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking
out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the inanner in
which they are nunbered has no significance as to tl~eimportance of any of them. If you do 1101
understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or
explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instn~ctions,what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I
sustained ail objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely nly
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruliilg thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and sliould be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.

[There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it. as though you
had never heard it.]
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must detennine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this coutrooln all of the experience and
background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday
affairs, you detennine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight
you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions
in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this
case.
IDJI2d 1.00 -Introductory iilstruction to jury
Comment:
This instruction is a revision of IDJI2d 100, to clarify the language and eliminate
unnecessary verbiage. It also supersedes and replaces IDJ12d 120 and 121.
Given

Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
IDJ12d 1.01 -Deliberation procedures (modified)
Comments:
See "Note" instruction as second part of this IDJI.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you do
take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room to
decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear other
answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and not
be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot. assign to one person
the duty of taking notes for all of you.
IDJ12d 1.O1 - Deliberation procedures (modified)
Comments:
Continuation of part of 1.01 extra.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.

2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or perinit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case,
you rnust report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury rooin to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.

4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and have

received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding

of the case.

6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.
IDJI2d 1.03 -Admonition to jury

Comment:
This instruction is an outline of the ele~nentsofLen stated to jurors at the beginning of a trial.
See, IRCP 47(n). It is perhaps preferable to use the elements of this iilstruction as a guide for a Inore
inforinal explanation to the jury of the necessary conduct expected of them, including reasons and
exa~nplesas appropriate.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have
advised you ofthe claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided.
IDJI2d 1.05 - Statement of claims not evidence
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. The following facts are not in dispute:
I) Through the exercise of eminent domain, the State of Idaho has acquired the following
property from the Defendants:
a.

A fee interest in 1.8784 acres of land (81,823 sq. ft.) for highway right-of-way and

also a bike path under the Perrine Coulee Bridge.
b.

A permaneilt ilrigatior! and slope easement over 0.3207 acres of land (13,970 sq. fir

c.

A temporary construction easement over 0.2145 acres of land 19,344 so. ft.).

2) The State of Idaho has the right of eminent domain.
3) The use to which the subiect property is to be applied is a use authorized by law.
4) The taking of the subiect propem is necessarv for such use.
t good faith to purchase the subiect wopertv s o u ~ h to
t be
5) The State of Idaho has s o u ~ h in

IDJI2d 1.07 -Facts not in dispute (modified as noted)
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.
IDJI2d 1.24.1- Circu~nstailtialevidence without definition
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
A witness who has special Itnowledge, in a particular matter may give his or her opinion

on that matter. 111 determining the weight to he given such opinion, you should consider the
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the proposition is Inore probably
true than not tlue

Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other

--

District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am included to favor
the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any such
suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, any opinion as to
wl~ichwitnesses are or are not worthy of belief, what facts are or are not establisl~ed;or what
inferences should be drawn &om the evidence. If any expression of mine seems to indicate as
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.

Give11
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. It is highly probable that during the course of this trial, it will be necessary for me to excuse
you and ask that you wait in the jury room while counsel for the parties and I discuss and try to
resolve disputes over the admissibility of evidence, the propriety of proposed juiy instructions, or
other important legal issues that may affect the trial. On occasion, I may declare an early recess, or
have you come in later than nonnal in order not to keep you waiting while we do this.
Let me assure you that while you are waiting, we are workii~g.Let me also assure you that
both the attorneys and I know that your time is valuable, and understand that delays which keep you
waiting can be frustrating. Both they and I will do everything reasonably possible to expedite the
presentation of evidence so that you can complete your duties and return to your normal lives as
soon as possible. I know that you understand that these proceedings are extremely important to the
parties, and your patience will help ensure that the final outcome is just and legally correct.

Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
You were advised earlier that twelve (12) members of this panel will decide this case. The
one among you who& the a l t e r n a t e d will be selected by lot and will be notified after the final
arguments are presented in the case. At the time the alternate w r will be excused, subject to recall
if necessary
(modified as noted)
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other

District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. The

involved in this case is entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced treatment that an

individual would be under lilte circumstances. You should decide this case with the same
impartiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals
IDJ12d 1.02 Corporate parties (modified as noted)
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the sum
of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage award or
percentage of negligence.
IDJI2d 1.09 - Quotient verdicts
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to tihe jury room for your
deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude
and co~lductof jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of
pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me,
there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you
must decide this case for yourselc but you should do so only after a discussion and co~~sideration
of
the case with your fellow jurors
IDJI2d 1.13 - Collcluding remarks
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over
your deliberations.
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use only the
oncs conforming to your coi~clusionsand return the others unused.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your verdict is
unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than thc cntire jury, agree,
then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who will

then return yon into open court.
IDJI 1.15.1 Completion of verdict iorm - general verdict
Given
Refused
Modkfied
Covered
Other

District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over
your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions on
the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine
or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill
it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on each question.
If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who will
then return you into open court.
IDJ12d 1.15.2 - Completion of verdict fonn on special interrogatories
Comment:
Two forms are set forth, one for use with a general verdict and one for use with special
interrogatories. There are still some ambiguities, such as exactly who signs the final verdict
when the same jurors do not agree to each question. I-Iowever, pattern instructions drafted to fit
every circumstance became too cumbersome. The committee determined that the above
instruction was sufficient to meet the general case; that if an ambiguous circumstance arose
which the jury could not work out for themselves, they could request further instructions from
the court.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the
sincere thanks of this Court. You inay now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone else.
For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely
your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are not required
to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to talk to
someone about this case, you inay tell them as much or as little as you like about your deliberations
or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in discussing the case over your
objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion has begun, you
may report it to me.
IDJ12d 1.17 -Post verdict jury instruction
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

JUDGE'S STOCK
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.
IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Tlie bailiff is now going to escoil you to the premises involved in this case. At the premises,
you are not to make any measurements, perform any tests, or conduct any demonstrations. The
view is iiot to be considered as evidence in this case, but is provided only to help you understand the
evidence.

IDJI 1.26.1 -View of tlie premises, preliminary instruction
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other

--

District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY ENSTRUCTION NO. You were taken out to view the premises involved in this case. What you observed there is
not to be considered evidence. You should consider your view of the premises only as a means of
understanding and applying the evidence produced here in trial.
IDJI 1.26.2 - View of the premises, final instruction
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. This lawsuit is a condemnation action brought under the governmental power of eminent
domain. In this case, the State of Idaho has been authorized to acquire a certain strio of land along
Pole Line Road, Twin Falls, Idaho belonging to the defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited
Partnershiu and Lazy J Ranch, Inc., for the purpose of building a divided four-lane highway, U.S.
Highway 93, Twin Falls Alternate Route. Stage 1.
Under our law, no private property may be taken through the power of eminent domain
without the payment of just compensation. The sole issue for your determination is the just
compensation to be paid to the defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J
Ranch, Inc., by the plaintiff, State of Idaho.
IDJI 7.01.1 - Explanation of eminent domain (modified as noted.)
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. In this case, the defendants have the burden of proving that the just compensation for the
taking of their property exceeds the sum of $263,800, which is the amount for just compensation
presented in this trial by the State of Idaho. Since the condeliniing authority has conceded this
value, your verdict should not be for an amount less than the amount of $263,800.
IDJI 7.03 -Burden of proof (modified as noted)
Comments:
State ex re1 Moore v. Bastain, 87 Idaho 444 (1976); State v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467 (1958);
State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45 (1955) and Village of Lapwai v. Allieier, 69 Idaho 397(1949), hold
that the condemnee (defendant) has the burden of proof. There should be no distinction between a
direct condemnation and an indirect or inverse condemnation case, as in both cases the question of
whether there has been a "talting" is an issue for the court, not the jury, thus in both cases the sole
issue for the jury is that of just compensation. Further, in any issue tried in a couri, legal principle
requires that someone have the "burden of proof." In a condemnation action, the burden oF proof
should be on the defendant to prove that the just compensation is an amount greater than that
offered or conceded by the state.
In an inverse condem~lationcase, the standard burden of proof instruction is appropriate, as
there may be no concession of value by the condemning authority.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Your sole task in this trial is to determine the amount of Just Comaensation due to the
propei-ty owners.
Just compensation means the fair market value o r the property taken, measured as of
December 28,2004

In deciding Just Compensation, you are not to consider any interest that may be due, the
amount of any party's attorney fees, exoert witness fees, or any other costs of litigation. The Judge
will decide compensation for these items at the end of the trial and they are not be considered at all
by you in your deliberations.
IDJI 7.05 -Definition of "just conipensation" (modified as noted OR see separate
jury instruction on fees and costs)
Comments:
This instruction applies to a total take with no elelnetit of severance damage.
[Note: In a direct cotidelnnatio~iaction, the date inserted in the instruction will be the date of
issuance of tlie surnmons -- I.C. 5 7-712. In ail inverse condernnatio~icase, tlie date will be the actual date
of taking as deterniined by the court.]
The only issue for submission to the iury is the question of the value of tlie propertv sought to be
taken or the alnoulit of compensation for tlie taking: all other factual issues are to be resolved bv the trial
court. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 94.0.943.500 P.2d 841. 844 (1972)
"Since we (Supreme Court'l have held that an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condetnnee
in a conde~nnatiotiproceeditig lies within tlie discretioti of the trial court. it is appropriate that we
delineate some factors which the trial court should consider in exercising that discretion. Hence, we
(Supreme Court) would deem that in considerinv tlie award of attorneys' fees to a condetnnee, a
condemnor should have reasonably made a tilnely offer of settletnent of at least 90 per cent of the
ultimate jury verdict." Ada Counfv Highway District v. Acarreazti. 105 Idaho 873, 673, P.2d 1067 (1983)
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other

District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. In determining the fair market value of property, you may consider not only the opiniolls of
the various witnesses who testified as to market value, but also all other evidence in the case which
may aid in deter~liinillgmarket value, such as location of the property, the surroundings and general
environment, ally peculiar suitability of the property for particular uses, and the reasonable
probabilities as to future potential uses, if any, for which the property is or would be suitable or
physically adaptable, all as shown by the evidence in the case to have existed on December 28,

2004.
IDJI 7.07 - Fair market value - factors to be considered (modified as noted)
Comment:
In a direct condemnatioll action, the date inserted in the instruction will be the date of
issuance of the surnnlons -- I.C. 5 7-712; in an inverse condemnation case, the date will be the
date of taking as determined by the court. City o f Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99 (1968),
City of Mt. I-Iome, 94 Idaho 528 (1972) and Eagle Sewer Dist. v. Hormaechea, 109 Idaho 418 (App.
1985).
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a willing seller would sell and a
willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marketplace free of restraints, taking into
account the highest and most profitable use of the property.
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no coinpulsion to do so, and
that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so.
It presumes that both parties are hlly informed, knowledgeable and aware of all relevant
market conditiolls and of the highest and best use potential of the property, and are basing their
decisions accordingly.
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property has been
exposed to the market for a reasonable time.
IDJI 7.09 -Definition of fair market value
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. You may consider the owner's particular plan for developinent and use of the property only
for tile purpose of determining uses for which the property is adaptable.

IDJI 7.14 - Owner's development plan
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
In determining what compensation should be paid for damages, if any, to the remainder of
the property, you should take into consideration the uses for which tlle land is adaptable before and
after the taking, the character and quality of the property, the shape and condition in which the
remaining property is left, t11e convenience of using the property before and after the taking, and
such other factors as you find would affect the market value of the propeay
IDJI 7.16.1 - Factors to be considered, partial take - severance da~nages
Comments:
This instruction is somewhat redundant to IDJI 7.07. Where there is no benefit claimed
to the remainder, the approach of State v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45 (1955), of determining just
compensation by subtracting the fair marltet value of the remainder from the fair marltet value of
the whole before the take would eliminate t l ~ enecessity for this instruction. Where, however, the
parcel taken and the parcel remaining are separately valued, this instruction might be useful.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other

District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. In this case, you should detennine the just colnpensation as follows:
First, determine the fair market value of the parcel being taken for the project, including all
improvelnents thereon, as of December 28,2004.
Next, determine the fair lnarket value of the remaining portion as it existed immediately
before the take, and the fair lnarket value of this parcel as it will exist immediately after the talte,
determined as of December 28.2004. In determining these values, you inay not consider the impact
of the project in determining the value before the take, hut you should consider the impact of the
project and any special benefits which will result from the construction of the improveinents in the

..

...

manner proposed by the plaintiff after the take, in determining the value of the remainder of the
property after the take.
If you detennine that the fair market value of the remainder after the take is less than the fair

,

.

market value of the remainder before the take, and that the dilninution of value is because of the
take, the difference is considered severance damage and the properly owner is entitled to this
difference as part of the just compensation.
..
. ..

If you detennine that the fair value of the remainder after the take is greater than the value
before the talte, because of benefits conferred upon the property by the project or because of the
construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff, then there are no
severance darnages and no other adjustment to value. Do not offset any excess in value applicable
to the remainder, or property not taken, against the value of the property taken.
Finally, determine whether the defendants have incurred any special danlages or costs on
account of the taking, and the amounts thereof.

..

Combine the amounts you find under each of the elements in this instruction to find the
amount ofjust coinpensation that is due from the plaintiffto the defendants in this case.
IDJI 7.18 -

Partial take with severance damage and a benefit to the remainder (modified as
noted)

Comment:
Idaho Code § 7-71 1; State v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19 (1969); Orofino v. Swayne, 95 Idaho
125 (1972).
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. You have heard testimony related to both city ordinances and provisions of a city
coinprehensive plan. I11 your deliberations, when considering the oroper weight to give these
provisions, you must rcmernber that only the city ordinance has the force and effect of law. In
contrast, a city's colnprehensive plan does not operate a zoning law, but rather serves to guide
a n d o v e r m n e n t a l agencies responsible for inaltiiig zoning decisions. The purpose of
a coinprehensive plan is to reflect the desirable goals and obiectives or desirable future situations
for the land within a iurisdiction.
Comments:
"Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all
,
and other regulatiol~sas are not in conflict with its charter or with the
such local ~ o l i c esanitary
general laws." Idaho Const. Art. XII, 6 2
"Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions not
inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as inay be expedient, in addition to the special
powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the
corporation and its trade, commerce and industry." I.C. 6 50-302(1)
"A comprehensive olan reflects the "desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future
situations" for the land within a jurisdiction. I.C. 6 67-6508. This Court has held that a
comorehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning law. but rather serves to guide
and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions." Urrutia v.
Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 353,357-58,2 P.3d 738,742-43 (2000)
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Your sole task in this trial is to determine the a~nouiltof Just Colnpensation due to the
property owners.
In deciding Just Compensation, you are not to consider any interest that may be due, the
amount of any party's attorney fees, expert witness fees, or any other costs of litigation. The Judge
will decide compensation for these items at the end of the trial and they are not be considered at a11
by you in your deliberations.
Comments:
mote: This is intended to be used should the Court want IDJI2d 7.05 to remain
unanended and give a fee and cost instruction separately.]
The only issue for submission to the iury is the question of the value of the prooert~
sought lo be taken or thc amount of compensation for the taking: all other factual issucs are to be
resolved by the trial court. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940,943,500 P.2d 841,844 11972)
"Since we (Supreme CourQ have held that an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a
condemnee in a condemnation proceeding lies within the discretion of the trial court, it is
apuropriate that we delineate some factors which the trial court should consider in exercising that
discretion. Hence, we (Supreme Court) would deem that in considerillv the award of attorneys'
fees to a condemnee, a condemnor should have reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of
at least 90 per cent of the ultimate iury verdict." Ada Counw H i ~ h w a yDistrict v. Acarreaui,
105 Idaho 873,673, P.2d 1067 (19831
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. The compensatioll which must be paid for orouerty talcen by eminent domain does not
necessarily depend upon the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking or on the
planned use by the property owner; rather, all the uses for which the property is suitable should
be considered in determining market value. It is the "highest and best use" of the property that
you should consider when determining just compensation.
The ''highest and best use" of a property is the reasonably orobable and legal use which is
physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible. and that results in the h i M
value. A potential highest and best use should be considered to the full extent that the prosoect
of demand for such use affects the market value of the proverty.
Comments:
"Highest and best use. The reasonably orohable and legal use of vacant land or an
improved propertL which is ahysically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible,
and that results in the highest value. The four criteria the highest and best use must meet are
legal permissibility, physical possibility. financial feasibility, and maximum productivity." The
Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, 4"'
"The compensation which must be paid for property taken by eminent domain does not
necessarily dep-on
the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking: rather, all the
uses for which the property is suitable should he considered in determining lnarket value.
"The highest and best use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be
needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered, not ilecessarily as a measure of value,
but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the lnarket value of the
p r o p e r t v . . . I t r o p e r t y
is claisned to be adaptable is
reasonably probable." Svmnzs v Cily ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 531, 493 P.2d 387, 389
(1972)(internal citations omitted)).
"It is the effect, if any, upon the fair market value on the date of taking which makes
relevant the evidence of a possible rezoning of the property.. .. a prospect o f r e z o n i n ~which may
aooear to be somewhat remote should, nevertheless, be considered by the court if it affects the
fair market value of the property on the date of the taking. (citations omitted). It is this standard
of relevance and nlateriality which the trial judge should employ in exercising his discretion to

admit or exclude evidence offered to show ~ossiblezoniilr, change." Ada CounO, Highway
Distvict v. Mapwive, 104 Idaho 656, 659,662 P.2d 237,240 (1983) (citation omitted).
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. In deciding whether a right to acccss was taken from the property owner, you must first
find that the property had a right of direct access to Pole Line Road in the before condition. If
you find it did not, no right to access has been taken and the owners are not cntitled to any
compensation for a taking of access.
If you find that the property owner had a riglit of direct access to Pole Line Road in the
before condition. you then have to determine whether or not the remaining vehicular access to
&roper@

is reasonable. If all rights to access the property wcre destroyed, or if the property

was not left wit11 reasonable access afler the taking. then there was a talcilig of access which
would entitle the property owner to compensation.

Only then may you determine iust

colnpensatioli for the taking of that access.

"The condemnee never having had access to the new highway there is no easement or
access taken in this proceeding. There can only be compensable damages for an existing
easement, and when one does not exist, there is none to take.
"Private rights relative to the use and entry of hi~hwaysmay be regulated many ways.
Where a property owner has no right of direct access to a highway, ilothin~is talceii from him by
the failure to give him such a right when the highway is constructed. (Cites Omitted)." State ex
e
i
9
5
8
~
"'We agree, however, with those courts which hold that where the property fronts on
inore than one street, access may be denied, under particular circumstances, at one of the streets
if adequate ineans of access remain to tlie owner at the otl~erstreet or streets. To us this seems a
reasonable exercise of the power of the city to urovide for the public safety, co~~venie~ice
and
welfare under the conditions created by modern motorized traffic in a large city.' Schrunk,%
Or. 63,408 P.2d 89.93 (19651."
"In tlie instant case, there having beexi no destruction of vehicular access to the Merritt
property, and the remaining vehicular access being reasonable, there was no taking of the
Merritt's prowcrty which would entitle him to compensation." Mevritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142,
145,742 P.2d 397,399-400 (1986).

Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other

District Judge

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY,
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICIC,
NEIL MILLER and JOI3N X. COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

1
1
)

Case No. CV-04-6336

)

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
-VS-

1
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
INC.
Defendants.

)

1
1

1

We the jury, find the amount of just compensation payable by the Plaintiff to the
Defendants in the above-entitled matter to be as follows:
Fair Market Value of the Entire Property
Before the Highway Project:
LESS
Fair Marlcet Value of the Remainder of
Property After the Highway Project:
EQUALS FAIR MARKET VALUE of
Real Property acquired:
PLUS
Severance Damages to the Remainder,
if any:

SPECIAL VERDICT - 1

$

LESS
Value of Special Benefits to the
Remainder, if any:
EQUALS
Total Amount of Just Compensation:
DATED this

day of June, 2007.

JURORS:
Presiding Juror

SPECIAI, VERDICT - 2

may Z Y Z U U I

IZ:ZY

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
KARI[, D.VOGT
D e p m ACtorpey General
Idaho Transportation D e p m e n t
33 11 Wesf Sfate Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho83707-1129
Telephone: (208)334-8815
Facsimile: (@8) 334-4498
ISB #5817
ISB 85015
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF ;THE FlFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TEE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O W OF TWIN FALLS
TEE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,

DAFSYEZX, v~UNNING,R. JAMBS
C O L E W , BRUCE SWEENEY,
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK,
NEIL MLLBR and JOHN X. COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

Plainti@

' Defendants.

)

1
1
)

Case No. CV-04-6336

1
1
)
)

AMENDED PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
sURY lNSTRUCTION @IJX 7.03)

1

The Plriintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of rewrd, submits to the Court
an Amended Proposed Jury Instruction (ID31 7.03). Plalnliff respectfully requests that the Court

replace ID31 7.03 filed on May 25,2007 with Exhibit A attached hereto. The original instruction

AMENDED PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION (CDJE 7.03) - 1
..

. .. .

taX:ZUUJJ444YU

nay

ru

LUUI

ir:ru

has a numeric typographical error and Plaintiff's respectiidly request this Instruction to be given
to the jury in @iscase.
DATED this

~ 2 ,

of May, 2067,

~ & t yAttorney General
Idaho Department of Transportation

I BY CERTIFY that on the

a

4day of May, 2007, I caused a true and conect

copy of the above to be served to:

E Don Copple
Heather Cwmhgham
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583'
Boise, Idaho 83701

~ u , sMail
:
n ~ a n Delivered
d
Clovemight Mail
m~elecopy(Fax) 386-9428

~ e ~ dAttorney
ty
General
Idabo Department of Transportation

MNDEDPCAINTIFF'S
. . .,
.
. PROPOSED JURY ,INSTRUCTION (IDJI 7.03) - 2

may L Y L U U I

ir:Ly

PLAINTIFF'S RJIQUESWD

...

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.-

In this case, the defendants have the burden of proving that the just compensation for rhe
taking of theii;property
exceeds the sum of$202.230.00, which is the amouat for just compensation
..
.
presented in '&s tlial by the state of Idaho. Since the condemning authority has conceded this
value; your vetdict
.
. should not be for an amomt less than the amount of $202.230.00.

ID31 7.03 -Burden o f p r o ~ (modified
f
as noted)
Cottunents:
State ex re1 Moore v. Bastain, 87 Idaho 444 (1976); Slate v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467 (1958);
State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45 (1955) and ~ i l l a i eof Lawwai v. AIligier, 69 Idaho 397(1949), hold
that the condeignee (defendant) has the burden of proof. There should be no distinction between.a
direct coniledation &id in i n k t or inverse condemmtion case, as in both cases the question of
whether thkre bas been a "taking" is an issue for the court, not the jury, thus in both cases the sole
issue for the jiky js tbat ofjust compensation Further, in any issue kied in a court, legal principle
requires that soheone have Zhe "burden of proof." In a condemnation action, the burden of proof
should be onthe defendant to prove that the just compensation is an amount greater than that
offered or corx~dedby the stab.
l[n an iriverse condemnation case, the standard burden of proof instruction is appropriate, as

there may be no concession of value by the condemning authority.
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other
District Judge

...

PLAIETTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY ~ &.T. R U C T ~ O
NO.
N

In this case, the defendants have the burden of

that the just compensation for the

taking of thejx property exceeds the sum of $202,230.00, which is the amount for just omp pens at ion
presented j.n:&his !+a1 by t$e State of Idaho. Since the condemning authority has conceded this
value, your virdict should not be for an amount less thanthe amount of $202,230.00.

w-=-""-W-.---."I-~-

elelk

~ - - ~ ~ . ~ - - . - - - - - -Deputy
--"-

ClQik

IN THE D118TRICT COURT OF THE FlFPH JUDICDWL DiSTWBCT 8 5 THE
STATE OF IIDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CBUBRI'PPT 0 5 TWIN FALLS

THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex. rel.,
DARRELL V. MANNING, JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWEENEY,
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK,
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD

)
)

Case No. CV 2004-6336

1
)
)
)

1
Plaintiff,

)

1
1

VS.

PRELIMUNABV

JURY BNSTRlLICTllONS

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED )
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, )
INC.
)
Defendants.

)
)
i

MEMBERS OF THE JURY: I will now give you the preliminary instructions in
this case. Individual copies of these Preliminary Instructions are being provided to each
of you. T11ese copies are yours to use throughout the trial. When the evidence is closed,
I will give you the final instructions in this case.

BNSTRUCTION NO. 'i

Ladies and gentleme~i,we are about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some of you
may be unfamiliar with the procedures in which you are about to participate; and I am
going, therefore, to outline briefly for you how this trial will proceed.
Now that the jury is selected and sworn, the court will read to you some of your
instructions. Then, the attorneys will maice opening statements; or the State's attorney
may, if he wishes, save his opening statement until later. In an eminent domain case
such as this, the Defendants have the right to give its opening statement first. The
opening statement is intended to inform you about the party's case, and what they
claim, and what evidence they intend to produce for you. The opening statement is not
evidence, however.
Then each side offers evidence to support his claim. The Defendants proceed
first and offer all their evidence. Then the Plaintiff proceeds to offer all its evidence on
its claims.
After all of the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest of your instructions. In
those instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will have to
decide.
Then the trial concludes with arguments of the lawyers for both sides.
Finally, you will be taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in
privacy.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based
on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case,
and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions
as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these
instructions are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as
to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may
send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point
further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of
attorneys inay help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they
say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence,
you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during
the trial, I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to

answer it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are
legal matters, and are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason
for any objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision
you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or
exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be
considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you much determine what evidence you
believe and what weight you attach to it. 111 SO doing, you bring with you to this
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives.
There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs,
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much
weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should
apply in your deliberations in this case.

INSTRUCTPION NO. 3

If you wish, you may talce notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not
hear other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the
jury room.
If you do not talce notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said
and not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to
one person the duty of taking notes for all of you.

lNSTRLd6TUQN NO. 4

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes talcen by you in the course of the trial proceedings.

Pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, trial courts like this one
have been given discretion to permit jurors in civil cases to submit questions to witnesses
who are called to testify during a trial. I am exercising my discretion to allow you to
submit questions in this case.
The limitations and procedures that will apply to questioi~ssubmitted by the jury
are as follows:
1. Once counsel for both parties have concluded their questioning, I will advise

that it is time for questions from the jury.
2. Each of you will be permitted to ask one question of each witness who testifies

during the trial.
3. Each of you will be issued a noteboolc and a pencil. When I announce that it is
time for juror questions, each of you should tear a sheet of paper out of your
notebook, whether you plan to ask a question or not. If you have no question,
simply write "No question" on your sheet, fold it and pass it to the bailiff. If
you do have a question, write it down, fold the piece of paper and pass it to the
bailiff. As a result of this process, no one but you will lcnow whicl~juror posed
whicl~particular question.
4. T11e bailiff will deliver the folded sheets of paper to me, and will ask counsel for

the parties to come to the bench and review the questions. If either party has an
objection to any of the proposed questions, I will have the bailiff escort you to
the jury room while we resolve the objections.
5. Once any objections have been resolved, I will read the juror questions to the
witrress, and the witness will respond.
6. If you submit a q~~estion
and that specific question is not asked, it may be
because your question duplicates that of another juror, or it was evident to me
that the question called for information that would be inadmissible. I will try to
ask as many of the questions as possible, exactly as written, but do not be

disturbed if your question is not asked. Please understand that if the question
was omitted, there was a good legal reason for doing so.
7. Once I have put the juror questions to the witness, I will give counsel for each
of the parties a chance to follow up with questions of their own.

8. In order to expedite matters, please try to hold your questions to one per
witness. Also, if you decided what you will want to aslc before that witness
finished testifying, go ahead and write your question down rather than waiting
until the witness finishes.

There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or
their employees, or any of the witnesses.

2.

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss
the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to
influence your decision in the case, you must report it to me promptly.

3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury
room to deliberate at the close of the entire case.

4.

You must not maice up your mind until you have heard all the testimony
and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.

5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater
understanding of the case.

6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

IMSTRUCTBORB NO. 7

If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am included
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate,
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, what facts are or are not
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of
mine seems to indicate as opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard
it.

PNSTRUGBIIOMI MO. 8

It is highly probable that during the course of this trial, it will be necessary for me to
excuse you and aslc that you wait in the jury room while counsel for the parties and I discuss
and try to resolve disputes over the admissibility of evidence, the propriety of proposed jury
instructions, or other important legal issues that may affect the trial. On occasion, I may
declare an early recess, or have you come UI later than normal in order not to lceep you
waiting while we do this.
Let me assure you that while you are waiting, we are working. Let me also assure you
that both the attorneys and I know that your time is valuable, and understand that delays
which keep you waiting can be frustrating. Both they and I will do everything reasonably
possible to expedite the presentation of evidence so that you can complete your duties and
return to your normal lives as soon as possible. I laow that you understand that these
proceedings are extremely important to the parties, and your patience will help ensure that
the final outcome is just and legally correct.

INSTRBICTBBN NO. 9

Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to
be decided.

llNSTRUCTlQBN NO. 10

A witness who has special itnowledge, in a particular matter may give his or her

opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should
consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his or her
opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem
it entitled.

IMSTRCICTIQN NO. 11

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law males no distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of
proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

BNSTRUeTIIQN NO. 12

The following issues are not in dispute:
1) Through the exercise of eminent domain, the State of Idaho has acquired the following
property from the Defendants:

a.

A fee interest in 1.8784acres of land (81,823 sq. ft.) for highway right-of-way and
also a bike path under the Perrine Coulee Bridge.

b.

A permanent irrigation and slope easement over 0.3207acresof land (13,970sq.
ft).

c.

A temporary construction easement over 0.2145 acres of land (9,344 sq. ft.).

d.

All direct access rights to Poleline Road were acquired by the State of Idaho.

2) The State of Idaho has the right of eminent domain.

3) The use to which the subject property is to be applied is a use authorized by law.

4) The taking of the subject property is necessary for such use.

5) The State of Idaho has sought in good faith to purchase the subject property sought to
be taken.

IINSTWUCIPIOM NO. 13
When I say that a party has the burdell of proof on a proposition, or use the expression
"if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the proposition is more
probably true than not true.

iNSTRPIGBICBN NO. a4

The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a willing seller
would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marketplace
free of restraints, taking into account the highest and most profitable use of the
property.
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no compulsion to do
so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so.
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, knowledgeable and fully aware
of all the relevant market conditions and the highest and best potential use of the
property, and are basing their decisions accordingly.
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property has
been exposed to the market for a reasonable time.

BNSBRUCTIOM NO. 15

The phrase "highest and best use" means the highest and most profitable use for
-

which the property is adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and
best use does not necessarily depend upon the uses to which the property is devoted;
rather, all uses for which the property is suitable should be considered.

IINSTRUCTION NO. Il6

Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, including
all permanent improvements thereon, together with any direct damages suffered by the
defendant, all measured as of December 28,2004.

INSTRUCTION NO. 117

You were advised earlier that twelve (12) members of this panel will decide this
case. The one among you who is the alternate juror will be selected by lot and will be
notified after the final arguments are presented in the case. At the time the alternate iuror
will be excused, subject to recall if necessary.

INSTRUCTION NO.' $ 8

Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among
yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case,
until after I finally submit the case to you.
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The Defendant, Canyon Vista, presents herewith instructions to the jury which they respectfully
request that the Court include in the instructions to be given the jury in this case. Furnished herewith are
the original requested instructions which are numbered.
DATED this -day of June, 2007.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX
By:
E Don Copple, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of June, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
I IIEREBY CERTIFY that on the
foregoing was s e ~ e d u p o nthe following by the method indicated below:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Atlorney General
Idaho Transportalion Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129

-U.S. MAIL
-Hand Delivery
-FacsimileTransmission
Overnight Mail

E Don Copple

DEFENDANT SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 1

In a conde~nnationcase,good faith is defined as a bona fide attempt to purchase the property,
with a bona fide offer made and reasonable effort made to induce the owner to accept it.
83 Idaho 475 [7, 81

GIVEN
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OTHER
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The Plaintill, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of record, submits to the Court
a Proposed Jury Instruction on the issue of Larger Parcel. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
Court consider the attached Larger Parcel Jury Instruction.
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PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Evidence has been introduced with regard to the amount of property that should
be considered in your determination of the laraer parcel.

Parcel is defined as a

consolidated body of land. The larger parcel is defined as a bodv of land that exhibits
unitv of use. unity of ownership and are phvsically continuous.
A parcel of land which has been used and treated like an entity shall be so
considered in assessinn colnpensation for the taking of part or all of it. The fact that land
thus treated is owned bv different entities does not destroy the unity of ownership
concept.
Idaho Code 57-71 1
Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, rev. 3d ed. (New York; Mathew Bender
Co. Inc. 1992), vol. 4A 5 14B.04(1).
State v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387
State v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 581,468 P.2d 306 (1970)
United States v. 429.59 Acre, 612 F2d 459 (463)
Given
Refused
Modified
Covered
Other

District Judge

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Evidence has been introduced with regard to the amount of property that should
be considered in your determination of the larger parcel.

Parcel is defined as a

consolidated body of land. The larger parcel is defined as a body of land that exhibits
unity of use, unity of ownership and are physically contiguous.
A parcel of land which has been used and treated like an entity shall be so

coilsidered in assessing compensation for the taking of part or all of it. The fact that land
thus treated is owned by different entities does not destroy the unity of ownership
concept.
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NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO, )
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CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED )
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, )
INC.
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MEMBERS OF THE JURY: I will now give you the final instructions
in this case. Individual copies of these Final Instructions are being provided
to each of you. These copies are yours to use, and you may highlight or
make notes upon them as you wish.

lNSBWUCTBOPl NO. f 9

The State and Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership are entitled to the same
fair and unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances.
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a
case between individuals.

INSTRUGTIOM NO. 20

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If
money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not
agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of
determining the amount of the damage awarddm-per-ca&ge~f+e~1+

INSTRUCTION NO. 21

This lawsuit is a condemnation action brought under the governmental power of
eminent domain. In this case, the state of Idaho has been authorized to acquire a strip
of land along Pole Line Road, Twin Falls, Idaho belonging to the defendant, Canyon
Vista Family Limited Partnership, for the purpose of building a divided four-lane
highway, U.S. Highway 93, Twin Falls Alternate Route, Stage 1. In addition thereto, all
the right of access to, from and between the public right of way and all of the
contiguous remaining property of Canyon Vista has been extinguished and prohibited
except for access, if any, as shown on the project plans.
Under our law, no private property may be taken through the power of eminent
domain without the payment of just compensation. The sole issue for your determination
is the amount to be paid to the defendant, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership by
the plaintiff, State of Idaho.

tlRilSTBaUCT1Btd NO. 22

Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, together
with any direct damages suffered by the defendant, all measured as of December 28,
2004.

The guiding principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the defendant for
the property interest taken. The defendant is entitled to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made whole but is not
entitled to more.

In determining what co~npensationshould be paid for damages, if any, to the remainder
of the property, you should talce into consideration the uses for which the land is adaptable before
and after the taking, the character and quality of the property, the shape and condition in which
the remaining property is left, the convenience of using the property before and after the taking,
and such other factors as you find would affect the market value of the property.

IIMSTRLBCTION NO. 24

In determining the fair marlcet value of property in the before and after conditions,
you may consider not only the opinions of the various witnesses who testified as to
market value, but also all other evidence in the case which may aid in determining
marlcet value, such as location of the property, the surroundings and general
environment, any peculiar suitability of the property for particular uses, and the
reasonable probabilities as to fu'cure potential uses, if any, for which the property is or
would be suitable or physically adaptable, all as shown by the evidence in the case to
have existed on December 28,2004.

BNSTWUCTIQN MQ. 25
You have heard testimony related to both city ordinances and provisions of a city
comprehensive plan. In your deliberations, when considering the proper weight to give
these provisions, you must remember that only the city ordinance has the force and effect
of law. In contrast, a city's comprehensive plan is not a zoning law, but rather serves to
guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions.
The purpose of a comprehensive plan is to reflect the desirable goals and objectives or
desirable future situations for the land within a jurisdiction.

UPISTRUCTION NO. 26
The measure of damages for the impairment of a right of access to a highway upon
which the property of an owner abuts is the difference between the fair marlcet value of
the property immediately before the taking, and the fair market value of the same
property immediately after the taking of the access. The basis of the damages awarded is
not the value of the right of access to the highway, but rather the difference in the value of
the property before and after the taking of the access, and this in turn is based upon the
highest and best use to which the land involved is suitable before and after the talcing.

INSTRUCTION NO. 27
The compensation which must be paid for property talcen by eminent domain does
not necessarily depend upon the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking or on
the planned use by the property owner; rather, all the uses for which the property is
suitable and adaptable in the reasonably foreseeable future should be considered in
determining market value. It is the "highest and best use" of the property that you
should consider when determining just compensation.
The "highest and best use" of a property is the reasonably probable and legal use
which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that
results in the highest value. A potential highest and best use should be considered to the
full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value of the
property.

INSTRUCTION NO. 28

In determining what uses andlor access would be allowed to Pole Line Road in the
before condition, you are instructed that a landowner whose property abuts an existing
roadway, has a property right which includes access to that roadway. The controlling
governniental authority (City of Twin Falls) cannot deny all direct access to that roadway
without payment of just compensation.
You are further instructed, in determining what access is allowed or available,
neither the City of Twin Falls nor the State of Idaho can require a land owner to join with
adjacent property owners for the purpose of providing access to the subject property in an
attempt to cure the access taken by the condemnation of Canyon Vista access rights to Pole
Line Road. Nor could the City of Twin Falls, when consideriiig a Planned Unit
Development application in the before condition, require Canyon Vista to file a joint
application with one or more adjoining parcels that have different ownership.

IIMSTRUGTBON NO. 29

Severance damages may arise where the property being talcen is only part of a
larger parcel belonging to the defendant. Severance damage consists of either or both of
the following.
a.

A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the taking or
severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; or

b.

A diminution in the value of the reminder caused by the construction upon
and use put to the property taken.

Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the
remainder immediately before the taking, and deducting from this value, the fair market
value which results after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the
project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. Damages to the defendant's remaining
property are to be assessed once and for all time.

INSTRUGTION NO. 30

In this case, the defendant has the burden of proving that the just compensation for
the taking of its property exceeds the sum of $202,230.00, which is the amount for just
compensation presented in this trial by the plaintiff, State of Idaho. Since the
condemning authority has conceded this value, your verdict should not be for an amount
less than the amount of $202,230.00.

INSTRUCTION NO, 3 l
The term "fair market value" mens the cash price at which a willing seller would
sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an open marltetplace free of
restraints, taking into account the highest and most profitable use of the property.
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no compulsion to do
so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so.
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, lcnowledgeable and fully aware of
all the relevant marlcet conditions and the highest and best potential use of the property,
and are basing their decisions accordingly.
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the subject property
has been exposed to the marlcet for a reasonable time.

lNSf RklCTllON NO. 32

The phrase "highest and best use" means the highest and most profitable use for
which the property is adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and
best use does not necessarily depend upon the uses to which the property is devoted;
rather, all uses for which the property is suitable should be considered.

INSTRUCTION NO. 33

If you find from the evidence that the fair market value of the property
condemned in this case increased or decreased because of the prospect of condemnation,
you should disregard any such influence and your award should be based on the value of
the property as it would be at the time of the taking if it had not been subjected to the
threat of condemnation. In other words, the just compensation that is due the owner for
the taking of his or her property should be the value of the property as it would have
been at the time of the taking uninfluenced by the fact that it was to be taken in this
proceeding.

BMSTRUCTION RBO. 34

In the State of Idaho the law provides that any incorporated city or town inay
make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as
are not in conflict with the general laws of the State. The power of a city only exists
within its boundaries.

IINSTRMGTION NO. 35

You may consider the owner's particular plan for development and use of the
property only for the purpose of determining uses for which the property is adaptable.

BlPBSTRaBCTION MQ. 36
Under Idaho Law a Planned Unit Development is permitted in cities as follows:
As part of or separate from the zoning ordinance, each governing board may provide,

by ordinance for the processing of applications for planned unit development permits.
A planned unit development may be defined as an area of land in which a variety of
residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses are provided for under single
ownership or control. Planned unit development ordinances may include, but are lxot
limited to, requirements for milximum area, permitted uses, ownership, common open
space, utilities, density, arrangements of land uses on a site and permit processing.

llNSTWlBCTllQN NO. 37

Evidence has been introduced with regard to the amount of property that should
be considered in your determination of the Iarger parcel. Parcel is defined as a
consolidated body of land. The larger parcel is defined as a body of land that exhibits
unity of use, unity of ownership and are physically contiguous.

BNSTRIUGTICPN NO. 38

An 'exaction" is the i~npositionof co~lditionsof approval by a government
agency against a landowner for his proposed development. An exaction can take
several forms, including but not limited to the dedication of land and/ or money in lieu
of land, constructing public i~nprovementsat the landowner's expense, providing traffic
signalization at the landowner's expense, etc.. .
An "exaction" must satisfy the following criteria: (1)a public problem exists; (2)
the proposed development impacts the public problem; (3) governmental approval of
the development based on a condition that tends to solve the problem; and (4) rough
proportionality between the proposed solution and the development's impact on the
problem.
An "exactio~~"
must have an "essential nexus" in that the condition of approval
serves a legitimate state interest and the condition of approval is "roughly
proportional" to relieve the impact created by the proposed development.
No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the government agency
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in the nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.
Although exactions may be required, the exaction must be accomplished without
p?J

going outside the boundaries of the property in question, if the extra property and/ or
easement over it could easily be acquired or purchased.

1NSTBBlUCTIQN NO. 39

In this case, you should determine the just compensation as follows:
First, determine the fair market value of the parcel being talcen for the project,
including all improvements thereon, as of December 28,2004.
Next, determine the fair market value of the remaining portion as it existed
immediately before the take and the fair marlcet value of this parcel as it will exist
immediately after the take, determined as of December 28,2004. In determining these
values, you may not consider the impact of the project in determining the value before the
take, but you should consider the impact of the project and any special benefits which will
result from the col~structionof the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff
after the take, in determining the value of the remainder of the property after the take.
If you determine that the fair market value of the remainder after the take is less
than the fair marlcet value of the remainder before the take, and that the diminution of
value is because of the take, the difference is considered severance damage and the
property owner is entitled to this difference as part of the just compensation.
If you determine that the fair value of the remainder after the take is greater than
the value before the take, because of benefits conferred upon the property by the project or
because of the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff,
then there are no severance damages and no other adjustment to value. Do not offset any

excess in value applicable to the remainder, or property not taken, against the value of the
property taken.
Finally, determine whether the defendants have incurred any special damages or
costs on account of the taking, and the amounts thereof.
Combine the amounts you find under each of the elements in this instruction to
find the amount of just compensation that is due from the plaintiff to the defendants in
this case.

INSTRUCTlOkB NO. 40

In this case you must decide if the property remaining after the take will be
specially and directly benefitted, it at all, by the construction of the project by the
plaintiff.
Special benefits are benefits irom the condemnation project that uniquely and/ or
directly benefit the remaining property. The law distinguishes these from general
benefits. General benefits, which are not offsets to damages, are general in nature and
benefit the public generally rather thqb confer a discrete benefit directly upon the
remaining property.

IINSTRUQTIIONNO, 44

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you
may send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to
communicate with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberatio~~s,
you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands
on any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so
by me.

I.,

r. r ,

1. ., !.,

BNSTRUCTION NO. 42

I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the
iacts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then
you will retire to the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore,
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important.
At the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make ail emphatic
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you
are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only
after a discussiol7 and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IIfMSTWUCPIION NO. 43
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least
three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of
each juror agreeing to it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after ail
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.

BBUSTRUCTIQM NO, 44

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a presiding juror, who
will preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with these instructioi~s.
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of
you by the instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As
soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in
the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary
that the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your presiding
juror alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then
those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the
bailiff, who will then return you into open court.
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SPECIAL, VERDICT

1
)

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PAIiTNERSIlIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
NC.
Defendants.

j

1
1

We the jury, find the amount of just compensation payable by the Plaintiff to the
Defendants in the above-entitled matter to be as follows:

A.
Fair Marltet Value of the Entire Property
before the take
B.
Value of the Property taken in fee and
easements

$

C.
Value of the Remainder of
Property (A - B) before the take:

D.
Fair Market Value of the Remainder after the
Project
E.
Severance Damages, if any (C - D)
SPECIAL VERDICT - 1

$

-

c"~)&k3g
ooa"."

$

6

[';Li:.glK.

G. Just Compensation Calculation:
Property Acquired (B)
PLUS Severance Damages (E)

EQUALS
LESS Special Benefits (I;)

DATED this &day

of June, '2007.

JURORS:

SPECIAL VERDICT - 2

399(033@~:
$ 2 ~/ ,2
$?$' 7
- m 2 1 6% 5

$

$
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Suite 600
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Boise, Idaho 83701
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Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
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BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
1
MCCLURE, GARY BLICIC, NEIL
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JNC.
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JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

1
1
)
)

)

THIS MATTER came on regularly for july trial corn~nencingon the ls' day of June,
2007, before a District Judge, the Honorable Nathan Higer. The above-named Defendant,
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 1

Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, appeared and was represented by its counsel of
record, E Don Copple and Heather A. Cunningham, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox of Boise,
Idaho, and John C. Lezamiz, Hepwoith Lezamiz and Janis, of Twin Falls, Idaho and the abovenamed Plaintiff Stale of Idaho appeared and was represented by its counsel of record, Joseph D.
Mallct and Karl D. Vogt, Deputy Attorney General of Boise, Idaho. Defendant Lazy J
disclaimed all interest prior to trial. A jury of twelve persons was impaneled and sworn to try
the action and witnesses on the part of Plaintiff and Defendant were sworn and examined. After
hearing the evidence, the arguments of counsel and instructions of the Court, the jury retired to
consider their verdict, and subsequently returned into Court, and by unanimous decision awarded
the Defendant the sum of TWO MILLION, FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND,
FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY AND 001100 DOLLARS ($2,421,530.00);
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and on the verdict of the jury,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant, recover by Judgment
on the Verdict from the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, the sum of TWO MILLION, FOUR
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY AND 001100
DOLLARS ($2,421,530.00), together with interest thereon at the legal rate per annum of 12%
from December 28,2004, to the date of Judgment and thereafter at the statutory post-judgment
interest rate. Interest has been computed in accordance with the Statement of Interest Due filed
by Defendant on June 18,2007, and amounts to SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE
THOUSAND, NINE HUNDRED FORTY AND 3411 00 DOLLARS ($623,940.34) through June
20, 2007 and $688.61 per diem thereafter until Judgment is entered. Therefore, the total amount
now due and owing to Defendant, with credit for $327,000 previously paid pursuant to the

JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 2

Stipulation for Possession, is TWO MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND,
FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY AND 341100 DOLLARS ($2,718,470.34).
Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 7-714, payment shall be made by Defendant within thirty (30)
days, made payable to Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox Trust Account on behalf of Defendant.
Upon payment of the just compensation the Court shall, pursuant to Idaho code $7-716 enter its
final order and judgment ol'i'co~ldemnation. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for
the purpose of enforcing the judgment.
The matter of costs and attorneys' fees shall be determined upon timely submission afa

,a*&-

Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees by
DATED this

& day of3
:\
3-m
,2007.

,/ District Judge

JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 3

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
the foregoing was served upon the following:
Karl D. Vogt
Joseph D. Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
E Don Copple
Heather A. Cunningham
Davison, Coppie, Copple & Cox
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 600
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 4

A.s.
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Overnight Mail

A.s.
MAIL
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Facsimile Tra~ismission
Overnight Mail

DISIRICT COURT

Fifth Judicial D,istrict

co:O"ntyof Twin Fells - atate of ldaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0
THE STATE OF IDAHO, EX REL.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY,
MONTE C. MCCLURE, GARY
BLICIC, NEIL MILLER, AND JOHN
X. COMBO, IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

CASE NO. CR-2004-6336
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,

CANYON VISTA FAMIT,Y LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J.
RANCH, INC.
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
This motion comes b y way of the defendants' request for costs and attorneys
fees pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(D)(l)(C,D);54(e)(l); and
26(b)(4)(C). Don E. Copple, John T. Lezamiz, and Heather Cunningham were
present as counsel for the defendant Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership
T l ~ eState, as plaintiff, was represented b y Joseph Mallet.

1. Wl~etl-terthe defendants are entitled to costs as a matter of rigl-tt?

2. Whether the defendants are entitled to discretionary costs?

3. Whether the defendants are entitled to attorneys fees?

-

DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST ISSUE - WHETHER THE
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.

The defendants, the prevailing party in this condemnation action,
incurred costs and fees which they now seek as matter of right. The decision to
grant costs as a matter of right is left to the sound discretion of the trial court
I.R.C.P. 54(d)il)(C);Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co. 140 Idaho 495,510,95
P.3d 977,992 (2004). "Tl~eparty opposing the award bears the burden of
demonstrating an abuse of the trial court's discretion." Workmen's Auto Ins. Co.
140 Idaho at 510, 95 P.3 at 992. In exercise of its discretion, the Court will look to
see if the costs as a matter of right were reasonable and necessary. Judge McKee
has ruled eminent domain cases are exceptional by nature. Therefore, due to the
exceptional nature of these cases, costs are clearly reasonable and necessary and
should be allowed.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(l)(C)provides in pertinent part
(emphasis added):

Costs as a Mattel. ofRig1zt. When costs are awarded to a party, such party
shall be entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right
1. Court filing fees.
4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other
tl-rai~a party, who testify in the trial of an action, computed at the rate of
$30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence, whether it be within
or without the state of Idaho; travel expenses of witnesses who travel
other than by private transportation, other than a party, computed as the
actual travel expenses of the witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way,

from the place of residence of the witness, whether it be within or without
the state of Idal~o.
6. Reasonable costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures,
photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a
hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all oi
such exhibits of each party.
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a
deposition or at a trial of an action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each
expert witness for all appearances.
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in t l ~ e
trial of an action.
The State has agreed by stipulation to pay the defendants' filing fees
($47.00),the costs of transcripts of depositions taken by the State ($2,326.48)and
by the Defendant ($4,475.14). The total of these costs equals $6,848.62.

Next, this Court has reviewed the defendants' requested expert witness
fees and finds they were not duplicative as they provided the jury wit11 a wide
range of informative value, and due to the exceptional nature of the case the fees
were reasonable and necessary. Therefore the Court shall award the following
expert witness fees as a matter of right
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Roger Dunlav: $2,000.00.
Gale Poolev: $2,000.00.
Richard Evans: $1,775.00.
Micl~aelMongelli: $2,000.00.
Gerald Martins: $625.00.
Total = $18,400.00

6. Pat Dobie: $2,000.00
7. Roger Dunlau: $2,000.00
8. Mark Butler: $2,000.00
9. Mark Richey: $2,000.00
10. Greg Kellev $2,000.00

' r .i B
f.. <> ( 1

Finally, the Court will grant mileage for expert witnesses ($736.70) as
stipulated by the State and Trial exhibits, preparation and supplies of $500.00.
I-lowever, this Court denies costs as a matter of right for t l ~ etestimonies of
Michael Bingllam, and James McDonald as they were not reasonable and
necessary for the case. Nor will the Court grant to the defendants travel
expenses and hotel costs, preparation and researcl~for tile trial, exceptional copy
costs, or mediation costs as none are exceptional even though they were
necessary and reasonable.

EXPERT DEPOSITION FEES
In addition to reasonable expert witness fees as a matter of right, the
defendants request reasonable expert fees for depositions pursuant to IRCP
26(b)(4)(C). Under IRCP 26(B)(4)(C)"Unless manifest injustice would result, (i)
the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery.. ."
Expert fees for depositions shall be awarded as requested in the amount of
$5,803.65; the costs are itemized below.

1. Patrick Dobie Deposition Time
Prep Time
2. Roger Dunlap Deposition Time
Prep Time
3. Mark Butler Deposition Time
Prep Time
4. Mark Ricl~eyDeposition Time
Prep Time

5. Greg ICelly Deposition Time
Prep Time
6. Gale Pooley Deposition Time
Prep Time
7. Richard Evans Deposition Time
Prep Time
8. Mike Mongelli Deposition Time
Prep Time
9. James MacDonald Deposition Time
Prep Time
Total $5,803.65

-

The defendants would not have incurred these costs if the State had not
initiated condemnation proceedings against them. As previously stated,
condemnation proceedings by their nature are exceptional, and costs and fees
si~ouldtherefore be granted. The deposition fees for expert witnesses in this case
were necessary and it is appropriate to award such fees to the prevailing party.

-

DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF THE SECOND ISSUE - WHETHER
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DISCRETIONARY COSTS.

In addition to the cost as a matter of right for the expert witnesses, the
defendants have also requested discretionary costs as they relate to the expert
witnesses. IRCP 54(d)(l)(D)reads in part "Discretioi~aryCosts... may be
allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the
adverse party."
As mentioned in the previous section, condemnation proceedings by
nature are exceptional and costs and fees should be allowed. Tl-ris Court has

reviewed all the information before it and finds the following discretionary
expert witness fees were reasonable and necessary to defend against the State's
position:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Patrick Dobie
Roger Dunlap
Mark Butler
Mark Ritchey
Greg Kelley
Gale Pooley
Michael Mongelli
Total = $141,326.19

$28,700.50
$16,111.04
$41,467.50
$27,604.55
$15,922.50
$8,150.50
$3,369.60

Additionally, the Court has reviewed the defendants' request for costs for
trial exhibits, the preparation of the exhibits, exhibit equipment and supplies and
finds they were reasonable and necessary for trial. The Court will award these
costs in the amount of $31,305.44.
Trial Exhibits, Preparation, Equipment and Supplies = $31,305.44

The Court does not find the defendants' travel expenses, hotel costs, trial
preparation and research, exceptional copy costs, and the cost of mediation,
exceptional even though they are necessary and reasonable and these requests
are denied.

-

DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD ISSUE WHETHER REOUESTED ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e)(l)is quoted in part below:
Attorney Fees. In any civil action the court may award reasonable
attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include

paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule
54(d)(l)(B),when provided for by any statute or contract.
Idaho Code section 12-121 addresses attorney fees and reads as follows:
111 any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall
not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for
the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is
defined to include any person, partnership, corporation,
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
The defendants' attorneys agreed to tale the case on a contingency fee
basis. The contingency agreement allowed the attorneys to take one-third (113) of
any amount recovered above $327,000.00. At the close of trial, the defendants
received an award of $2,421,530.00.
This Court finds the work performed by the defendants' attorneys to be
both reasonable and necessary. In this case, the Court finds a contingency
agreement to be a reasonable manner to calculate attorneys' fees because this is
an exceptional case and exceptional hours were required to defend it. Thus, the
requested attorneys' fees are granted in the amount of $698,176.67. The Court
determined this amount as calculated below:

1.. $2,421,530.00 (award) - $327,000.00 = $2,094,530.00
2. $2,094,530.00 / 3 (contingency agreement) = $698,176.67

CONCLUSION

Using its discretion, and for the reasons heretofore given, this Court will
award the defendants' costs and fees in the following amounts:
1. Attorneys Fees:
2. Costs as a matter of right:
3. Discretionary Costs:

Total Award

$903,096.77

Counsel for tlie defendants is requested to prepare an order consiste~~t
witli this opinion.

Ll

DATED t h i r z day of July, 2007
/'

/ Senior District Judge

/
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mailed to the following persons by U.S. Mail postage prepaid, or placed in Courthouse
mail folder as follows:
Joseph Mallet
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Heather Cunningham
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SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 1

)
)

1

CASE NO. CV 04-6336
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT ON
VERIblCT

This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 19'hday of July, 2007, before District
Judge, the Honorable Nathan Higer. The above-named Defendant appeared through its counsel
of record, E Don Copple and Heather A. Cunningham of Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox of
Boise, Idaho, and John Leza~nizof Hepworlh, Lezamiz & Janis of Twin Falls, Idaho, the abovenamed Plaintiff appeared and was represented by its counsel of record, Joseph Mallet, Deputy
Attorney General, of Boise, Idaho. A Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Attorneys'
Fees and costs was entered on July 26,2007, ordering Plaintiff to pay $32,288.47 as costs as a
matter of right, $170,631.63 as discretionary costs and $698,176.67 in attorneys fees. The parties
have stipulated that there was a math enor and costs awarded should be $30,288.47 and have
submitted a separate Order to Amend the Memorandum Decision and Order entered July 26,
2007. This is in addition to the jury verdict of $2,421,530.00, together with pre-judgment
interest which has been paid by Plaintiff
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and on the Memorandum Decision and Order
Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant, Canyon Vista Family
Partnership, recover by Supplemental Judgment for Costs and Attorneys Fees from Plaintiff,
State of Idaho, the additional sum of NINE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX
HUNDRED AND 771100 DOLLARS ($901,096.77), together with interest after the date of
Judgment at the legal rate.
DATED this

_&day of August, 2007.

SUPPLEMENTAI.. JUDGMENT ON VERDICT - 2
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT:

.

.

1

.

.

TO:: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARWRSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, WC., AND THE?P:ARTIES AmORNEYS, E DON
COPPLE, DAVXSON, COPPLE, COWLE, ANn COX, P.O. BOX 1583,BOISE, ID 83701 AND
JOHN LEZAM,g,EpWOR7J3 & LEZAM[Z,1.33 SHOSHONE ST. N, T m F A L L S , ID 833030389, AND TNECLERK OF IFHE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
.
.

,

1. The above namedAppellant, State of idaho, ex rel. Idaho TransportationBoard, appeals

against the above-named Respondents to the fdaho Supreme Court from Judgment on'verdict
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.

.

.

entered in the-ib.dGe-entitled actionbn.the 3* day of July, 2007, Honorable Judge Nathan Higer
. .

presiding.
.

,

2. That the party has a right to appeal to the rdaho Supreme C o w and the judgrneirts or
.

.

orders described in pkgfaph.1 above are appealable orders under and pursuakt to
I.A.R.

il(a)(l),

.

.
,

,

.

. .

.

.

.

.

3. P preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which tb6 Appellant then intends t i assert
in the appeal; ~rovided,any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the, Appellant Froom
asserting other issues on appeal:

.

.

' a ) The Disdct Court erred in admitting the Order of ~ondemBti&for purpos6s of.
.

,

deening the scripe of &e taking.
b)

The District Court ened in defining the scope of the taking with regard to access by

relying solely on the Order of Condemnation and in denying PIaintiWAppelIant a fxial on the scope
of the take issue. ' .
c)

.

.

'TheDistrict Court erred inadmittink DefendantRespondents' &x*ertte&ony ofthe

value of theprope~%ytakenwhe,nthat testigony was based on tbevaluk of noxi-existent lotsor "pad
.. the property as a whole.:
sites," rathei. thw

..

. .

,

.

d). The
erred in excluding P1aintifYAppellant7sreb~rtalei&t
..
- District Cburt

wimess

testimony regai8ing the amount of damages ~kfendant&os~ondents'expert witqesii. met@dslogy
.
would have indicated if those experts would
.
have used the proper adjustments and asmptions irt
,

calculating theit daniage opinions,.
4. An &der has not been'intered sealing all or any portion of the recbrd.

5.

(a)' A reporte~'~
rranscript is requested.
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.

.

.

..

.

,

@) ,The Apptllant requests the preparation of the fellowing portions of the reporter's

.,

traa'script: Th@entire reportir's standaid transcript as defined in Rule 2S(a), LAX., suppkmmted by
..

the fo~owing:..
,

..

.

,

.

..,

* ' Tbe ~ l ~ s i n ~ a r ~ofecounsel.
nts

.
.

.
,

.

The cor66rencb on requested jury instmctiqns, $lie objedtiom of the p d e s to
the inshctions, ,&d the court's rulings thereon,

Q

.

All of the,hearings and proceedings
,2007.
. .

.

,'

.

this matter th@toccurred on May 18,

.

.

'

6..The.8~peIlantrequests the following documents to be includea in the clerk's record in
addition to those
iiiclud'edundet Rule 28, I.A.R.:
.
. automatically
.

,

.

. .

'

. ..

s.

All requestedmd given jury insiiuctions.

o

Order Regarding Both Plaintiffs'. &d Defendants' Motions in Limine and
Motions to
. Exclude, issued May 23,2007.

.

.

,

.. . .

,

..

,

.

.

.

..
.

.

.,

,

..

. .

.

Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap.

s

Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of
Roger Dunlap.

.

o

Amended Fourth AEfidavit of Joseph D. Mallet.

e

Plaintiffs Second Motion in'Limiie.

'

P

Brief in Support of Plaintiff's SecondMotion inLimine.

"'

e

All exhibits of ~iaintifl~p~ellant's
expert witness, Paul Hyde, that were .
excluded from evidence.

'

.

,

.

7. I.certify: .
'(a) Th8t a copy of this ~ h t i c of
e Appeal has been s&ed on the report&.

.

..

@). TEat
.. the c o w reporter has been paid the estimated fee of $100.00 for preparation of
'

the reptiBer's transcript:
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.

Y.

UD

.

(c) That .the Appellant is exenipt from payhg the estimbted fee for the preparation ofthe
,?

recbrd beciusi
of Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code.
..

. .

(d) That the appellate is exempt from paying the appellat&filing fee because of Sectian.67.

2301, Idaho Code.
a

. .

(e) %at sei+ice has been made upon all parties requi*ed to be served pursaant to Rule 20..

&.+miTi& I ~*day~NdayofAugu~t, 2007.

,

.

..

~ e ~ d~tt yt o r n General
e~
Attorney for the Appellint

.
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I HEREBY
, , , . .. .. .CERTFY
.
that on

..

.

?",

&day of ~ugust,'2007,I caus6d to be ?ewe$ a h e and

6 b i . i . e ~ t d~ fbthe-foiigoing
~~
by the'niethod indicated below, aid addressed to the following:
,

,

,.

.

'

Idaho Supreme Court
451'W. state St.
P.O. BOX83720
Boise, Tt) 83720
..

,

.
.

.

[IIu.S..hiail
a H a n d Delivered
' . CjOv&ight Mail
n ~ e l e c o pax)
~y

.

ails ~ i u n t yclerk

T&

.

.

.

I Z ] ~ a n dDelivered
Dovemight ail
~ T e l e c o p y(Fax)

NUS.Mail

.

,

.

3bhn T. gzamiz.
Hepworth & Lezamiz
133 ~ h & i b n St!
k N.

P.O. Box 389
.Twii:~ijfs,ID 83303-0389
. ., ..
~ u ~ k&e Associates,
r
LLC
A

. .

605 ~ e sFort
i St.

P.O;'
BOX i625 '
Boise, ID 83701

,

.

U ~ a f i dDelivered
Clovernight Mail
m ~ e l e c o p y(Fax)

Davison~Coppie., Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
. . . ..
.poise,
. @
,.. 83701

.,

.

.

E Don copi1e
..

. .

~ u . sMail
.

C;ooper

Fifth ~udicialDistrict
P..O.,BOX126
Twin %hs ID'83303-0126

..

..

'

a U . S . Mail
a ~ a n Delivered
d
[IIOvemight'Mail
[IITelecopy (Fax)
[Sl~.~.'~ail
r ] ~ a n d~eliyered
00vernight Mail
n ~ e l e c o (Fax)
~y

~ c / ~ uAttorney
ly
General'
Idaho Department of Transportation

NOTICE OF @PEAL -Page 5

.

.

.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAI-10, ex rel.,
1
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN
1
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE )
C. MCCLURE, GARY RLICK, NEIL
)
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO,
1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, )

SUPREME COURT NO. 34485

1

PlaintiffIAppellant,

f

1

vs.
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)

1
1
1

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify:
That the following is a list of exhibits to the record that have been filed during the
course of this case.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (aerial photo of area)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (Aerial photo of area)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 (aerial photo of area with depiction of previous alternate route)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 (aerial photo of area with depiction of current alternate route)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 (Aerial photo of subject property)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 (aerial photo of subject property)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 (aerial photo of subject property)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 (aerial photo of subject property)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 (aerial photo of subject property)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 (aerial photo of subject property with depiction of property line of
parcel 41)
.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 1

, .

I?:, . .
/c

r,.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CHARLES L.
WINDER, JOHN MC HUGH, BRUCE
SWEENEY, MONTE C. MC CLURE, GARY
BLICK, NEIL MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
BOARD,

1

1

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)

ORDER GRANTING SECOND MOTION
TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD

)
)
)

SupremeCburt Docket No. 34485-2007
Twin Falls County District Court No.
04-6336

v.
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant-Respondent.
and
LAZY J RANCH, INC.,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

A SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD and AFFIDAVIT OF HEATHER
A. CUNNINGHAM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD with
attachments were filed by counsel for Respondent on December 1, 2008. Therefore, good cause
appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED &d the augmentation record shall include the documents
listed below, copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:
1. Jury Instruction No. 28; and
2. Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and
Argument regarding the development of subject property with adjacent properties.
DATED this

!be

day of December 2008,
For the Supreme Court

cc:

'

Counsel of Record

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 (aerial photo of subject property with depiction of property line of
parcel 41-1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 (aerial photo of neighboring property with depiction of property
line of Lazy J Ranch Mobile Home Park)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 (aerial photo with depiction of subject property and Lazy J Ranch
Mobile Home Park)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 (aerial photo of depiction of right of way requirements of parcel
41 and parcel 41-1
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15 (close-up aerial photo of depiction of right of way requirements
of parcel 41 and parcel 41-1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 (construction plans of right of way requirements of parcel 41 and
parcel 41-1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 (aerial photo of subject property and Lazy J Ranch Mobile home
park at completion of project)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 (aerial photo of approaches at completion of project)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19 (Hyde comparable sales location map)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 (Ilyde land sales photo comparable sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 26 (Hyde land sales ii~focomparable sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 27 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 5 )
Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 30 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 31 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 7)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 7)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 34 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 8)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 35 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 8)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 36 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 9)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 37 (Hyde land sales photo colnparable sale 9)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 10)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 39 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 10)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 40 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 11)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 41 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 11)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 42 (Hyde land sales info comparable sale 12)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 43 (Hyde land sales photo comparable sale 12)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 2

Plaintiff's Exhibit 44 (Hyde just comnpensation)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 45 (Market conditions survey)
Plaintiff's Exhibits 46 (Richey Comparables Locations map)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 48 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale I)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 49 (Richey Land Sales Info comparable Sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 50 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 51 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 52 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 53 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 54 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 55 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 56 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 57 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 58 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 59 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 7)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 60 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 7)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 61 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 8)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 62 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 8)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 9)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 64 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 9)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 65 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 10)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 66 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 10)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 67 (Richey Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 11)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 68 (Richey Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 11)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 70 (Kelley Comparables Locations)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 71 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 72 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 73 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 74 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 75 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 76 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 77 (Kelley Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 78 (Kelley Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 80 (Dunlap Co~nparablesLocations)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 81 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Coml~arableSale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 82 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 83 (Dnnlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 84 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 85 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 3)
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 86 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 87 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 88 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 89 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 90 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 92 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 93 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 7)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 94 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 7)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 95 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 8)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 96 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 8)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 97 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 9)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 98 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 9)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 99 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 10)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 100 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 10)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 101 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 11)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 102 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 1I)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 103 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 12)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 104 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 12)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 105 (Dunlap Land Sales Info Comparable Sale 13)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 106 (Dunlap Land Sales Photo Comparable Sale 13)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 108 (Canyon Vista and Lazy J Aerial Photograph)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 109 (Canyon Vista and Lazy J Aerial Photograph)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 110 (Depiction of Property before separation)
Plaintiff' s Exhibit 111 (Dillinan Comparables Locations)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 112 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 113 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 114 (Dillinan Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 115 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 116 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 117 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 118 (Dillman Land Sales info and Photo Comparable Sale 7)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 119 (Dillman Just Compensation)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 120 (Twin Falls City Code 10-1-6)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 121 (Twin Falls City Code 10-1-5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 122 (Twin Falls City Code 10-6-1.4)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 123 (Twin Falls City Code)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 124 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-1-2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 125 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-1-5)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 126 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-2-1)
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 127 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-3-2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 128 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-3-3)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 129 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-3-9)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 130 (Twin Falls City Code 10-12-4-2)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 131 (Twin Falls City Code 10-1-12)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 132 (Twin Falls City Code 10-2-1)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 133 (letter from Gerald Martens to the City)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 141 (turning movement Canyon Vista)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 142 (turning movement Canyon VistalLazy J)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 144 (traffic flowlWashington StISo. of Falls Ave)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 146 (Fred Meyer aerial)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 147 (Twin Falls Home Depot aerial)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 148 (Twin Falls Canyon Park East aerial)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 149 (Magic Valley Mall aerial)
Plaintiff's exhibit 153, site diagram concept plan
Plaintiff's exhibit 154, site diagram concept plan

Defendant's Exhibits 1001 (property before)
Defendant's Exhibit 1002 (conditions before the state's taking)
Defendant's Exhibits 1003 (adjacent properties aerial)
Defendant's Exhibit 1004 (Resolution No. 1493)
Defendant's Exhibit 1005 (May 25, 1994 ITD Menlo)
Defendant's Exhibit 1006 (May 1995 City minutes)
Defendant's Exhibit 1007 (April 15, 1996 Filer Highway District Letter)
Defendant's Exhibit 1008 (ITD memo to PDE from ADE dated September 27, 1998)
Defendant's Exhibit 1009 (Letter to City zoning Administrator f r o b ITD dated July 7 ,
1998)
Defendant's Exhibit 1010 (Entrance meeting minutes dated July 16, 1998)
Defendant's Exhibit 1011 (December 3, 1998 ITD memo to Federal Highway
Administration from Chuck Carnohan)
Defendant's exhibit 1012 (access control section of enviromnental assessment)
Defendant's Exhibit 1013 (Letter to Bonita Koonce from Robert Latham dated January
5, 2000)
Defendant's Exhibit 1014 (Letter to Robert Latham from Bonita Koonce dated January
2 1, 2000)
Defendant's Exhibit 1015 (Letter to Twin Falls Highway District from ITD dated
October 22, 2001)
Defendant's Exhibit 1016 (Section of Canyon Properties PUD Agreement dated March
2, 2003)
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Defendant's Exhibit 1018 (Annexation ordinance- Ordinance 2510)
Defendant's Exhibit 1019 offered, stipulated admitted (Official zoning map for city of
Twin Falls)
Defendant's Exhibit 1021 (City of Twin Falls Comprehensive plan land use map)
Defendant's Exhibit 1022 (excerpt of Twin Falls, City Code 10-2-1 definition of PUD)
Defendant's Exhibit 1023 (before highs and best use illustration)
Defendant's Exhibit 1024 (floodwaylfloodplain exhibit)
Defendant's Exhibit 1025 (Blue Lakes and Pole Line Road existing accesses)
Defendant's Exhibit 1026 (ordinance no. 24lordinaince adopting street plan
Defendant's Exhibit 1027 (Twin Falls master street plan functional street classification
map)
Defendant's Exhibit 1028 (Pole line road access history)
Defendant's Exhibit 1029 (property taken by Government)
Defendant's Exhibit 1030 (neighborhood after taking photo)
Defendant's Exhibit 1031 (after highs and best use illustration)
Defendant's Exhibit 1032 (examples of recently approved commercial access)
Defendant's Exhibit 1033 (comparable sales map)
Defendant's Exhibit 1034 (Comparable Sales Information)
Defendant's Exhibit 1035 (just compensation: Roger Dunlap)
Defeildant's Exhibit 1036 (just compensation of Greg Kelley)
Defendant's Exhibit 1037 (just compensation: Mark Richey)
Defendant's Exhibit 1038 (Roger Dunlap adjustment chart)
Defendant's Exhibit 1039 (Greg Kelley adjustment chart)
Defe~ldant'sExhibit 1040 (Mark Richey Adjustment chart)
Defendant's Exhibits 1041 (order of condemnation)
Defendant's 1042 (First amended Complaint)
Defendant's Exhibit 1043 (Warranty Deed for Lazy J dated May 7, 1970)
Defendant's Exhibit 1044 (Quitclaim deed KLS& M)
Defendant's Exhibit 1045 (Quitclaim Deed BCM&W)
Defendant's Exhibit 1046 (Quitclaim Deed Canyon Vista)
Defendant's Exhibit 1047 (building permit for new shop)
Defendant's Exhibit 1048 (application for building permit)
Defendant's Exhibit 1049 (master street plan access guidelines table 7)
Defendant's Exhibit 1050 (actual after approved site plan in Billiar)
Defendant's Exhibit 1051 (city of Twin Falls map)
Defe~~dant's
Exhibit 1052 (options 1 and 2: parcel 2 approximately 8.8 acres, parcel 3
approx. 10 acres buyer Manaus, LLC 6-1-04)
Defendant's Exhibit 1053 (option 3: parcel 4 approx 31.8 buyer Frontera Acquisitions,
LLC 12-10-2004)
Defendant's Exhibit 1054 (Option 4: parcel 1 approx 10.6 sold to Manaus)
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Defendant's Exhibit 1055 (US 93 Study area and system linage)
Defendant's Exhibit 1056 (project plans pages 112, 113 abd 115 of 477)
Defendant's Exhibit 1058 (Site generated traffic table 4 page 7)
Defendant's Exhibit 1059 (access management guidelines for activity centers pages 59
and 61)
Defendant's Exhibit 1061 (traffic impact study figure 2 plus table 5)
Defendant's Exhibit 1062 (traffic impact study figure 4 table 8 and table 9)
Defendant's Exhibit 1063 (environmental assessment- projected traffic volumes)
Defendant's Exhibit 1064 (ITD access management standards- auxiliary lane)
Defendant's Exhibit 1069 (Road and Traffic Signal Spacing)
Defendant's Exhibit 1070 (aerial photo of showing gold's gym)
Defendant's Exhibit 1071 (Lease to Lazy J)
Defendant's Exhibit 1072 (before access options)
Defendant's Exhibit 1074 (City of Twin Falls/Special Meeting Council Minutes dated
April 19, 1995)
Defendant's Exhibit 1078 (Ksispy Kseme Permit)
Defendant's Exhibit 1079 (PUD Comp plan section 3.7)
Defendant's Exhibit 1080 (Blue Lakes and Pole Line Intersection Photo)
Defendant's Exhibit 1082 (before and after aerial photo of property)
Defendant's Exhibit 1084 (photo of Pole Line Road as built)
Defendant's Exhibit 1085 (IDAPA Rules 39.03.42)
Defendant's Exhibit 1086 (Dunlap Land Sales)
Defendant's Exhibit 1087 (access control section of environmental re-assessment)
Defendant's Exhibit 1088 (master street plan access guidelines)
Defendant's Exhibit 1094 (historic deed depiction)
Defendant's Exhibits 1095 (page from concept report)
Defendant's Exhibits 1096 (page from concept report)
Defendant's Exhibit 1099 (ITD policy)
Defendant's Exhibit 1100 (aerial photo)
Defendant's Exhibit 1101 (aerial photo before)
Defendant's Exhibit 1102 (8 aerial photos on one page of Billiar property)
Defendant's Exhibit 1103 (Billiar property before the taking)
Defendant's Exhibit 1104 (Billiar property highest and best use photo)
Defendant's Exhibit 1106 (annexation exhibit)
Defendant's Exhibit 1108 (John Dillman opinions of value)
Defendant's Exhibit 1110 (retail development examples)
Defendant's Exhibit 1111 (Eagle River Retail Development)
Defendant's Exhibit 1112 (site plan accesses)
Defendant's Exhibit 1113 (subdivision definition page)
Defendant's Exhibit 1114 (Letter from Assistant City Engineer)
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Court's Exhibit 1 (front page of Times News dated June 11, 2007)
Exhibits not sent to Supreme Court
Defendant's Exhibit 1105 (Roger Dunlap's computation on white pad)
Illustrative purposes
Defendant's Exhibit 1107 (computation of Greg Kelley white pad)
Defendant's Exhibit 1109 (map of properties)

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 17Ihday of March, 2008.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

1

1

SUPREME COURT NO. 34485

)
)
)

Plai~ltiffIAppella~~t,
VS.

1

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,

)
)

DefendantIRespondent,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

1

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the
foregoing CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by
Appellate Rule 28.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court
this 17Ihday of March, 2008.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK
C l ~ of
k the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex re]. ,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 34485

1
)

1
PlaintiffIAppellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

VS.

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH
INC.,

)
)

DefendantiRespondent,
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD and
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
P. 0 . Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129

Don Copple
Heather Cunningham
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox
P. 0. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said this 17"'
day of March, 2008.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK
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OF TKE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AM) FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
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1
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1
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I

Plaintiff,

)

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

1 BIEURCATE

j

-vsCANYONVISTA FAMILYLIMITED
PARTNERS* AND FAZY J . W C H ,

INc.;
.

..,,

1

1
1
1

1

.
,

D,efendants.

1

Comes now the Pl&tiff, State of Idaho, by and through its c o w e l of record, Joseph D.
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court for an order
bihcating the trial in Ulis'matter so that the scope of the taking issues can be Med and resolved

by the Court prio* to the presentation of the issue ofjust compensation to the jwy.
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This motion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 42@), and other authorities, as

further set forth in the Brief in Support of PlaintifPs Motion to Bifurcate, filed concurrently

herewi as well as the other pleadings and papers on file in this case.

DATED his

a
10
day O ~ M ~2007,
Y,

Idaho llmsportation Department
CERT.WECATE OF SERVICE
I KflRjBY C~RTIFYthat on the

Eiday of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above to be served to:

~ u . sMail
.
Q ~ m dDelivered
novernight Mail
B ~ e l e c o p y(Fax) 386-9428

E Don Copple,
Heather C w g h a m
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O.Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

-
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JOSEPH D.MALLET
KARL D.VOGT
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation DeparZment
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1.129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
TSB #5817
ISB #5015

Counsel £OK Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRfCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICW DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, INAND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
DARRELL V, ML$;NNING,R.JAMES
COLEMAN, ~ R U C ESWEENY, MONTE C.
McCLURE, GARY BLXCK, NEIL MILLER

)
)
)
)

and JOHN X.':C~;MBO.IDAHO

.I

TE&

,,

CANYON
FAMILY LMTED
P A R T N E AND
~ ~ LAZY
~
J RANCH,

mc.,

j
)
)

Case No. CV-04-6336
BREF IN SUPPORT OF PLAJNTIFR'S
MOTlQN TO BIFURCATE

\

1
1
1
.I

Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through i t s counsel of record, Joseph D.

Mallet, Deputy ~

t

k General
e ~ for the State of Iclaho, and hereby submits rhis Memorandum in

support of its motion to bifurcate the trial in this matter so that the scope of the taking issues can

be tried and resolved by the Court prjor tothe presentation of the issue ofjust compensation to
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the jury.
1.

mTRODU%TION
Thb ii an eminent domain case. The Plaintiff, State of Idaho (hereinafter, "ED") has
essentially taken a "slrip take" from Defe~dants,Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and

Lazy J. ~ a n c h(hereinafter, Tefendants") in conjunction with phase one of the US 93 Twin
Falls Alternate Route Project (hereinafter, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93
west on Pole Line Road, bypassing the core of the City of Twin Falls.
Through the discovery process and the recent exchange of pretrial motions, it has become
clear that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the 'lager parcel" issue in this case. In
other words, ihe parties disagree as to what consolidated body of land constitutes the remainder
parcel or the f;tl parcel in the before condition. A specific description of the remaiader parcel is
essential for &e jury to' analyze the issue of severance damages. For this reason, Plaintiff has
moved to bihrcate the trial so that the Court can resolve Ihe larger parcel dispute prior to
submitting the issue of just compensation to the jury.

11.
LEGAL STANDaW)
~ o t i o tko bikcate are common in eminent domain cases because, in Idaho, the Coud
and the jury are both required to decide separate factual issues. In eminent domain cases, 'Yhe
only issue for,,submissionto a jury is the question of the value of the property sought to be taken
or the amo&t of compensation for the taking." Srate ex rel. Fl~ndrov. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940,
943, 500 ~ . 2 d841, 844 (July 28, 1972). All issues other than just compensation are for
resolution by the trial court. Ruefh v. State, 100 Idaho 203,223, 596 P.2d 75, 95 (1978) rehr'g
denied (1979) (hereinafter "Rueth r9. This includes any question as to the scope of .the take,

I T D LEGAL
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1

which are legdquestions to be decided by the court. Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, 135
.Idaho 888,892i.26P:3d 1225,1229(Ct. App. 2001)).
Because of the inteaelated fact findig roles of the judge and jury, the Idaho Supreme
Court has recobzed that trial courts may find it preferable to bifurcate the issues with the court
fist determining the taking issues, then providing the jury with "an accurate description of the

property or right therein which has been taken." Ruerh I at 223, 95. The policy behind
bifurcation is @at "Such a procedure would save the litigants the unnecessary expense of expert
witness fees &d trial Mme were all issues submirted in one trial and the taking issue then
resolved adverselyto the property owner." Id.
However, the deeision to bifurcate em'inent domain proceedings is left to the sound
discretion of ifie trial court. Rueth v, State, 103 Idaho 74, '80, 644 P.2d 1333, 1339 (1982)
(be~einafter"kueth IT').

This is consistent with azCP 42@) which allows for a cowf, in its

discretion, to Order separate trials for any sepmte issues in a case "'in fuahemnce of convenience
or to avoid pkjudice, or *en

separate trials will. be conduotive to eexpdition md economy."

RCP 42@).

In this case, bifurcation i s approprjate because the parties have a mate*jal dispute as to
what constitutes the "larger parcel." ITD asks the court to bifurcate the trial and resolve the
larger parcel dispute prior to submitting the issue of just compensation to the jury.
A.

The h r r e r Parcel Rile.

The larger parcei issue arises from the language of Section 7-711, Idaho Code, which sets
forth the rules for assessing damages in eminent domain cases. .This statute provides in part that
"If the property sought to be condemned consfitutes only a part of a larger parcel.. ." then the

-
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jury must assess '&e damages, if any, '"which will accrue to the portion not sought to be

coodemned, b.i reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the
oonstruction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."

I.C. $ 7-711(2)

(emphasis added).' Incidentally, if severance damages are found, they must be offset by the
extent the larger parcel is "specially and directly benefited" by the ttaldag. 1.C. $ 7-711(3).
"Parcel," as used in.(his section, means a consolidated body of land. State ex rel. $mms v. City
of Motrntain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972)(citing Big Lost River kigation

Co. v. ~uvidFon,2iIdaho 160,171-172, l Z 1 P. 88 (1912)).

The larger parcel issue is also related to the valuation of the paxt taken. In the Cfry of
Galdwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 F.2d 615 (1968), the Court held that the vdue of the part
taken should be dekmkned "&th the whole parcel being sold in its then condition in one sale."

Id. at 101, 617 (emphasis added). In that case, the court invalidated a valuation methdd that
valued the .j&e by comparing it to the market piice of a small portion of the remainder arce el,
not the whole.property itself. Simihly, it is enor to not consider the correct larger parcel when
deciding the appricable highest and best use of the property. Stde ex rel. Symmr v City

oJ-

Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390.

Accordingly, for the jury to analyze just compensation, the jury must be supplied with a
specific description of the larger parcel. Only after the jw knows the hebods of the correct
larger parcel can @e jury decide the highest and best use, value of property taken, and whether

any damages accrue to the larger parcel in excess of special benefits confeaed. It is the court's
responsibility to decide the larger parcel. In State ex re1 FInndro v. Seddon, 94 Xd&o 940, 500
P.2d 841, (Jdy 28, 1972), the court held that the jury can only decide questions of just

compensation. All othw factual issues are to be resolved by the court. Id. at 943,844. Flandro,
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while not a larger parcel case, concerned a fie issue. The court held W whether or not an
item was a f i m e had to be decided by the trial court. Only if and when the trial court decided
the item in
.

.

was

a fixture would the jury be allowed to determine the value of the fixture.

Similarly, in t)~ec+e at bar, it should be the Court that determines the larger parcel. Once the
larger parcel is settled, the issue can then be given to the jury to determine just compensation. In
both cases, the court describes the property and the jury values it.
ITD is obligated to disclose and discuss contrary dicta from State ex rel. Symms v. Cify of
Mowtadn Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (Feb 2, 1972). In that case, while reviewing the

correctness of a larger parcei determination, the court mentioned that ordinarily the larger parcel
,

,..

.

question wa5.a practical question for the jury. Id. 532, 391. Since that time,the cow has
specifically addressed.the boundaries of what a jury may properly decide in an eminent domain
case. It was .the Flandro owe, decided later in 1972, that Tust made it clear tbat %
' I emineht
domain prociediigs the ody issue for submission to a jury is the question of the value of the
property sought to be taken or tbe mount of compensation for the taking!'

Flandro, 94 Idaho at

943,500 ~ . 2 at
d 844 Ruefh ZaIso clatiiied that the role of the cow was to provide the jury with
both the "des,wiption of the property or the right therein which has been taken." Rueah I, 100
Idaho at 223, 596 P. 2d at 95. Since the larger parcel determination arrives at an accurate
description ofthe property, under Randro and Rueth I, it is a ques'don for the court to resolve.

p.

The Lar~erParcel Dispute.

In the,case at bar, there is a dispute as to the larger parcel that needs to be resolved. The

expert witnesses hired by each side disagree as to the larger parcel determination. For a correct
resolution of ,$his issue, .the parties need to have a fair opportuuity to argue the applicable law as
well, as the facts. The larger parcel answers \wy from expert to expert, and those answers wit1
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vary dependiug on how the Court inteprets the applicable law. Examples of the larger parcel
dispute follow:
Roger Dunlap (Defense valuation witness).

1.

Mf.

Dunlap analyzed the larger

parcel and concluded that the larger parcel matched the legal description jn the
.complaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Roger L. Dunlap, Exhibit "A7' to
Affidavit of Josepb D. Mallet in Support of Plaintiffs Mo.tion to Bifurcate, at p.
,120, LL. 8-1 1) (hereafter 'Dunlap Tr."). However, for purposes of valuing the
.. taking, he assmed the property was taken from a 1-acre pad site. (Dunlap Tr. at

1 6 5 , ' ~5-24).
~.
This allowed bim to use co&mble sales that indicated pad
site values, not the value of the parcel described in the legat description.
Mark Ricley (Defense valuation witness). Mr. Richey analyzed the larger parcel

2.

and concluded that the larger parcel was ody the property described in the
.

.

complaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Mark Richey, Exhibit "B" to Affidavit

. of Josepb D. Mallet id Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 89, L. 24 to

: p. 90, L. 3) (hereafter 'Schey Tr.").

3.

- S o h Dillman (Plaintiff valuation witness). Mr. 'Dillman concluded the larger
parcel included not only ~e subject property, but dso a+ least the adjacent parcel
to the east. (See Deposition Transcript of John Dillman, Exhibit "C"to Afftdavit
"

of Joseph D. Malle't in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 13, L. 21 to
p. 14, L. 12) &reafter "Dillman Tr."). Mr. Dillman discussed that the larger

.

4.

parcel could be She four adjacent parcels. @illman Tr. at p. 3 1, LL. 9-1 1).

. Paul Hyde (Plaintiff valuation witness). While Mr. Hyde assessed damages to the
subject property, calling that the larger parcel, he also discussed the fact that he

-
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the subjed property assuming that the highest and best me was to develop
.valued
..
with dl four adjacent parcels 'developing together, which is essentially a larger

parcel determination. (See Deposition Transcript of Paul Hyde, Exhibit "D" .to
~ffidavitof Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 7,

,LL. 13-24) eereafker "Hyde Tr."). Mr. Eyde analyzed the value of the subject
pxoperty assuming that it would at least develop in conjunction with the:
peighboring parcels. ffXydeTI.at p. 103, L. 23 to p. 104, L. 7 ) .

In a d d i k to the factual issues related to the larger parcel issue, the C o w also needs to
clarify the applicable law. The parties dispute whether legally sufficient unity of ownership
exists for the.i&er parcel to include the neighboring parceis. In State ex rel. Symsns v. Nelson

Sadand Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574,468 P.2d 306 (1970), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a
larger parcel determination does not require a fee interest in each tract. Diering ownerships,
such as a fee ownership in one paroel and a leasehold interest in another, are sufficient for larger
parcel purposes. Ndsovr Sand and Gravel, 93 Idaho at 581,468 P.2d at 313.
The defense witnesses mistakenly believe that a larger parcel determination requires a
party to own the land in question in

fee.

Dunlap, for example, says his largw parcel

determination would have been lafger if su$icient unity of ownetsbip (a fee interest) existed.

(Dunlap Tr. at p. 112, L. 23 to p. 115, L. 3). Richey also says the absence of common fee
ownership caused bim to fmd a smaller larger parcel. (Richey Tr. at p. 96, L. 10 to p. 97,.,I 14).
While finding no univ of ownership, Riohey admi& that the subject property is leased by the
neighboring parcel. (Richey Tr. at p. 102, LL. 3-5). Correctly applying the Nelson Sand and
Gravel rule, both Dunlap and Richey would have different larger parcels. This law nwds to be

clarified and applied by the Court before the jury can determine just compensation.

-
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Confwion on this issue also exists to the reality of .the ownership of the related parcels.
J.C, and Magwet , ~ i E m sat, one h e , owned a "parent parcel7' that has been split bb four
parts. ( ~ e e : ~ ; ~ o s i 6Transcript
on
of Linda Wills, Exhibit '73" to Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in
.. .

Support of ~k&iffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 49, LL. 5-14) (bereafter "Wills Tr."). One of
the subject parcel which is owned by the Cmyon Vista Family Limited

theses parts

Partnership. The children of J+C.and Margaret Wiflims, Linda Wis, Christie Williams, and
are all equal partners in that entity and receive equal disbursements of

Gary WIi@
l !s,

pWership,incpme. (,WillsTr, atp. 67, L. 1 to p. 69, L.6). The ownership of the m S & M parcel
to the west is the same. (Wills Tr. at p. 59, L. 23 top. 60, LA). SimUarly, the parcel to the east,
the Lazy J.picel, is owned by a corporation and the shareholders of that corporation are the
.

.

same people wpo o . p ,the adjacent parcels as partners. (Wills Tr. at p. 23, L. 6 to p. 24, L. 11).
h a sitmation

this, .*re

the same four people own four adjacent pieces of property

.

.,

under different business entities, fhe hequestionof unity of title for purposes of a larger parcel
analysis is..a.factualdetemhation that needs to be resolved before the jusy can value h a g e s .
Theparties dispute whether yity of .title exists where the same people o m adjacent properties
t h u g h different entities. ITD argues Nelson Sand and Gravel only requires that the same
person has an ownership interevt in each of the two
.

"

tracts.

The Defendants, lhrougla aeir

re elude

a larger

. .

experts,. argue that the different entity fee owners

arc el

determination

hcludidg &e.adjacent properties. Tbis factual pad legal dispute must be resolved by the Court

Pr;or to allow& the jury to determine just compensation. Under these ckcumstances,
b i b a t i o n is.approptiateto resolve the issue prior to presenting the issue of just compensation to
the jury.

-
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IV.
CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons,

respectfully requests that the Court bifurcate the Ma1in

this matter to resolve the larger parcel issues prior to the jury's assessment ofjust compensation.

'
t
j
fi
day of May, 2007.
.,
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e~
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the @- day of May, 2007, I caused a .true and conect
copy of the above to be served to:

E Don Copple
Heather Cunqingham
Davison CoppIe Coppie & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

C1LJ.S. Mail
n ~ m Delivered
d

movernight Mail
'pa~eleco~y
@ax) 386-9428
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
JOSEPH D. MALLET
KARL D. VOGT
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
331 1 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-8815
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB 115817
ISB #5015
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
DARRELL V MANNING, R. JAMES
COLEMAN, BRUCE S WEENEY,
MONTE C. McCLURE, GARY BLICK,
NEIL MILLER and JOHN X. COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-04-6336

)

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH D. MALLET
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO BIFURCATE

1
1

-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
rNC.
J.

Defendants.
State of Idaho

1
)ss.

County of Ada
Joseph D. Mallet, being first duly sworn, states the following:
1.

I am the counsel of record for the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, in the above captioned

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH D. MALLET - 1

case and make this Affidavit based on my personal knowledge, unless stated otherwise.
2.

On Wednesday, April 1I, 2007, I took a deposition in this case of the Defendants'

valuation witness, Roger Dunlap. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Deposition Transcript of Mr.
Dunlap from the April 11,2007 deposition.

3.

On Monday, April 16, 2007, I took a deposition in this case of the Defendants'

valuation witness, Mark Richey. Attached hereto as Exhibit " B and incorporated herein by
reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Deposition Transcript of Mr.
Richey from the April 16,2007 deposition.
4.

On Monday, April 2,2007, opposing counsel took a deposition in this case of the

Plaintiffs valuation witness, John Dillman. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated
herein by reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Deposition Transcript
of Mr. Dillman from the April 2,2007 deposition.
5.

On Friday, April 6, 2007, opposing counsel took a deposition in this case of the

Plaintiffs valuation witness, Paul Hyde. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein
by reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the Deposition Transcript of Mr.
Hyde from the April 6, 2007 deposition.
6.

On Tuesday, April 24,2007, I took a deposition in this case of one of the partners

of the Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, Linda Wills. Attached hereto as Exhibit "En
and incorporated herein by reference, is a true and accurate copy of relevant portions of the
Deposition Transcript of Ms. Wills from the April 24,2007 deposition.
7.

Further your affiant sayeth not.
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DATED this %day

of May, 2007.

Deput/ Attorney General
Idaho Department of Transportation
SIJBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this &y

of May, 2007
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

a'TAday of May, 2007, I caused a true and correct

copy of the above to be served to:
E Don Copple
Heather Cunningham
Davison Copple Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

[I]u.s.
Mail
n ~ a n Delivered
d
Dovemight Mail
&$~eleco~y (Fax) 386-9428
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Page 109

Page 111

I was.
identifies the parcels that it is touching.
2
Do you believe that that is the same
So the first thing I do is I look at
3 highest and best use for adjacent parcels on both
title to other adjacent properties. And then 1
look at whether these properties have a similar 4 sides?
A. It's very similar. I can't recall
highest and best use. So if you have a smaller 5
property with a different zoning, and a different 6 exactly what it was on Lazy J or KLS&M right now.
highest and best use, but it happens to be under 7 But I think it was really similar.
Q. It is your opinion, then, if not
8 the same ownership, I may call the smaller parce 8
9 identical, they are substantially the same?
9 the larger parcel.
10
A. Yes.
And then the other thing I do is look
10
Q. So in the highest and best use factor
11 at unity of title. Who owns the property is the 11
12 we actually got a check mark. I mean, that is
12 potential larger parcel. And then possibly
13 present on that one factor in your analysis;
13 narrow it down from there.
14
correct?
Q.
So
you
look
at
the
governmental
-you
14
A. Yes.
15 look at the parcel the government identifies to 15
16
Q. You don't see any barriers related to
16 start with; correct?
17 the highest and best use -- nothing about the
17
A. Right.
18 highest and best use of the neighboring parcels
Q. And you look to see if that truly is
18
19 what the market would consider the parcel for thd9 would cause you to make a larger parcel
20 determination than what you have done?
20 purposes of development?
21
A. No. You're correct.
21
A. Right.
22
Q. And the second factor was -- or it ]nay
Q. Did I state that accurately?
22
23 have been the first factor you gave me. The next
A. Right. Plus, the ownership.
23
24 factor is whether or not the parcels are
Q. Right. And that is relevant to you
24
25a.nti.gu~usI&atc~t?.e&
2154&e~i~~~.l.uein-what-~egar$L
Page

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Page 112

1
A. Right.
A. Well, you need to know what you are
1
Q. You called it contiguity?
2 appraising. Once you come up with your larger 2
A. Right.
3 parcel, that is your subject property. And that 3
Q. Whether that's a word or not, I think I
4
4 is what you appraise.
Q. Did you perform that analysis in this
5 know what you are mean. They are touching each
5
6
other. They are next to each other. Right?
6 case?
7
A. That is a word.
7
A. Yes.
8
Q. Okay. So you look at the Lazy J parcel
Q.
And
what
was
your
determination?
8
9 on the east. And what we call the KLS&M parcel
A. The determination is the legal
9
10 on the west. In fact, the BCM&W parcel -- let's
10 description in the complaint is the larger
11 go one more furiher on the west.
I 1 parcel.
The BCM&W is not contiguous; is it?
Q. And what was it that made you decide t 112
12
13
A.
To the subject; no.
13 use that as your larger parcel in this case?
14
Q. But the two adjacent parcels that 1
14
A. Well, the highest and best use is a
1 5 mixed used center as illustrated on this diagram 15 have just identified, they are contiguous, and
16 And there are no other contiguous parcels that 16 share the same highest and best use?
A. Yes.
1 7 are owned by the same folks. I guess that's the 17
18
Q. So far so good. It looks like we have
18 end of the analysis.
Q. Okay. So you gave me three factors. 19 a larger parcel as of these two factors; correct?
19
A. Correct.
20 And you applied those three factors. And the 20
27
Q. We move down to the unity of title.
21 result was the parcel that we've identified is
22
A. Right.
22 the larger parcel?
23
Q. And that is the sole reason that you
23
A. Yes.
24 have determined the lar er parcel to be only the
Q. Now, highest and best use of the
24
25 subject property. You have just stated what that25 subject parcel?

-
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I
2

3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

A. Yes.
Q. And what was it that made you decide
there wasn't sufficient unity of title?
A. There are different companies that own
three different parcels.
Q. And the companies would be? On the
subject we have Canyon Vista -A. LLC.
Q. It's a limited family partnership, I
think.
A. I think it's limited liability company.
But I could be wrong.
Q. Whichever the entity is. We've got
that entity. And Lazy J is owned by the Lazy J
Ranch Corporation?
A. Something like that.
Q. Because those two are different
entities, that is the basis of your determination
that unity of title didn't exist?
A. Yes.
Q. And because unity of title didn't
exist, for that sole reason you have taken the
larger parcel oiily as the subject property?
A. I should say I started with the premise

P a g e 115

Q. Now, you said it's possible. Is it
1
2 likely that would have occurred?
3
A. Yes.
Q. What effect, if any, would that have
4
5 had on your valuation in this case, in your
6 opinion?
7
A. I don't know. I can't do that
8 appraisal on the fly.
Q. Too big for you to say as you sit here
9
1 0 today?
11
A. Yeah.
Q. Is it possible it would have had a
12
1 3 difference? Is it possible it would have made a
1 4 difference?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. It seems like your severance damage
17 determination that the subject parcel is
1 8 landlocked, your determination that there is
1 9 damages because it is legally landlocked, that
20 aspect would go away if the larger parcel
21 included all three parcels; would it not?
22
A. It would be different. Now, if it had
2 3 access somehow through adjacent parcels -- for
24 instance, if there was one here (indicating), and

25-that-.t--thelega-l-de~~-1pt~i0ni~~~~0~~e~t..i~n~~t~~~~25~-~0nehe~e~~i~n
1 complaint. You know, if you legally described 1 drain the whole property? And would all three of
2 this, and this property was also owned by Canyon 2 these properties be worth less? Maybe Lazy J and
3 Vista, LLC, 1 would say, "Wait a minute. How 3 KLS&M have value now that would be lower if they
4 had to share access with this middle parcel. I
4 come there is two different lawsuits or two
5 don't know. That's a biggy. That would be
5 different complaints?" But I saw no reason to
6 another assignment.
6 include other properties, because they are not
7
Q. Ican appreciate the fact that that is
7 owned by the same entity.
8 a complex question.
Q. Now, if they were, hypothetically,
8
If you can tell me, would you assume
9 owned by the same entity, would your highest and 9
10 best -- would your larger parcel determination 10 that a larger parcel of all three, including all
1I three properties we just discussed, would you
11 have been different?
12 assume that that determination would give you
12
A. Very possible.
13 less severance damages overall? Or can you even
Q. It seems like unity of title was the
13
14
say?
1 4 one aspect that bumped it down to the size that
A. I can't say.
1 5 you have determined. If that made any sense to 15
MR. MALLET: OEf the record.
16
16 you. Go ahead and answer.
17
(A discussion was held offthe record.)
It seemed like unity of title was the
17
(Noon recess taken.)
18 sole factor for you determining the larger parcel 18
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Before our lunch break
19 that you did. And I gave you a hypothetical. If 19
20 we would have had unity of ownership, or, as yo120 we were speaking about the large parcel issue.
21 And your large parcel determination in this case.
21 call it, unity of title on the two adjacent
22 I want to switch gears a little bit and talk
22 properties, is it possible that your larger
23 parcel would have been all three of the parcels? 23 about a concept called assemblage.
24
Are you familiar with that concept?
24 Being Lazy J, Canyon Vista, and I<LS&M?
25
A. Yes.
25
A. Yes.
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whole parcel. If I were to buy this whole large 1 site for the sake of our discussion right now to
2 avoid confusion?
parcel at $5.50 a square foot in the before;
correct?
3
A. Yes.
4
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Under that definition of a pad
5 site, if I were to come up with this piece of
Q. Your $9.50 a square foot, isn't that
essentially what a purchaser would pay for -- I 6 property in the before, and want one of those pad
7 sites, and I were to buy it, you are saying $9.50
want to say a pad site on the front. Is that
8 a square foot; right?
fair to say? If I were to buy a pad site on the
9
A. I'm saying that is the price for the
front, or if I were to sever off something in
10 dirt.
that band on the front, sever off a pad site, I
11
Q. Right.
I I would pay $9.50 for that as a purchaser?
12
A. The one acre of dirt undeveloped.
12
A. Yeah. And let me just clarify that.
Q. The one acre of dirt undeveloped. So
13 $9.50 contemplates selling off an acre of land 13
14 that $9.50 a square foot equates to what you
14 with frontage on Pole Line. There is some
15 confusioii in the market and in our termiilology 15 would sell a piece of -- sever off and sell a
16 when we talk about real estate. Sometimes padd 6 piece of the front dirt to a purchaser?
A. Yes.
17 mean that you sell this area off to a potential 17
Q. You would call that the economy scale?
18 user. And the parking lot has been installed. 18
19 What do you call that when the individual part in
19 And all of the utilities been stubbed to this
20 building. And the only thing that is there is a 20 the front has a higher price than what a
21 little piece of dirt where they can drop in the 21 purchaser would be induced to pay for the whole
22 building and everything is ready to go. That is 22 parcel? What do you attribute that to?
A. Proximity, access, and size.
23 not what I'm thinking of when I say pad sites. 23
Q. Those are all characteristics unique to
24
Q. I'm with you. What are you describing 24
j . ~ ~ t + ~age
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A. I'm thinking of a pad site with a
1
2 one-acre -- approximately one-acre site that is
3 suitable for a user to develop a building, as
4 well as a parking lot.

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
A. Right.
Q. Now, you could have taken the approach
2
3 to where you assessed the value by determining
4 what would be -- what price would be paid by one

5 buyer for the whole parcel; correct? You could
Q. I appreciate you clarifying that. I
was having trouble forlnulating my question. An ,6 have done that?
7
A. Yes.
that, I think, was the part I was having trouble
Q. But you chose not to?
8
with.
9
A. Right.
So if you've got a shopping center that
Q. Now, at the date of the take there was
is almost 90 percent built out. There may be a 10
I 1 no platted pad site on this property; was there?
little square of dirt up there with a parking
12
A. No.
lot. Services stubbed out. Everything of that
Q. It is still your opinion that a market
nature. And somebody is going to come by and 13
14 existed for one of.those at the date of the take?
stick a coffee shop, or a Jack in the Box, or
15
A. Yes.
something on that square of dirt.
16
Q. So you basically decide what a
That is what some people refer to as a
17 purchaser would pay in the future for land in one
pad site; correct?
18 of those smaller pad sites and that is what you
A. Yes.
19 assign to the take?
Q. My question was -- and I think it was
A. In the future?
in line of what you are thinking. What do you 20
Q. At the date of the take. Excuse me.
call it when you have your band of value up here, 21
22 Would you lilte me to rephrase that?
and you're contemplating the whole site that
23
A. Yes, please.
would be encompassed for that use? In other
Q. You basically decide what a purchaser
words, not only that little square of dirt, but
24
25 would pay at the date of the take for land in one
the parking lot and -- can we call that a pad
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1 control on those roads have to reflect the
1 analysis; why didn't you just go in and take
2 ITD's parcel they've identified and use that as
2 movement of traffic through urban areas. So
3 access has changed and I expect it to continually 3 your large parcel; why does it matter to you as
4 change to ease the flow of traffic through most 4 an appraiser?
5
A. Well, sometimes the properties that you
5 all the towns in Idaho.
Q. So is it fair to say that as cities or
6
6 are appraising that's identified in a project
7 communities grow their access policies become 7 reflect a larger parcel and sometimes they don't.
Q. Why do you even care what the larger
8 more restrictive kind of as a general
8
9 proposition?
9 parcel is, is what I'm asking; why does it matter
10 to you?
10
A. Yes.
Q. Have you observed this in Twin Falls?
11
A. Because it determines the highest and
11
A. 1observed it, yes.
12 best use.
12
13
Q. Certainly Twin Falls is a classic
Q. Other than the fact that it relates to
13
1 4 the highest and best use, is it useful to you at
1 4 example of a rural community that is being
15 affected by a lot of growth; is it not?
1 5 all?
A. It defines the larger parcel that I'm
16
A. Yes.
16
Q. When you appraised this property, my
1 7 appraising.
17
Q. I understand that is what it does. I'm
1 8 understanding of your work and what you've donid 8
1 9 asking yon why that matters. You seem to say it
19 is that your larger parcel determination
20 coincides with the way ITD has identified this 20 matters for highest and best use. Does it matter
21 for any other reason?
21 parcel; is that correct?
A. Well, that would be partly due to it
22
A. It matters for highest and best use
22
2 3 because you measure the effects of the project
2 3 and also it's the ownership of record.
Q. Without respect yet to the reasons why, 24 against the highest and best use. Should this
24
25-am--I-c~~e~ti~~~de~stand.i.n.g--tbat-y0~1-laer--~~-just-beas~ma~~.-pa~ce1~
ge 90
1 the project affects the use of that property
1 parcel is exactly the same as the parcel
2 stand alone, that is the parcel.
2 identified in ITD's complaint?
Q. What about severance damages, does it
3
3
A. I believe it is.
4
have
any relationship to severance damages or
4
Q. When you undertake your larger parcel
5 determination, do you consider it persuasive the 5 your assessment of severance damages in the case?
A. The larger parcel; is that your
6
6 way ITD has addressed the properties?
7 question?
7
A. No.
8
Q. That is my question.
Q. In other words, you really don't care
8
A. Yes.
9 what ITD says the larger parcel is, you make y o u 9
Q. How is that related?
10
1 0 own; is that right?
A. Severance damages can be reflected by
11
A. I make my own; that 1s correct.
11
12 change in highest and best use.
Q. It just happens in this case that your
12
Q. We've talked about your general
13 larger parcel coincides with ITD's parcel in this 1 3
14 approach to determining the highest and best use
14 case?
15 and why you do it. Did you do that analysis in
15
A. It coincides.
16 this case?
Q. I-Iow is the larger parcel determination
16
A. Did I do the highest and besl use
17
1 7 rclevant to your valuation?
18
analysis?
A. It generally determines the contiguity
18
19
Q. Yes. Actually, I'm asking about the
19 of use, contiguity of ownership, continuity of
20 larger parcel analysis. I'm sorry.
20 use and ownership. It's part and parcel to the
21
Did you undertake that in this case?
21 valuation of the property.
A. Yes.
22
Q. Whcn you say it's part and parcel to
22
Q. You gave me three factors, you said
2 3 the determination of the value of the property, 23
24 use, I believe, you looked at, ownership, and
24 how does that affect the outcome, a smaller
25 whether the properties a .
2 5 versus a larger; why do you even do this
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC - (208) 345-961 1
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1 KLS&M. I think there is just some survey
discrepancy where they fall over. So highest and
best uses are similar, but the existing uses
would be different.
Q. So we are talking about your larger
parcel determination in this case. When you are
looking at that use factor, just as to that
factor, it looks like you've got some uses that
are common between the adjoining properties on
both sides; is that correct?
A. Well, that happens with almost any
12
property
you would ever appraise has some common
1 2 example, are there similar uses on the property
1 3 uses.
1 3 right now or at the date of the take?
Q. We are just talking about the use leg.
14
14
A. Yes.
Q. Are the highest and best uses similar, 15 1 understand you gave me three legs of analysis.
15
16 But just as to the use leg, it seems like what
16 in your opinion?
17
you are telling me is you've got this prong
A. I haven't done one on the Lazy J, so I
17
18 satisfied as to the neighboring parcels, at least
1 8 can't answer that.
Q. As you sit here today, do you have an 19 this prong; is that your opinion?
19
A. On the highest and best use they have
20 opinion on whether the highest and best use is 20
21 similar highest and best uses.
21 likely the same?
Q. But that is not the end of your
22
A. I don't know. I don't really know how 22
23 the Lazy J fits with all the adjacent properties 23 analysis; is it? If it was, you'd have a larger
24 parcel of possibly three or four other parcels;
24 and what the access scenarios are. I can't
~ - - w ~ u ~ ~ - o u - Z
25--answer-thatt
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1

A. Yes.

2
Q. While that is generally the analysis
2
3
3 you apply to your larger parcel determinations,
4
4 is that the analysis you applied in this case?
5
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. The result of that analysis was that
6
7 the property we've described in the complaint i 7
8
8 the larger parcel?
9
9
A. Yes.
t(80
Q. When you look at neighboring parcels
10
I 1 the subject property, say, the Lazy J parcel, for I1

A. Right. They don't have common
Q. You've done the KLS&M property. Let's 1
1
2
ownership.
2 look to that side. Is the highest and best use
Q. One of the other factors was contiguity
3 similar between these two properties, KLS&M and 3
4 I think you said, whether they are contiguous or
4 the subject?
5 whether they are next to each other. Certainly
5
A. In what condition?
6 the parcels we are talking about, the KLS&M and
Q. In the before condition.
6
7
Lazy J, are contiguous to the subject property;
7
A. Similar.
8 are they not?
Q. So it looks like on your use leg of
8
9
A. They are contiguous.
9 your analysis you've got the use at the time of
10
Q. We've bumped through two of the factors
1 0 the take is similar to at least one of the
11 and so far it looks like we've got those
11 adjacent properties; correct?
12 satisfied. I take it you get hung up on the
A. Similar highest and best use, that's
12
1 3 third one, that is ownership?
1 3 correct.
14
A. Yes.
Q. Well, not only the highest and best
14
Q. If there were common ownership between
1 5 use, but you've got the mobile home park use that 15
16
all
three
of the parcels, would you have made a
1 6 spills over on to the KLS&M property, occupies
17 the Canyon Vista property and the Lazy J as well; 17 larger parcel determination that was greater than
18 the one you made in this case?
1 8 right?
A. There is common ownerships between the
19
A. Well, I believe the manufactured units
19
20 two parcels or I should say common interests
20 that slop over from the Lazy J park that is
21 located on Canyon View, some of those units, just21 between the two parcels. It's my understanding
22 the ownership of the subject property is sole and
22 due to the line of the legal description, flop
2 3 over onto KLS&M property. 1 don't think there is 23 separate from the ownership of the KLS&M properly
24 even though they are related entities. The owner
2 4 a technically improved mobile home park, an
2 5 economic entity mobile home park constructed on 25 of the subject property doesn't have 100 percent
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1
2
3
4

interest in the subject property because those
1
Q. Now, when you are looking at the
shares or whatever are being transfened out
2 current use of the property, do you believe or is
through estate planning through a family
3 it your understanding that the Lazy J Ranch
partnership.
4 Corporation that owns the Lazy J property, that
I believe the KLS&M parcel, the owner
5
5 they have some sort of a lease or right of use
6 there doesn't own 100 percent interest, but has a 6 over the Canyon Vista property?
7 majority interest like the subject property,
7
A. They have a lease over at least a
8 awaiting additional shares to be gifted through
8 portion of the property.
9 estate planning and via a family partnership.
Q. "This property" being the subject
9
1 0 But it's also my understanding that those parcels 1 0 property?
A. Over the subject property, that's
11 were all created -- they were created prior to
11
1 2 the project and the project caused the change of 12 correct.
13 access to each of those parcels that were
13
Q. I know my question may have been a
1 4 created.
1 4 little confusing, so I want to clarify.
15
15
You believe that the Lazy J parcel
Q. You have read Christy Williams'
1 6 deposition; is that correct?
1 6 owners have a lease on the subject property?
17
A. Well, let me review the lease to be
A. Yes.
17
18
Q. 1,sthat where you base your opinion of 1 8 accurate on that. There is a lease in there and
1 9 the ownership or information you received from 1 9 I have a copy of the lease in my file and I would
2 0 her, is that the basis for your opinion that the
2 0 like to review that before I answer that
21 larger parcel determination as far as the
21 question.
22 neighboring parcels fails on the ownership prong'22
Q. That would be fine.
23
A. Can we take a break?
A. I think you asked two or three
23
2 4 questions in there. Could you repeat that for
MR. MALLET: Actually, that's a good
24
2l-.&,a :...&t$t&~a..bre&
25...m+please
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(Recess taken.)
Q. I'd be happy to reask it.
1
2
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) We are back on the
2
It looks like you've considered the
3 record after a short break.
3 ownership prong in your larger parcel
Before we left we were talking about
4
4 determination and you think that the adjoining
5
your
opinion
that there was some sort of a lease
5 properties fail that common ownership
6 by the owners of the Lazy J parcel over the
6 requirement; is that correct?
7 subject property and you qualified that by
7
A. Yes.
8 saying: I've got a document I need to look at to
Q. You get that information from where
8
9 give you the real answer. Have you had that
9 that leads you to that determination?
1 0 document in front of you?
A. Well, it's contained in that
10
A. Yes.
11 deposition, but also at a meeting years ago they 11
Q. What, if anything, does that tell you
12 described the ownership in those three parcels
12
1 3 about the possibility or the certainty that the
1 3 when we had the meeting at the clubhouse.
Lazy J owners have a lease over the subject
Q.
Now,
the
Lazy
J
Ranch
Mobile
Home
Par134
14
15 or manufactured home park has a use that Lazy J 1 5 property?
A. It just shows the parties to the lease
16
1 6 parcel and Canyon Vista parcel share; does it
1 7 and when it was made. So what I wanted to
1 7 not?
1 8 confirm is that the Lazy J did have the lease on
18
A. Is a use that they share, that's
1
9 it. When you asked me the question, I knew there
1 9 correct.
20 was a related entity that had the lease, the
20
Q. In other words, this operating mobile
21 mobile home park, but I didn't know, at the time
21 home park, which is apparently named Lazy J
22 I wasn't prepared to answer I knew what entity
22 Ranch, it is cited on both of these, the Lazy J
2 3 that was. But it does look like the Lazy J
2 3 and the Canyon Vista parcels?
24 Mobile Home Ranch does have a lease on the
A. It covers both of those parcels, that's
24
2 5 subject property for the mobile home portion of
25 correct.
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1 determination, would it matter if separate
I the property.
Q.
I
apologize,
we
took
a
break
and
I
2
parcels were created but not through the legal
2
3 can't remember what I have or haven't asked y o ~ , 3subdivision process?
A. I don't really know what you are asking
4 so I may reask a couple questions. But just to 4
5 me. You can create whatever parcel you want in
5 make sure we are on the same page;itls your
6 understanding that the Lazy J Mobile Ranch, In .6 the state of Idaho. So I don't know what you are
7 asking me regarding to subdivision.
7 is the owner of the Lazy J parcel?
8
Q. 1'11 give you a hypothetical. The day
8
A. No, that's not my understanding. I
9
before
the date of the take if the owners of the
9 don't know who owns the Lazy J parcel. All I'm
1 0 commenting on is the lease between the Lazy J 1 0 subject property were to have created 20 leases
11 Mobile Home Ranch and the part of the subject 11 and sold this parcel in 20 different
12 property it affects. I believe a previous family 12 approximately 1-acre parcels to other people,
13 would you consider each of those parcels as the
13 partnership created this lease prior to the -14 prior to the creation of the current ownership. 1.4 larger parcel or how would that affect, if it
1 5 would, your larger parcel determination? I may
15 I think the current owners are successors in
1
6 need to reask that, let me know if I do.
1 6 title to this property.
A. You said they created 20. It's a
Q. Where you see a use that occupies the 1 7
17
18 hypothetical question, but you said they created
1.8Lazy J parcel and the subject parcel, do you
1 9 assume that there are leases in favor of cross- 19 20 leases?
Q. Twenty lots.
20 leases or leases in favor of one property owner 20
A. Twenty lots?
2 1 over
~ the other; how do you account for that in 21
22
Q. Yes.
22 your opinion when you are appraising this
In other words, if the owner of the
2 3 property; what do you think the facts are; what 23
24 did you assume for purposes of your opinion? 24 property gets deeds and divides their parcel into
254~~a~-the1-eisa-leas~f~~-t-h%m~~~2~~O-appro~ima-t~e
1 home occupation on the subject property for that 1
2
2 use.
Q. Whatever the lease may be, there is
3
3
4
4 some sort of lease; is that your opinion?
5
5
A. Yes.
6
Q.
Now,
we've
been
talking
about
the
6
7
7 larger parcel determination before our break. 1
8
8 would like to continue on, at least for a time,
9
9 on that issue.
10
10.
When you are looking at the way these
11
11 parcels were created and the timing and how it
12 was done, do you have any opinions as to whether 12
13 the KLS&M property and the subject property wertfl3
14
1 4 legally subdivided from each other?
15
1 5 . A. Do I have an opinion if they were
16
16 legally subdivided from each other?
17
17'
Q. Yes.
1
8
18
A. No.
19
Q. Did you make any assumptions of that
19
20 nature when you formulated your opinion in this 20
21
21 case?
22
A. They are each legal parcels of record
22
2
3
23 and as far as the legality of a subdivision, I
24
24 don't have an opinion to that.
25
Q. As far as your larger parcel
25

them away to other people, would that affect your
larger parcel determination on the next day, the
date of the take?
A. It may.
Q. Now, if they didn't go through a
subdivision process, in other words, those splits
were not created through a subdivision or they'
didn't avail themselves of the subdivision
requirements to make those smaller divisions of
their property, would that matter to you?
A. It may not in the hypothetical you are
describing because Ibelieve you can survey and
divide any parcel pretty much any way you want to
in the state of Idaho. If you break, if you
create what they call maybe an illegal
subdivision parcel, it depends on what the county
records are, the ones that are illegal you
couldn't build a house on them. And since you
are not putting houses on that parcel, it
probably wouldn't have a big effect on it because
you are going to go through the entitlement
process to put the property to its highest and
best use anyway and cure those issues.
Q. So in other words, ifthat were screwed
up, if the creating of the lots was done outside
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-961 1
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Is this updating a specific page

of the report?
A. I'd have to look at the report, but
there was a math error on here's the summary of
it. It had to do with the summary ofthe
remainder value, and explained the error. It was
a thousand-dollar error, so the compensation would
have been 326 instead of 327.
Q. Okay. And when did you discover that?
A. Saturday.
Q. This past Saturday?
A. Yes.
Q. So you have refreshed yourselfon your
2003 report?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that report was an
accurate assessment of fair compensation as of
July 30th, 20037
A. With the correction to the 326, yes.
Q. Okay. Why did you in your 2003 report
appraise the Canyon Vista as a stand-alone
property, and in your update combine it with
parcel 1 Y?
A. The more I was involved in the project,
Page 14

--

and particularly the four parcels owned by the
Williams extended family unit, it was clear to me
that the larger parcel was not an individual
property, that the mobile home park, the Lazy J
Mobile Home Ranch, was operated as a single mtit
across three properties. And YS percent of them
were on parcels 19 and 41, and I concluded that
was a larger parcel. And I concluded that parcels
16 and 40 were a separate larger parcel. And at
the advice of counsel, I use those two different
units as larger parcels, but the compensation was
allocated out to each different parcel separately.
Q. As an appraiser how do you properly
determine the larger parcel?
A. It has to do with ownership, use, and
particularly the proximity to each other.
Q. Is there a definition of larger parcel
that you use?
A. Basically, the three components that I
just gave you define a larger parcel. But it has
to be somewhat flexible; it might not have all
three -- ownership, unity of use, and contiguity
--all, in every case.
Q. And how do you use the three factors lo
determine what the larger parcel consists of!

John Dillman
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. You look at the property you are
appraising. You look at the ownership, you look
at the usc.
Q. Do you look at the current use or the
highest and best use?
A. You have to look at both. Current use
could be the highest and best use.
Q. Let's deal with the ownership issue
first. How did you analyze that and determine the
larger parcel in doing your Canyon Vista
appraisal?
A. The original tract owned by the
Williams family was about 82 acres. Originally,
it was subdivided -- not subdivided. It was split
into two properties: Lazy J, and J and M
Investments. And in November of 2001, J and M
Investments split their area into three tracts of
land which are now known as parcels 41, 16, and
40; for the project, not the joint legal
descriptions.
Q. When was the property originally split
into Lazy J and J and M?
A. I don't have a date on the Lazy J,
which occurred before November of 2001. But the
other split occurred on November 2nd, I believe,
Page 1 6

2001.
Q. How do you know Lazy J was split off
before 20017
A. There was a reference in my 2002
appraisals where -- no, that's not quite right.
The original set of plans showed parcel 19 as
Lazy J and the other three as parcel 16. So based
on that, I assumed that Lazy J had been separated
before the other three properties. They could
have all occurred at once in November of 2001.
But there is no record that I have, there is
nothing in the title report that shows that.
Q. That shows what?
A. I'm sorry?
Q . There's nothing in the title report
that shows what?
A. That it was split off earlier than
that.
Q. And is that why, throughout your 2007
appraisal report, you reference all four as being
split at the same time?
A. Yes.
Q. When you read that report, you were
under the impression that all four were split at
the same time.
4 (Pages 13 t o 16)
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Page 29
hasn't changed.
2
Q. What did you conclude about the highest
3
and best use before the taking of the Lazy J piece
4 standing alone?
5
A. Same conclusion.
6
Q. What did you conclude about the KLSMN,
7 or parcel 16 piece, standing alone?
8
A. Same conclusion.
Q How about BCM&W on the corner -9
10
A. Same conclusion.
11
Q. You need to let me finish my question
1 2 for the record.
13
What was your conclusion of the highest
1 4 and best use BCM&W standing alone?
A. Same conclusion.
15
Q. So all four pieces in your view have
16
17 the same highest and best use; correct?
18
MR. MALLET: Object to the question. The
1 9 form of the question is not clear whether you are
20 asking him in the before or the after.
21
MS. CUNNINGHAM: In the before.
22
THE WITNESS: In the before, the highest and
23 best use is to develop all four of them in one
24 master plan, one C-1 PUD.
25 //I
Page 30
1

BY MS. CUNNINGHAM:
Q. So for highest and best use purposes,
why wouldn't that point to the larger parcels
4
being all four pieces then?
5
A. Well, like I said, reanalyzing the
6 property over the years that I have spent on this
7 project, I reconsidered my original conclusions in
8 that the property would have to be developed
9
together to maximize the benefits to the
1 0 ownership. And it was clear that the ownership
11 stretched across three, at least three of the
12 properties that were operated as the Lazy J.
13
So I changed my opinion about the
1 4 larger parcel. The highest and best use never
1 5 changed. The broad highest and best use for
1 6 redevelopment sometime in the future is commercial
17 and residential.
18
Q. You said that the three prongs of
1 9 determining the larger parcel were ownership, use,
20 and contiguity, meaning whether or not the
2 1 properties are contiguous to one another; correct?
22
A. Yes, correct.
23
Q. So if we look at all four pieces, under
24 your analysis they would have common ownership
25 because they are all somehow tied into the family,
1

2
3

1

and that is all that's required; correct? In your
view?
3
A.' In my opinion, yes.
4
Q. And all four of them have the same
5
highest and best use; correct? In the before?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. And all four are contiguous; correct?
A. Correct.
8
Q. So why isn't the larger parcel all
9
1 0 four?
11
A. The larger parcel could he all four.
12
Q. Yes, it could. Why isn't it?
13
A. Well, I think it had to do with the
1 4 fact that the parcel numbers were developed by the
1 5 Highway Department, that the ownership required
16 compensation to each of the four individuals and
1 7 not as one lump sum, and that the value
1 8 conclusions were the same for each larger parcel.
1 9 So in effect, it was appraised as one larger
20 parcel. The before value of each parcel is the
21 same as the same as the after value.
22
But you're right. In retrospect, it
23 could have been appraised as one parcel.
24
Q. Are you saying, in effect it was -- one
25 larger parcel as all four because your values were
P a g e 32
2

--

1

the same in the before, or similar; and your
values were the same in the after in each separate
3
appraisal?
4
MR. MALLET: Object to the form.
5
THE WITNESS: Well, I'll retract that.
6
There's two larger parcels: One is improved, with
7 95 percent of the mobile home park. The other
8 larger parcel is mostly cropland.
9 BY MS. CUNNINGHAM:
Q. Would you agree that the current use is
10
11 not as important as the highest and best use when
1 2 you are appraising property for condemnation?
13
A. Yes.
14
Q. Would you agree that when you're
15 determining the larger parcel, the highest and
1 6 best use is what you need to look at as far as
1 7 unity of use?
18
A. Yes.
Q. And that is more important than the
19
2 0 current use in that context; correct?
21
A. If it's in the changing market, yes.
22
Q. And this is a changing market; correct?
23
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And it was in 2004?
24
25
A. It was in 2004, yes.
8 ( P a g e s 29 to 3 2 )
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Q. Okay. I would agree. Why don't you
tell me what you'd like to change in that regard.
3
A. Just that I considered the larger
3
A. I just finished one last week.
4
parcel issue in this case, the main concern is the
Q. What would be the first condemnation
4
5
unity of ownership as to whether or not that
5 report that you did, what point in your career?
6 exists and view that as a legal matter. And so I
6
A. Probably three or four years ago.
7
Q. So you've only been doing condemnation 7 really considered the legal from the position
8 just the one parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel, this
8 work for the last three or four years?
9 parcel 41 is probably, as I mentioned later, is my
9
A. Yes.
1 0 larger parcel. However, as you gathered through
10
Q. Have you ever done any condemnation
11 the report, I still considered all four parcels in
11 work for property owners?
1 2 highest and best use considerations.
A. Yes.
12
13
Q. Okay. If I understand you correctly,
13
Q. What percentage of your condemnation
1 4 you're saying that the larger parcel that you've
1 4 work's been for owners?
1 5 appraised and valued is specifically only parcel
A. I guess probably one out of six, so
15
1 6 41; is that correct?
1 6 that would be, what, whatever percentage that
17
A. Yes.
1 7 works out to, a little less than 20 percent.
18
Q. However, in your view, the property
Q. Out of the five that you've done for
18
1 9 would be developed together all four for highest
1 9 condemnors, would those all be for ITD?
20 and best use purposes?
20
A. Yes.
21
A. Yes.
21
Q. And how did you come to start
22
Q. All right. And that's true in your
2 2 appraising for ITD in condemnation?
2 3 view both before and after the taking; correct?
23
A. I received a phone call, oh, it's been
24
A. Yes.
24 a couple, a number of years ago from a Scott
Q. When you say unity of ownership is a
25 Campbell. They were interested particularly at 25
1

2

1
2

A. Six or seven.
Q. How recently?

--

Page 6

Page 8

that time for business valuations.
Q. What pro.jects have you worked for ITD
3
doing condemnation work?
A. Let's see. As best I recall there was
4
5 a mobile home park in Idaho Fails. There's
6
been it was the Fearless Farris property there
7 in Nampa. And there's been, let's see, three on
8
this Twin Falls project. It seemed like there was
9 another one somewhere, too, but those are the ones
1 0 I can remember off the top of my head.
11
Q. What other properties did you appraise
12 in Twin Falls?
13
A. Two of the parcels that were next to
14 this one, the Lazy J. and then the KLS&M.
15
Q. Did you ever do any work on the comer
1 6 parcel BCM&W?
17
A. No.
Q. Before we begin today, are there any
18
1 9 changes that you'd like to make to your March 7,
20 2007 report in tbis matter?
21
A. I jus! wanted to clarify perhaps the
22 discussion in the cover letter dealing with the
23 larger parcel. As I read through it last night, I
24 realized that 1 didn't clarify what is mentioned
25 later on in the report.

legai issue, what do you mean by that from an
appraisal standpoint?
3
A. Well, in my investigation of the four
4 named entities, there's clearly some common
5
ownerships. And looking at the appraisal text, it
6
talks about there are some cases that say that
7
common ownership is sufficient and some that would
8
argue that point. I'm not an attorney, so I'm not
9
going to specify how that would work out.
10
Q. Okay. Did you ask for any
11 clarification on that issue from ITD's legal
1 2 department?
A. Yes.
13
14
Q. What did you learn?
15
A. They really wanted me to just conclude
1 6 on a value for this specific parcel. So it wasn't
17 as big an issue.
18
Q. So your value of $3 a foot before and
1 9 after assumes that this property is sold as a
20
stand-alone piece in the market?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Are you familiar with the process that
23 ITD has for having a list of approved appraisers?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. And have you made application to be on

1

2

--

1

2
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Page 101

initial other than larger parcel because of the
2 legal connotation. I wasn't meaning that, just
3 meaning because of the bigger piece. And I
4 realize I should have come up with different
5 verbiage.
6
MR. MALLET: Bigger parcel.
THE WITNESS: Bigger parcel, would that
7
8 work? The bigger combined parcel. I should have
9 said like the combined fours parcels or something
l o like that would have been more clear.
11
Q. BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: Right, to refer to
1 2 your highest and best use concept.
13
A. Exactly.
14
Q. But when we get to our valuation
1 5 concept, we're just dealing with this as a stand16 alone?
A. Yes. That's what I should have said.
17
1 8 I wasn't thinking the larger parcel word as a
1 9 legal connotation.
25
Q. Let's take a little break.
(Recess.)
21
Q. BY MS. CUNNMGHAM: All right. Page 64
22
23 is where we're going next.
24
A. Okay.
Q. Okay. The second paragraph down you've
25
1

1
2
3

4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

assessment. I'm wondering if you know whether or
not the tax assessed value of the property is
going up or down?
A. I don't know. But generally it goes
up, but I don't know for sure.
Q. If it were going down, would that
impact your view at all?
A. No. If it were an income-producing
property, it would, but in this case it wouldn'l.
Q. On page 67 and a couple other places in
the report under physical possible use you
reference the relatively large size of the
property, and given your other statements I was
confused as to whether that meant the 20-acre or
the 82-acre size.
A. This is particularly now we're talking
just about this would be the 20-acre piece.
Q. So you consider that to be a relatively
large size?
A. Yeah. But as I've mentioned, you know,
you'd make more money ifyou'd develop it as an
80-acre site.
Q. Along similar lines on page 68 when
we're talking about the conclusion of highest and
best use if leA vacant, again are we talking
Page 104

Page 102
1

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

mentioned that you've talked to both Mr. Mallet
and JoAnn Butler about this issue of the trailer
parks -- I mean the mobile home evictions or 1
don't know if you want to call them evictions but
redevelopment of the site.
A. Yes. It sounds better; huh?
Q. Yes. If I understand you correctly,
you had a concern about whether or not you could
redevelop the site given its current use; is that
fair to say?
A. Well, not whether you could but at
least considering timing and costs and would that
impact the properiy and how much.
Q. And do you think that a six-month
timeframe to transition the use would have any
impact on value?
A. I consider that in the value basically.
In other words, I think I concluded I probably
would have concluded at a little bit higher value
had it not been for the mobile home park but not a
significant amount. Now in other states where
there's other issues, then it would have made a
major difference. But Idaho, this is -- as far as
we could determine this is it.
Q. Okay. On page 65 you deal with the tax

1
2
3

4

5
6

7
8

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

about a subject development as a mixed use 20-acre
or as an 82-acre?
A. It's really both. Talking specifically
at this point I'm valuing this specific piece, so
it's the 20-acre piece. But I'm looking at that
highest and best use for the entire parcel so the
larger -- not larger parcel, the bigger piece.
Q. Did you do an economic feasibility
study?
A. No.
Q. Did you do a developmental approach as
a check on highest and best use?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Now on page 74, I need some help
understanding what you're saying here about the
before and after camps.
A. Okay.
Q. You seem to be saying that it's okay to
use comps for both the before and the after, the
same comps, and I'm curious how that relates to
disregarding project influence in condemnation.
A. Well, in this case as I mentioned you
ordinarily try and do others, but because of the
long history of this project, 1thought that that
was basically so well known that it was basically
26 (Pages 101 to 104)
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A. 19 spaces were added at a later date.
1 corporate shareholder for the Lazy J Corporation
Q. Do you know roughly where those were, 2 and as an employee of the corporation. First of
3 or where those are?
3 all, you are a currently a shareholder in the
4
A. Yes.
4 Lazy J Corporation; are you not?
5
Q. Where is that?
5
A. Yes.
Q. When I say Lazy J Ranch, the full name
6
A. That would be -- well, take 157 spaces
6
7 and subtract 19, and they're between those two
7 is Lazy J Ranch, Inc.?
8 numbers.
8
A. Yes.
Q. And you are a shareholder in that
9
Q. I just mean, where are they located?
9
1 0 entity?
10 Are those the ones on the property line in
11
A. Yes, I am.
11 between?
Q. And you were at the time of the taking
12
12
A. No. No. They would be on the north
13 side of Canyon Vista. They would run along Pole13 in this case, which was December 28th, 2004?
14 Line Road.
14
A. Yes.
15
Q. It's my understanding that in between
Q. What are your responsibilities in the
15
1 6 Canyon Vista and the KLS & M parcel, there are dl6 corporation as a corporate shareholder, if any?
1 7 row of trailers that are split by the property
1 7 I think you were listed as secretary?
18
A. I'm secretaryltreasurer now. My
I 1 . Is that your understanding?
1 9 parents were always the officers, and the three
A. Yes.
19
Q. And there may even be a couple that are 20 of us were directors up until -- oh, I don't
20
21 over the property line; is that correct?
21 know -- four, or five, six years ago. I can't
22 remember exactly what year. We thought it best
22
A. That's correct.
Q. And those were in existence or in place 2 3 that somebody be an officer.
23
Q. Now, just for the record, you have a
2 4 before the property line was created?
24
25
PA.T h a , k e ~ ~ & .
Page 2 2
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Page 2 4
1
2

1
A. Yes.
1
Q. Okay. I was led to believe that you
Q. And a sister, Christie Wills?
2 are the manager of the mobile home park; is that 2
3
A. Williams.
3 fair to say?
4
Q. Excuse me, my apologies.
4
A. That's what they call me.
5
A. Yes.
Q. Can you explain what your duties are.
5
Q. They are both shareholders in this
6 Why don't you explain to me what your position 6
7 is, or what your duties are generally, basically. 7 corporation?
8
A. Yes.
8
A. Basically, I am the manager. I oversee
Q. And currently, your mother is the
9
9 the employees we've got; the outside person,
1 0 people who do our lawn mowing; my office help,lO fourth shareholder in the Lazy J Corporation?
A. She is the president.
? 1 which right now is my granddaughter. I collect I 1
Q. So it looks like you said, until four
12
1 2 rent. I pay the bills. I pay the employees and
1 3 or five years ago, it was you and your parents
13 do the withholdings.
14 that were the directors; is that correct?
14
Q. Now, is this your primary occupation?
A. No. My mother and my father were the
15
15
A. Yes.
16 officers. And my brother and sister and I were
Q. Do you receive a wage?
16
1 7 directors.
17
A. Yes.
Q. Directors; okay. What type of
Q. Would you consider yourself an employee18
18
19 decisions as the secretary and treasurer can you
1 9 of Lazy J Ranch Corporation?
20 make for the corporation, or do you make?
20
A. Yes.
A. Boy, what kind of decisions?
Q. Is that who your W-2 would show as you 21
21
Q. I have to ask. Can you give employees
22
2 2 employer?
2
3
raises?
You are the employee.
23
A. Absolutely.
A. I would like to.
Q. And one thing I'm curious about is the 24
24
25
MR. COPPLE: R E x M , B i x d
25 split between your responsibilities as a
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A. It's the corporation, and it's owned by
I
1 were split, and the ownership interest of all
2 these different entities. So I'm going to try to
2 my brother, my sister, and I, and my parents.
3
Q. Now, it seemed like in 1970, there was
3 wade through that.
4 a name change. It looked like it was Lazy J
4
A. Okay.
Q. We've gone through the easy stuff, and
5 Mobile Home Park?
5
6
A. That's correct.
6 it took a long time. I'm hoping that's not a
7 hard venture of things to come. But let's go
Q. But that's the same corporation?
7
8 ahead and start by talking about how these
8
A. Absolutely.
Q. Except the name change, the Lazy J
9
9 properties were split-up originally.
Originally, your mom and dad owned a
1 0 Ranch, Inc. today is the same corporation?
10
11 very large piece of property that now consists of
11
A. Yes.
Q. In 1970, as far as I can see, the
I 2 what we call the BCM & W, the KLS & M, the Canyonn2
13 corporate records show that there were three
1 3 Vista, and the Lazy J parcel?
1 4 shareholders in the corporation. And I showed it
14
A. Yes.
Q. So at one point, your mom and dad owned
15
15 Emil Pike was one share, your mother was one, and
1 6 your dad was one. Are you familiar with that at
16 that piece of property?
17 all?
17
A. Yes.
A. Kind of. I vaguely remember that when
18
Q.
And
the
first
split,
it
looks
to
me
was
18
19 it was first set up as the corporation, he was
19 in 1970, where they split off what we call the
20 their attorney, and he had to have a share or
20 Lazy J parcel -21 something. I don't remember any more than that.
21
A. That's correct.
Q. So the lawyer drafted the documents and
Q. -- which is the coulee and east;
22
22
23 included himself in the deal, it looks like?
23 correct?
MR. COPPLE: That was not uncustomary,
24
24
A. Correct.
2 5 . - ~ b ~ 1 - k a v a ~ y - i d d + ~ uPage 2 5 & ~ 6 a u ~ ~ ~ 6 0 y 3 e r 1 That was the days before one-man companies.
I canals coulees in Twin Falls?
2
MR. MALLET: I didn't know that. I was
A. No, I don't. Because supposedly, it's
2
3
wondering
why it was that way.
3 an incorrect name for them.
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) But basically, as far
4
Q. Is that a French word or -4
5 as you know, it was your mom and dad that ran the
5
A. It beats me.
MR. MALLET: Do you mind if we take a 6 corporation. And your lawyer was only nominally
6
7 included?
7 recess, since I spilled water?
8
A. Yes.
8
MR. COPPLE: No.
Q. So in 1970, we have a corporation with
9
9
(A recess was had.)
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Now, this original 1 0 your mom and dad owning what we call the Lazy J
10
11 parcel. It's been split off from the 60-acre
II division was in 1970, as far as you know?
1
2 parcel. At the time it was split off, it was
12
A. Yes.
Q. And it left what we now call the Lazy J 1 3 owned by whom, if you know?
13
A. J C and Margaret Williams.
14 parcel. And then its adjacent eastern parcel had 1 4
15
Q.
Was that the J&M, Limited Partnership
1 5 about 60 acres in it?
16
A. That was my mom and dad's parcel that 1 6 that owned that, by chance?
17
A. No.
17 was left.
Q. That came to be actually later; didn't
1
8
18
MR. COPPLE: But that's not what he
1 9 it?
1 9 asked you. Was there about 60 acres in the
A. Yes.
20
2 0 parcel that was left?
Q. So your mom and dad owned the 60
21
21
THE WITNESS: Yes.
22 individually, and then they owned the smaller
22
MR. MALLET: Thanks.
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) At the time it was 2 3 parcel through the corporate entity in '70.
23
A. The land is actually in the
24
2 4 split, who owned the Lazy J property, if you
25
corporation.
2 5 know?
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC - (208) 345-961 1
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1
THE WITNESS: I don't know why you had
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) So the property was
1
2 transferred out of the J & M Family Investments, 2 me bring anything. You've got everything.
3
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Actually, I don't have
3 Limited Partnership -- it was transferred out,
4 everything that you've brought. I have quite a
4 that would be the transfer in November of 2001,
5 few items from your sister. She claimed not to
5 which split the 60-acre parcel?
6 have access to Lazy J. She punted to you, I
6
A. The 60 acres was transferred out.
7 guess, so...
Q. That's correct. So we've gone from
7
A. That's probably true, though.
8 1970, where the 60 acres was held by your mom ailc~8
9
Q. I figured it was. Since you were not
9 dad?
10
only
the manager, but the secretary of the
10
A. Right.
11 corporation as well. So here we are.
Q. ,And then we move to 1983, where it was
I1
These partnerships, the limited
12 transferred from your mom and dad to the J & M 12
1
3
partnerships
that received title in 2001, your
1 3 Family Limited Partnership?
14 entity was the KLS & M partnership, the limited
14
A. That's right.
15
partnership?
Q.
And
now
I'm
moving
ahead
to
2001,
15
A. Yes.
16
16 specifically, November, and now it looks like the
Q. And the general partner at that time
17
17 limited partnership transferred title of that 60
18 was or is the KLS & M, LLC?
18 acres to -19
A. Yes.
A. Right. That's correct, to the three
19
Q. And that has one member, which is you;
20
20 other entities.
21
correct?
Q.
Right.
Okay.
I
have
a
copy
of
a
21
22
A. Correct.
22 quitclaim deed from the limited partnership to
Q. At the time it received title, who were
23 the Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, and 23
24 the limited partners, if you know, of that
24 that appears to have been dated November Znd,
25-K;6.s&-M-p&~w+--Page 6 0
woo-1.
Page 58
1
A. In other words, the date of the change?
2
Q. Correct, 2001?
A.
Myself, my sister, and my brother.
3
Q. Okay. And you would have a similar
3
Q. How about your mother?
4
4 quitclaim deed -A. You know, they did have a little
5
5
A. Right.
6
percentage,
and they -- I believe, that was
Q. --to your entity, which would he the
6
7 signed over right at the time of the change of
7 KLS&M?
8 the entity.
A.
Yes.
Right.
I
know
I'm
talking
over
8
Q. The reason I ask is, because it looks
9
9 him. I'm sony.
1 0 to me like on the Canyon Vista, instead of having
Q. Again, that's productive to do that in
10
11 everyday conversation. It's just going to muddle 11 an LLC, you have a corporation, which is the
12 general partner, which is your sister, Christie?
1 2 our record up a little.
13
A. MIII-1u11m.
13
A. Okay.
Q. But the limited partners are -- as far
14
Q. So my questioil was: You received a
14
15
as
the
documents I've seen, were originally your
15 similar quitclaim deed that deeded the ICLS & M
16 inom and dad, and then you, your sister, your
1 6 property into your entity?
1 7 brother. And that seemed like it was probably
17
A. Yes.
18
the case on the KLS & M as well; is that correct?
Q. And as far as you know, the 60 acres
18
19
A. I guess I lost you when you were
19 has stayed titled the same way, since this
20 talking about her corporation. What does that
20 transfer in 2001 ; as far as you know, have all
21 three of the parcels stayed in the same ownership21 have to do with it? Okay. Start again.
Q. Yes. If you don't understand, all you
2
22 since that time?
2 3 have to do is ask me to repeat the question.
A. Yes.
23
A. Okay. Repeat it.
MR.
MALLET:
She's
going
to
wait.
24
Q. Instead of having an LLC as the general
2 5 She's giving me a hard time, Don.
A. I imagine that's when it was gifted
1
2 over to her entities.

1:
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Q. I had a bunch of questions related to
Q. And your mom and dad, possibly?
1
1
A.
They
had
.3
something
in
the
beginning,
2
some
documents that your sister gave me. I have
2
3 tabbed what she calls "Tax Report 2003." Have
3 and then they gifted it out immediately.
4 you ever seen that document?
4
Q. Now, how was it that your
5
A. Yes, this is something she's made up.
5 grandchildren -6 It's on her -6
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. -- and your daughter, how do they come
7
Q. That was my first question: If you've
7
8
seen
it, where did it come from? And it looks
8 to supplant your sister and your brother and your
9 mom and dad as owners of the KLS & M, the limited 9 like you didn't generate that as your manager or
10 secretarial duties?
10 partners?
A.
Okay.
You
are
going
to
have
to
repeat
11
A. No, I didn't.
11
Q. Now, this is the Canyon Vista Family,
12 that. 1 don't understand that.
12
13 Limited Partnership record, at least it was
Q. You said originally, your brother,
13
14 represented to me, to be a record of that limited
14 sister and your mom and dad, and possibly you
15 partnership?
15 were limited partners in the KLS & M, Limited
A. That's exactly what that is.
16
7 6 Partnership?
Q. Are you currently a limited partner of
17
17
A. That's correct.
Q. It looks like that's changed; hasn't
18 that limited partnership?
18
19
A. Yes, Iam.
19 it?
Q. It shows that you received a
20
A. Yes.
20
Q. How did that come to pass? Did
21 disbursement, at least in 2003, of 18,000, almost
21
22 $19,000?
22 somebody gift to your kids?
23
A. That very well could be. I don't know
23
A. No, sir.
24 that that's accurate, but it sounds good.
Q. Did they gift to you and gift to your
24
~EL-&~~FP~
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MR. COPPLE: That's four years ago.
1
A. I also gifted to my children, and I
1
Q.
(BY MR. MALLET) In other words, you
2
2 also gifted to my brother's children. In return,
3 received a disbursement that year. You are just
3 he gifted to his children and gifted to my
4 not sure if that's right to the dollar amount?
4 children. He gifted from his part in my entity
5
A. Yes, exactly.
5 to my children.
6
Q. Okay. Now, this disbursement, this
Q. And you gifted from your part in his
6
7 money would be -- it's not income from the Lazy J
7 entity to his children?
8 Mobile Home Park; is it?
8
A. Yes, I did.
9
A. No, it's rent.
Q. When did that happen?
9
Q. So the Canyon Vista Family, Limited
10
A. Right off the bat, I started gifting to
10
1I my children and my grandchildren. I think maybr4 1 Partnership receives a rent check, and that's
12 supposedly how it got disbursed this year?
12 it was the next year I started gifting to his
13
A. Yes.
13 children. Then when he got grandchildren, I
Q. And is that how it's still done today?
14
14 gifted to all of them.
A. Yes, I believe so.
15
MR. COPPLE: We've been going an
15
Q. And I can assume it was done that way
16
16 hour-and-a-half. Do you want take a break?
$
7
in
2404
as well?
17
MR. MALLET: Yes, let's do it. Let's
A. Yeah. Right now, she's getting more
18
18 take a real break.
19 rent.
19
(A recess was had.)
Q. I'm talking about how the rent is
20
MR. MALLET: Back on the record.
20
Q. (BY MR. MALLET) I think we've gone 21 split-up now. We all talk about that as being
21
22 over the profits of the mobile home park, how 22 your sister's parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel?
23
A. Correct.
23 they are split. I wanted to talk more about the
Q. But the partnership that owns it, you
24
24 rents.
25 actually are a limited partner in that
25
A. Okay.
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1
A. It could have come from Mom and Dad's
1 partnership; correct?
2 share.
2
A. Right.
3
Q. This is just something I wanted to ask
Q. And as part of your rights as a limited
3
4 partner, you receive what it looks like, an equal 4 you about. In 2004, it looks like -- and these
5 are still the Canyon Vista Family, Limited
5 share of rents to your brother and sister?
6
Partnership returns. It looks like the
6
A. Yes.
7 partnership showed some income from the rental of
7
Q. A lot of these old tax returns, I've
8 got 2001 here tabbed, for example, it shows the 8 the house. Do you see that?
A. I don't see it, but I know they did,
9 profit sharing as just under 33 percent. Now, do 9
10 yes.
1 0 you see that in this 2001 return?
Q. The house rental, it would be under 8,
11
A.
The
profit
sharing
-what
am
I
looking
11
12 line B.
1 2 at? This is Lazy J's?
A. Yes, right up here (indicating).
13
Q. No, this is the Canyon Vista Family,
13
Q. Yes.
14
14 Limited Partnership's tax return.
15
A. Uh-huh.
15
A. Okay.
Q. Now, the house is not part of the Lazy
16
Q. And it's a 2001 return. And this is
16
1 7 one for the limited partner named Linda Wills, 17 J Mobile Home Park, then?
18
A. No.
18 which is you; right?
Q. It's separate?
19
A. Right.
19
20
A. It's gone.
Q. And it shows that you have an equal
20
Q. We're talking back before it was gone?
21
21 share, 32.3 percent share in the limited
22
A. Yes. Yes. Okay.
2 2 partnership?
Q.
You, as the manager of the mobile home
23
23
A. Yes.
24
park,
did
you manage that house -Q. While that was true in 2001, was it
24
%+~t1e-f-we11?
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Q. -- or how did that work?
1
A. Yes.
2
A. Christie owned that house.
Q. Is it true as we sit here today?
Q. While Christie had prepared those
3
A. I believe so.
4 documents before, it looks like there is a 2004
Q. You had talked about your parents
5 tax form for the Canyon Vista Family, Limited
having what you believe is a small share. It
6 Partnership, and it looks like your distribution
looks like in 2001, J. C. Williams had a 1.55
7 that year would have been 18,868. Does that
percent share. Do you see where it says that?
8 sound accurate?
A. Yes.
A. That could be. I don't think they've
9
Q. And does that sound right?
10 changed anything, because I believe my own
A. Yes.
11 accountant.
Q. And I see one to your mother.
Q. Okay. I was going to say, unless
12
A. She would have been the same, uh-huh.
1 3 somebody lied to the IRS, that probably is
Q. And at some point, as far as you know,
14 correct; isn't it?
has your mother divested herself from -15
A. Yes.
A. She gifted it off.
Q. On the KLS & M parcel, does the KLS & M
16
Q. And we see some documents, tax
documents for that Canyon Vista Family, Limited 17 Family, Limited Partnership receive any rental
18 income?
Partnership in 2003. This one relates to you?
19
A. No.
A. Okay.
Q. So although some of the mobile homes
20
Q. And it shows you have a higher
21
are
wholly
or partly on that property, the rent
ownership now, it's 33.08 percent?
22 distribution doesn't go at all to that entity?
A. Yes.
23
A. Un-huh,
Q. And I assume that that higher
MR. COPPLE: Say no.
percentage would have been obtained through soma24
25
THE
WITNESS: No.
sort of gifting or inheritance?
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
1
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
1
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
)
Plaintiff,

1
1
1

CASE NO. CV 04-6336

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO BIFURCATE

VS.
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
)
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, )
INC.
1
Defendants.

COME NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J
Ranch, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record of the firm Davison, Coppie, Copple & Cox,
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 1

and hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to the PlaintifT's Motion to Bifurcate the trial
to resolve the issue of the larger parcel in this matter prior to the presentation of the issue of just
compensation.

I. INTRODUCTION
After nearly two and a half years since the filing of this condemnation action, the State
now contends tinat ihrough the discovery process and' recent exchange of pretrial motions that "it
has become clear that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the 'larger parcel' issue in
this case." PlaintiffS Brief in Support ofMotion, p. 2.
Not only is this representation to the Court misleading and false in reflecting the State's
understanding of this case and the other thee cases in which it now contends it desires to
consolidate into one larger parcel, but the State's own actions firther indicate that it made a
deliberate decision in separating the cases into four distinct parcels.
Since at least October of 2001, the State has been klly aware that the family members
intended to divide a 60 acre parcel into three distinct parcels for estate planning purposes.
Despite having this knowledge and three years afterwards, the State filed four separate
condemnation lawsuits against the properties, appraised each individual parcel as a separate
parcel of property and ultimately resolved three of the four parcels short of trial. Not once did
the State file with the Court that the three cases of State v. KLS&M (Case No. CV 04-6334, Fifth
Judicial District, Twill Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV 04-6335, Fifth
Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337,
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) constitute one larger parcel for purposes of
detennining just compensation. In each case, just compensation was settled for $380,000,
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$817,500 and $150,000, respectively. In each of those cases, the property owners were required
to disclose their opinions first and they always advocated each parcel was a separate and distinct
piece of property. The State, too, in assessing just compensation appraised and valued the
properties separately.
It is only now, after the State recognizes that this case is going to trial, that the State
attempts to utilize the settled three cases to mitigate the damages arising from the Pole Line Road
project to the subject property, the fourth and final parcel.
It is difficult to see how the State's efforts to inject this issue after taking inconsistent
positions previously in the three other cases can be anything other than bad faith and one must
question whether the intent of this motion is anything more than an attempt to delay the jury trial
which has been set for nearly two years.
Based upon the authority set forth herein, Defendants' respectfully request that this Court
enter its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate.

n. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. The Other Three Parcels Were Cpndemned Separate&
and Adiudicated and Should Not be Included in the Subiect Case.
Previously, Defendants provided the Court with authority in Defendants' Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence, Testimony and Argument regarding the Development of the subject
Property with Adjacent Properties that held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied when
the government attempted to introduce valuation evidence of other parcels, which had been
adjudicated previously, with the subject parcel of the snit. The Illinois court affirmed the trial
court's decision to exclude the proposed valuation evidence.
In Department of Transportation v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 707 N.E.2d 637 (1999),
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the Appellate Court of Illinois was faced with the issue of whether valuation evidence of other
parcels, which were condemned separately and adjudicated, should have be included with the
property at issue under the larger parcel concept. The Court rejected the Transportation
Department's arguments and explained its holding as follows:
A prior judgment may preclude a subsequent action under both res judicata and
collateral estoppel. (Citation omitted). The doctrine of res judicata provides that
a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties in that
case and constitutes an absolute bar to a later action involving the same claim.
(Citation omitted). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when a party
participates in two separate cases arising on different causes of actions, as here,
and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both cases
has already been adjudicated against that party in a prior case. (Citation omitted).
Housing Authority, (citation omitted), involved a dispute over the ownership of a
parcel of land. However, the court in that case found that the ownership of the
parcel had already been determined long ago in a 1932 federal condemnation case
The court in Housing Authority thus determined that the two cases were
substantially the same. (Citation omitted).
Here, the ownership and valuation of the other parcels has already been
adjudicated. As to the East Parcel, the circuit court in that case entered an order
on February 28,2989, that Marco Muscarello was the owner. The final judgment
order was entered in that case on June 19, 1997. The notice of appeal for the
instant case was filed on September 30, 1997, but no appeal was taken from the
final judgment in the East Parcel case. A just compensation award was paid to
Marco Muscarello, as trustee. (Citation omitted).
As to West Parcel I, the circuit COUI3 in that case entered final judgment order on
May 22, 1990, for a just compensation award to Gershon Hanllner as the owner of
the property. . . .
The remainder damages as to these parcels have already been determined and
awarded to the appropriate parties. IDOT cannot now argue that the remainder
damages of any of the parcels have decreased due to a subsequent acquisition to
these properties. The issue of who held title to the other parcels, as well as the
valuation of those parcels, was properly determined by the circuit courts as of the
date of filing of the complaints to condemn.
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Although there is no Idaho appellate case directly on point, Idaho courts have adopted and
applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel which is clearly applicable to situations and
circumstances now raised by the State. The Chicago Title court's application of collateral
estoppel is consistent with the elements of judicial estoppel adopted by the Idaho appellate
courts.
In Robertson Suppk Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,952 P.2d 914 (1998), the Idaho Court
of Appeals explained the judicial estoppel doctrine as follows:
The Idaho Supreme Court considered and adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel
in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87,277 P.2d 561 (1954). In Loomis, the Court
stated:
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such
sworn statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration
from one party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating such
allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations
or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against
another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter.

Id., 76 Idaho at 93-94,277 P.2d at 565. Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party
from assuming a position in one proceeding and then talcing an inconsistent
position in a subsequent proceeding. (Citation omitted). There are very important
policies underlying the judicial estoppel doctrine. One purpose of the doctrine is
to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly
administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings.
(Citation omitted). The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from playing
fast and loose with the courts. (Citation omitted).
Id., 131 Idaho at 101.
In Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,92 P.3d 492 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
reaffirmed the application ofjudicial estoppel.
The application ofjudicial esloppel is one of discretion. In McKay v. Owens, 130
Idaho 148, 152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997), the Court referred to the Risserto v.
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local, which applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel
and stated the doctrine and the policies behind it:
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Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine of
preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining
an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second
advantage by taking an incompatible position.
(Citation omitted). There are also important policies behind judicial estoppel. In
Risetto, the Ninth Circuit stated that:
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are
general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and
regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. . . Judicial estoppel is
intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and losses with
the courts. . . Because it is intended to protect the dignity of the
judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at
its discretion. (Citations omitted).

Id., 140 Idaho at 252.
Other Idaho cases which considered the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, include Smith v.

U.S.R.! l Properties, LLC, 141 Idaho 795, 118 P.3d 127 (2005) and A&JConstruction Co., Inc.
v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,116 P.3d 12 (2005).
The State attempts to disguise its motion to bifurcate as an issue of law on its face by
neglecting to advise this Court of its own voluntary actions in the other cases which now become
part of the issue raised before this Court. The State postures as if it has treated each individual
case on its own merits and that what transpired in the other cases is irrelevant in the instant case,
despite now attempting to raise the issue of the larger parcel in this case. The State is now trying
to back door Canyon Vista, by incorporating other parcels which may have constituted the larger
parcel, but the State elected to proceed in a different manner with them.
The State cites Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203 (1978) and State ex rel Flandro v. Seddon,
94 Idaho 940 (1 972) for the proposition that the larger parcel is a question of law to be resolved
by the court. In neither Rueth nor Flandro was the court faced with the issue of whether other
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properties which had been previously adjudicated could be incorporated into a larger parcel issue
on a pending case that had yet to be adjudicated. Even if the State's proposition that the larger
parcel is an issue of law is correct, which we do not disagree, it is remarkable that the issue can
now be heard after judgments have been entered on the other cases and the time for appeal in
those cases has expired and three weeks prior to the trial in this matter. This radical shift in
positions comes after significant time and expense has been spent preparing for trial and if
granted would substantially prejudice the Defendants.

B. If The Court Finds The Larger Parcel to Include Adiacent Pro~erties
Are the Judgments Previouslv Entered Void.
Assuming the Court decides that the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and/or
judicial estoppel do not apply and that the larger parcel in this case consists of one or more
adjacent parcels for purposes of just compensation in this case, the issue then becomes are the
judgments entered against the other properties void. The entire premise for seeking a larger
parcel ruling is the State's attempt to mitigate the damages incurred to Canyon Vista's property
as a result of the Pole Line Road project. The State's theory is that if the adjacent properties
which have direct access to Pole Line are included, then canyon Vista would then have
reasonable access to Pole Line Road, albeit not directly from its physical boundaries but way of
the larger parcel concept.
Defendants disagree and dispute that the State's proposed theory would render Canyon
Vista's property with reasonable access to Pole Line Road. However, what has not been
contemplated by the State is that if this were the case, do the damages the other adjacent
properties may incur to provide Canyon Vista's property with access which were never
contemplated in the judgments entered by the Court in those cases, open the door for Lazy J.
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Ranch, KLS&M andlor BCM&W to seek new damages.
The State cannot use the judgments previously entered against the adjacent properties as a
shield and then subsequently utilize those properties to cure the subject property under the cloak
of the judgmeilts without any further recourse by those owners. The State's proposed theory in
this case goes directly against the doctrines referenced herein that have been established since the
inception of the law. Finality would not exist in the condemnation world if government agencies
were permitted to use adjudicated cases to its advantage to cure other properties whose case is
pending.
Should the Court be inclined to allow for evidence which includes the adjacent properties
that have been adjudicated as part of the larger parcel, then Defendants request a ruling on the
new issue raised of whether the judgments previously entered by this Court no longer have the
effect of res judicata.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the case law and arguments provided herein, Defendants' respectfully request
the Court entered its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate and find that the State is
estopped from asserting an inconsistent position.
In the alternative, should the State's Motion to Bifurcate be granted, then Defendants'
respectfully request a ruling from this Court that the judgments previously entered in the three
other cases be set aside and the cases be set for trial.
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m
DATED this @day of May, 2007.

Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the foregoing was served upon the following:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129

of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
__ U.S. MAIL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TIHE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
)
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCI-IUGH )
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C.
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
1
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
)

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV 04-6336

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
BIFURCATE

1

VS.

1
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH,
INC.
Defendants.

)
)

1
1

COME NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Fanily Limited Partnership and Lazy J.
Ranch, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox,
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and hereby submit its objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate the trial on the grounds and for
the reasons that:
1)

Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case;

2)

The doctrine of res judicata applies to State v. KLS&M (Case No. CV 04-6334,
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV
04-6335, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J.

Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho)
on the larger parcel issue; and
3)

Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case.

This Objection is made and based on the records and files herein, and the authorities cited
in Defendants' Brief in Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate.

/S

DATED this -day of May, 2007.

.A

.

Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
foregoing was served upon the following:
Joseph Mallet
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129

J

U.S. MAIL
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
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